Section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act as the same deals with the limitations prescribed with regard to grant of bail to a person indicted in an offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act. The said Section reads as thus;
“37. Offences to be cognizable and non- bailable.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) –
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for [offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.]”
A perusal of the aforesaid section would go to show that Court while addressing the bail application of a person accused of the offences mention in Section 37(1)(b) of the N.D.P.S. Act, the Court must give an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to object the prayer for bail and if he objects, should not grant bail without recording the satisfaction that there are reasonable ground for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged and not likely to commit any offence if allowed to go on bail. Any offence has been held by the Apex Court to be an offence of similar nature. The aforesaid limitations are in addition to the limitations provided for grant of bail in the Cr.P.C. as well as in any other law.
In the case of Niranjan Singh and another vrs. Prabhakar Sajram Kharote and others, AIR 1980 SC 785, the Apex Court while dealing with the “law of bails” have held as follows;
“The law of bails, like any other branch of law, has its own philosophy, and occupies an important place in the administration of justice and the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict the liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime and the presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal. An accused is not detained in custody with the object of punishing him on the assumption of his guilt. The granting of bail in the case of a non-bailable offence is a concession allowed to an accused person. In the case of a bailable offence, bail can be obtained as of right under Sec. 436(1), Cr.P.C., subject to restrictions under Sec. 436(2).
While considering an application for bail, detailed discussion of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits is to be avoided. This requirement stems from the desirability that no party should have the impression that his case has been pre- judged. Existence of a prima-facie case is only to be considered. Elaborate analysis or exhaustive exploration of the merits is not required………….”
In the case of State of Maharashtra vrs. Anand Chaintaman Digha, AIR 1990 SC 625, the Apex Court have held that where the offence is of serious nature the question of grant of bail has to be decided keeping in view the nature and seriousness of the offence, character of the evidence and amongst others the larger interest of the public.
In the case of Prahalad Singh Bhati vrs. NCT, Delhi, (2001) 4 SCC 280, the Apex Court have held as follows;
“8……… While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviours, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or the State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words ‘reasonable ground for believing ‘instead of ‘the evidence’ which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”
With regard to grant of bail to accused-petitioner indicted for commission of offence as mandated in Section 37(1)(b) of the N.D.P.S. Act, the Apex Court in the case of Narcotics Control Bureau vrs. Dilip Pralhad Namade, (2004) S.C.C. 619, dealing with the provisions of Section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act at paragraphs-9, 10, 11 and 12 have held as follows;
“9. As observed by this Court in Union of India v. Thamisharasi clause (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 37 imposes limitations on granting of bail in addition to those provided under the Code. The two limitations are: (1) an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose the bail application, and (2) satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
The limitations on granting of bail come in only when the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions which really have relevance so far as the present respondent- accused is concerned, are:
(1) the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence, and
(2) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative and not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused being not guilty has to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. This nature of embargo seems to have been envisaged keeping in view the deleterious nature of the offence, necessities of public interest and the normal tendencies of the persons involved in such network to pursue their activities with greater vigour and make hay when at large. In the case at hand the High Court seeks to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 and transgressed the limitations statutorily imposed in allowing bail. It did not take note of the confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the Act.
