Category: MURDER

Sita Ram Vs. State of NCT of Delhi – 09/07/19

Sections 302 and 323 read with 34 of the I.P.C.- the occurrence was without premeditation and sudden fight between the parties started in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. The occurrence happened when deceased as his way back home questioned the accused as to his conduct of tapping electricity from the pole. He was not pre-armed and other accused were also not pre-armed. Though, deceased has sustained as many as nine injuries, except injury no(s).1 to 3 which are the injuries caused on the head and all other injuries are on the hand, shoulder, arms etc.

Considering the nature of the injuries sustained by deceased, it cannot be said that the accused and other accused have taken undue advantage of deceased in attacking him. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the conviction under Section 302 read with 34 I.P.C. deserves to be modified under Section 304 Part II I.P.C.

Ramesh Dasu Chauhan and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra-04/07/19

Evidence Act-There is no gainsaying that confession made to a police officer cannot be proved as against a person accused of any offence and no confession made by a person while in police custody except made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, can be proved against him in view of embargo created by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Section 27 of the Act nevertheless carves out an exception as it provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence while he is in police custody, “so much of such information”, regardless of it being a confession or not, may be proved, if it relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered.

Kamlakar Vs. State of Maharashtra-31/05/19

Section 302 & Section 147, 148 of Indian Penal Code- Supreme Court not interfered when having reappreciated the evidence to the extent it is required and a detailed perusal of the judgment passed by the Sessions Court as also the High Court would indicate that both the Courts have adverted to the evidence in detail and have ultimately arrived at the conclusion and when the concurrent judgment based upon the evidence have found the appellant to be guilty of the charge alleged against him in committing the murder and had convicted him under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Kalicharan & Ors-31/05/19

Section 302/149 of the IPC & Section 304 Part II of the IPC- it was a case of free fight,  the weapon used by the accused was Farsa and he caused the injury on the vital part of the body i.e. head which proved to be fatal and again the evidence on record, more particularly, the medical evidence and the manner in which the incident took place, the accused should have been held guilty for the offence under Section 304 Part I and not 304 Part II of the IPC.

Ashoksinh Jayendrasinh Vs. State of Gujarat – 07/05/19

Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC- Life imprisonment converted into acquittal by giving benefit of doubt-Supreme Court would be slow to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. In an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with unless shown to be perverse (vide Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 11 SCC 141). Where the appreciation of evidence is erroneous, the Supreme Court would certainly appreciate the evidence.

Govind Singh Vs. State of Chhattisgarh

Murder-The entire occurrence was in a spur of the moment. There was a quarrel between the father and daughter as to where the bulb is to be put on. In the sudden quarrel and in the spur of the moment, the appellant threw the chimney lamp on his daughter. The occurrence was sudden and there was no premeditation. The chimney lamp was burning there which the appellant had picked up and thrown on the deceased. Since the occurrence was in a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation, the act of the accused would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300.

Mani Vs. State of Kerala and Others-1/4/2019

Offence of Murder – In view of sudden fight without any premeditation, the conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 302 is not made out. The cause of death of the deceased is knife blow on the chest of the deceased-Soman. Such injury is with the knowledge that such injury is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death. Thus, the death of Soman is a culpable homicide not amounting to murder as the death has occurred in heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel falling within Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC. Therefore, it is an offence punishable under Section 304 Part I, IPC.

Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object u/s 141 I.P.C

CRIMINAL – Section 302 read with Section 149 – the FIR was registered on 12.08.1989 but was forwarded to the Magistrate only on 16.08.1989, after a delay of 4 days, becomes significant in light of the inconsistencies in the story of the prosecution with respect to the appellant. It appears that the appellant was roped in as an accused, due to the inimical relationship between the parties which clearly emanates from the record. [ MARCH 29 2019 ]

In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus and `murder’ its species.

All `murder’ is `culpable homicide’ but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, `culpable homicide’ sans ‘special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, `culpable homicide of the first degree’. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as `murder’.

Whether facts of last seen together by itself lead to inference that the accused committed the murder

The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. There may be cases where on account of close proximity of place and time between the event of the accused having been last seen with the deceased and the factum of death a rational mind may be persuaded to reach an irresistible conclusion that either the accused should explain how and in what circumstances the victim suffered the death or should own the liability for the homicide. In the present case there is no such proximity of time and place