M. Thanigivelu & Ors. v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Ors., 2026 INSC 229.

M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 INSC 229

Citation: 2026 INSC 229
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Rajesh Bindal and Vijay Bishnoi, JJ.
Date of Judgment: March 11, 2026

Facts:
The dispute revolved around the inter-se seniority of Assistant Engineers (Electrical) in the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (the Board) recruited from two sources: direct recruits and internally selected candidates (promotees). The direct recruits were selected and appointed in December 2000 and March 2001. Their appointment letters stipulated a two-year training period. The internally selected candidates were promoted in May 2002. Their selection was delayed partly due to their own challenge to the introduction of a written examination for internal candidates, which was stayed by the High Court.

In 2002, the Board issued BP No. 9, reducing the training period for the direct recruits from two years to three months, effective from the date of issuance. The internal candidates challenged this, arguing it would unfairly affect their seniority vis-à-vis the direct recruits. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed their petition, holding that direct recruits were entitled to seniority from their initial appointment date. However, the Division Bench reversed this, holding that BP No. 9 could not be applied retrospectively and that the direct recruits’ probation (and thus their seniority) could only be counted from the date of BP No. 9 (23.04.2002). This effectively placed both sets of recruits in the same year (2002) and directed a redrawn seniority list. The direct recruits and the Board appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the seniority of directly recruited Assistant Engineers should be reckoned from the date of their initial appointment (including the training period) or from the date they commenced their probation after the reduction of the training period by BP No. 9.

Held:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Division Bench’s judgment. The Court held that the seniority of the direct recruits must be counted from the date of their initial appointment in 2000 and 2001. The training period, regardless of its duration, forms part of their service, and any subsequent administrative order (BP No. 9) reducing the training period does not alter the date of appointment for the purpose of seniority.

Analysis

The Supreme Court’s judgment is a classic example of how statutory rules and regulations prevail over administrative instructions and executive orders. The Court rejected the High Court’s reliance on the Board Proceedings (BPs) and anchored its decision firmly in the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations, 1967.

Key Analytical Points from the Judgment:

1. Primacy of Statutory Regulations: The Court held that the confusion created by various Board Proceedings (BPs) should not cloud the core issue. The complete answer to the problem lies in the Service Regulations, which have statutory force. BPs, being administrative in nature, cannot override the clear provisions of the Regulations. [Para 20, 24]
2. Definition of “Duty” and “Appointment” under the Regulations: The Court interpreted Regulations 10(9), 87, and 97 harmoniously.
   • Regulation 10(9) defines “duty” to include performing the duties of a post or undergoing the probation, instruction, or training prescribed for the post. This means a person undergoing training is considered to be on duty. [Para 21]
   • Regulation 87(1) states that a person is “appointed to a class of service” when he discharges the duties of a post for the first time or commences the probation, instruction, or training prescribed therefor. Therefore, the date of joining for training is the date of appointment. [Para 22]
3. Seniority is Determined by Rank, Not by Start of Probation: The Court clarified that Regulation 97 deals with seniority. It states that seniority is determined by the rank obtained by the candidate in the list of approved candidates. The proviso regarding the “date of commencement of his probation” is only to fix the starting point for the probation period itself, which is the date he joins duty. This proviso does not mean that seniority is counted from the date probation begins. The regulation does not support the argument that seniority flows from the commencement of probation. [Para 22.1, 22.2]
4. Training is Part of Service: The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the training period should be excluded for seniority purposes. Once a person joins and is sent for training, he is in the service of the Board. The fact that he receives a consolidated stipend during training and a regular scale after probation does not alter his status as an employee from the date of joining. [Para 22.3, 25]
5. BP No. 9 is Irrelevant for Seniority: The Court held that BP No. 9, which reduced the training period, had no bearing on the determination of seniority. It was an order concerning the duration of training and emoluments, not seniority. The internal candidates’ challenge to it was based on a “self-imagination” that it would affect seniority. The High Court erred in making this BP the centerpiece of its decision. [Para 23]
6. Proviso to Regulation 97 is Inapplicable: The proviso, which deals with inter-se seniority of recruits from two sources in the same calendar year, was held inapplicable because the direct recruits were appointed in 2000-01 and the internal candidates in 2002. They were not recruited in the same calendar year. [Para 22.3]

Law Points

1. Statutory Rules Override Administrative Instructions: In matters of service, including seniority, the provisions of the governing statutory rules and regulations (like the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations) are paramount and will prevail over administrative orders or Board Proceedings that are contrary to them. [Para 20, 24]
2. Training Constitutes Service: As per standard service jurisprudence, where the service rules define “duty” or “appointment” to include undergoing training, the period of training is to be counted as part of an employee’s continuous service from the date of joining. A person is considered to have been appointed from the date he joins and commences the prescribed training. [Para 21, 22]
3. Seniority Flows from Date of Appointment/Joining, Not from Start of Probation: Seniority is generally determined from the date a person is appointed to the service, which is often the date of joining duty. The commencement of probation is a subsequent stage in the service career and does not reset or determine the seniority date, unless the rules explicitly state otherwise. The rank/merit list usually determines the order of seniority within a batch. [Para 22.1, 22.2]
4. Irrelevance of Training Period Changes to Seniority: An administrative order altering the duration of the training period for a batch of employees does not, by itself, affect their date of appointment or their inter-se seniority vis-à-vis employees from other batches or sources. Such orders pertain to service conditions (like emoluments during training), not to the fundamental date of entry into service. [Para 23]
5. Effect of Litigation by One Party on Seniority: If a party’s own litigation (e.g., challenging a selection process) delays their appointment, they cannot later claim that the delay should disadvantage others who were appointed earlier and have been serving since then. The principle of “relation back” does not apply to prejudice the rights of those who joined earlier and have been working. [Para 10]
6. Specific Relief Not Relevant: The judgment in Govt. of A.P. v. P. Bhaskar (2008) , cited by the direct recruits, stands for the proposition that seniority cannot be counted from a date before the candidate’s birth or entry into the cadre. This principle supports the view that a person’s seniority cannot be ante-dated to a period when they were not in service. [Para 11] (Note: P. Bhaskar was cited in argument, but the principle is consistent with the judgment’s outcome).