British pussed US in 1952 for ousting Iranian PM Mosaddegh

Iran Coup History: Declassified U.S. Papers Show British Role in 1952 Plot

1953 Iran Coup

Freshly declassified State Department documents show that the British Foreign Office approached the Truman administration several times in late 1952 to propose a coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. Two newly released memoranda, previously marked Top Secret, describe a chain of discussions beginning in October 1952 in which British officials tried to secure U.S. support for Mosaddeq’s removal. While Britain has never released any records directly confirming its role in the coup that ultimately took place in August 1953—and has long pressed Washington not to release its own evidence—there has long been ample indication of deep British involvement. A leaked 1954 CIA after-action report and memoirs by participants have repeatedly pointed in that direction. What is new about today’s material is that it offers the most explicit officially declassified confirmation yet produced by any government.

These two records had originally been slated for inclusion in the State Department’s massive 2017 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volume on the coup period, a 1,007-page collection of declassified State, CIA, and National Security Council documents. Although the volume listed both memos by title and date, it withheld their contents entirely. The first memo, dated November 26, 1952, titled “Proposal to Organize a Coup d’etat in Iran,” was written by Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade to Deputy Under Secretary H. Freeman Matthews. Byroade reports that Britain’s Minister in Washington, Sir Christopher Steel, has requested a meeting to discuss a possible coup and notes that the British Embassy had already raised the idea on October 8. Although Byroade was largely skeptical of the proposal, he still recommended that Matthews hear Steel out. The second memo, dated December 3 and similarly titled, records the subsequent State Department meeting with Steel. Others present included senior officials from both governments, among them Paul Nitze, head of Policy Planning.

After the FRUS volume appeared, the authors of today’s posting filed Mandatory Declassification Review requests for the two memos. The FRUS edition was itself conceived in the early 1990s to supplement an earlier volume that had intentionally omitted discussion of the American-British roles in the coup on political and intelligence grounds. Although the 2017 volume contains substantial detail on U.S. planning and execution, it almost entirely omits the British role—widely believed to reflect London’s insistence on secrecy. Numerous other withheld records, still under MDR appeal, presumably contain further evidence of British activities.

NARA responded quickly and positively to the MDR requests, but even before the formal replies arrived, Tulane University professor Mark Gasiorowski located the original documents during a research visit to NARA in July 2017. The November 26 memo shows a declassification marking from May 17, 2017, just weeks before the FRUS volume was released. A prior stamp from 1999 downgraded it to Secret but required that full declassification await CIA concurrence or the year 2025. The December 3 memo carries a similar 1999 notation but adds that release would have to follow disclosure by the British government or else wait until 2025. This implies that U.S. records were, at least originally, treated as subject to British approval—a striking indication of London’s influence. Whether Britain was in fact consulted about the 2017 release is unknown.

The documents matter for several reasons. They provide the first officially released evidence that Britain explicitly sought U.S. support for Mosaddeq’s ouster in late 1952. They also show how British officials assessed Iran’s political situation and why they believed a coup was needed. At the meeting recorded in the December memo, Steel outlined three possible paths for Iran: Mosaddeq might remain in office and move against the Communist Tudeh party; he might be replaced by someone willing to do so; or, failing either outcome, Communists would gradually gain control. Steel doubted Mosaddeq’s willingness to confront the Tudeh but claimed the British government had not yet decided on concrete action. His stated aim was simply to introduce the idea and urge joint consideration.

This carefully restrained tone reflects a British effort to present their case in terms most likely to resonate with Washington. Britain’s overriding aim was to regain its position in Iran’s oil industry, lost when Mosaddeq nationalized it in 1951 and expelled British personnel soon after. But the Truman administration refused to take radical action on behalf of British colonial interests, fearing such steps would strengthen Soviet influence in Iran. Washington was already supporting an economic boycott, but Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson remained convinced that working with Mosaddeq offered the best chance of avoiding instability.

The November 26 memo confirms that the administration was still preparing to support Mosaddeq if Britain failed to compromise on an oil settlement. As Byroade observed, openly aiding Mosaddeq while secretly planning his overthrow would have been impossible. He also speculated that Britain might be raising the coup idea partly to block potential unilateral U.S. assistance to the prime minister. Depending on the U.S. response, London might become either less flexible or more inclined to reach an agreement.

During the December meeting, Matthews made clear that Washington was not embracing the coup idea but was not rejecting it outright. He also halted any further contacts between CIA officers and British intelligence on the matter. Steel acknowledged that Truman was about to leave office but pressed the point that a decision would be needed by January since spring would be the optimal time for a coup.

Several details in the memos offer fresh insights. John Jernegan noted that U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson believed Mosaddeq was genuinely anti-communist and would deal more firmly with the Tudeh if he secured an oil settlement or stronger financial footing—a view that contrasts with later depictions of Henderson as deeply hostile to Mosaddeq. Another striking detail is Paul Nitze’s suggestion that the Iranian group the British hoped to use might first test its abilities by targeting Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani along with the Tudeh. The idea was unanimously rejected.

Together, the memos shed new light on American and British thinking during the Iran crisis and highlight the complex blend of cooperation, distrust, and conflicting priorities that shaped the path to the 1953 coup.

01-State-Department-Memorandum-of-Conversation
Document 01

State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, Byroade to Matthews, “Proposal to Organize a Coup d’etat in Iran,” Top Secret, November 26, 1952
Nov 26, 1952
Source
NARA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1950-54 Central Decimal File, File: 788.00/11-2652

Henry Byroade provides his superior, H. Freeman Matthews with a moderately lengthy memo on Great Britain’s desire to promote a coup against the Mosaddeq government. He notes that the idea first came up in a paper the British presented to the Americans on October 8, 1952. Since then, three meetings had been held but the conclusion was that the prospects were not hopeful. The lack of a viable substitute for Mosaddeq and the risk of a Tudeh counter-action were among the reasons. Another very interesting argument is the fact that the U.S. at the time has plans to try to prop up Mosaddeq in some way in the event the British continue to be unsupportive of an oil deal. This is a new piece of evidence on the open question of whether the U.S. government genuinely sided with the Iranian prime minister against their principal ally, or simply paid lip service to the idea. Byroade offers a list of his own doubts about the coup proposal but still recommends that Matthews meet with British Minister Sir Christopher Steel to hear him out.

Document 02

State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, “British Proposal to Organize a Coup d’etat in Iran,” Top Secret, December 3, 1952
Dec 3, 1952

Source: NARA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1950-54 Central Decimal File, File: 788.00/12-352

H. Freeman Matthews, Paul Nitze and John Jernegan represent the State Department at this meeting with senior British Embassy representatives in Washington. This is the meeting Henry Byroade mentioned in the above memo to Matthews. According to this record, the Americans are skeptical about the prospects for a successful coup and are further disinclined because the Truman administration will shortly be replaced and therefore is even less in a position to act on an issue of this kind. The British purport to be unconvinced themselves about the idea, yet they pointedly note that they will probably need an American decision within a few weeks because they would prefer to carry out the operation in Spring. Subtlety in the wake of months of exhortations to the U.S. government seems to have been the British modus operandi at this stage.