VOLUME 23: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT – INSPECTIONS, PENALTIES, HEARINGS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
Introduction to Volume 23
The Administrative Procedure Act tells agencies how to make rules and adjudicate cases. But the APA does not tell agencies how to find violations. It does not tell them what to do when they find one. The tools of enforcement come from other statutes: the agency’s organic act, the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and a patchwork of whistleblower laws.
Most agency enforcement is civil, not criminal. The EPA issues a fine. OSHA issues a citation. The SEC imposes a penalty. No one goes to jail. But the same agency that investigates also prosecutes and adjudicates. The same agency that writes the rule also enforces it. That combination of functions is the target of persistent criticism. A single agency acts as legislator, prosecutor, judge, and jury.
The Constitution permits this. The Court has upheld the combination of functions as long as the agency provides a fair hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. But the Court has also imposed limits. The Fourth Amendment restricts administrative searches. The Due Process Clause requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Excessive Fines Clause limits the size of civil penalties. And the whistleblower statutes protect employees who report misconduct from retaliation.
This volume covers the enforcement process from beginning to end. Part One covers how agencies find violations: inspections, administrative subpoenas, and the Fourth Amendment limits on both. Part Two covers what agencies do when they find a violation: civil penalties, the factors that go into setting the amount, and the constitutional limits. Part Three covers what happens when the accused fights back: administrative hearings, the role of the administrative law judge, and the due process requirements. Part Four covers the special case of whistleblowers: federal employees who report misconduct and the laws that protect them from retaliation.
The law in this area is not neat. Different agencies operate under different statutes. The procedural protections vary. The cases turn on the specific facts of the inspection, the specific penalty, and the specific hearing. But the underlying principles are consistent. The agency must act reasonably. The agency must be fair. The agency cannot punish a person without giving that person a chance to be heard.
PART ONE: INSPECTIONS
Chapter 1: Administrative Searches Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches. Administrative inspections are searches. The government cannot inspect your factory, your office, or your home without complying with the Fourth Amendment.
But the rules for administrative searches are not the same as the rules for criminal searches. The criminal standard requires probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. The administrative standard is lower. The government may inspect simply because the inspection is part of a reasonable program to enforce the law.
The shift began with Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) . A tenant in San Francisco refused to let a housing inspector into his apartment. The inspector did not have a warrant. The city prosecuted the tenant for refusing entry. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Fourth Amendment applies to administrative inspections. The tenant had a right to insist on a warrant.
But the warrant does not need probable cause of a violation. A warrant may issue if the inspection is part of a “reasonable legislative or administrative program.” The city must show that the area has been selected for inspection under a neutral plan. It need not show that this particular apartment is in violation.
In See v. City of Seattle (1967) , decided the same day as Camara, the Court applied the same rule to commercial property. The owner of a commercial warehouse refused to let a fire inspector inside. The Court held that the owner had a right to a warrant. Commercial property is not entitled to less Fourth Amendment protection than residential property.
But the Court recognized an exception. The warrant requirement does not apply to “pervasively regulated” industries. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States (1970) , the Court upheld a warrantless inspection of a liquor licensee. The liquor industry has been closely regulated for centuries. The licensee accepts inspection as a condition of doing business.
In United States v. Biswell (1972) , the Court extended the exception to firearms dealers. The Gun Control Act of 1968 gave inspectors the right to enter and inspect the premises of any firearms dealer. The dealer knew about the law when he got his license. He could not complain about the inspection.
The scope of the exception was tested in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. (1978) . OSHA inspectors wanted to inspect the workplace of an electrical and plumbing contractor. The contractor refused entry. The inspectors did not have a warrant. The Court held that the exception did not apply. General industry is not pervasively regulated. The contractor did not consent to warrantless inspections when he went into business.
The Court in Barlow’s did not say that OSHA could never inspect. It said OSHA must get a warrant. The warrant may issue based on a showing that the workplace was chosen for inspection under a reasonable administrative plan. It need not be based on probable cause of a violation.
Chapter 2: The Closely Regulated Business Exception
The most permissive standard applies to businesses that are “closely regulated.” In New York v. Burger (1987) , the Court upheld a warrantless inspection of a junkyard. New York law required junkyards to maintain records of the vehicles they processed. The law gave inspectors the right to inspect the junkyard during business hours. The Court held that the junkyard had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Court set out a three-part test:
- The regulatory scheme must be “comprehensive and defined.” The statute must give clear notice of what is required.
- The regulation must advance a “substantial government interest.”
- The inspection must be a “constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.” The statute must limit the discretion of the inspector. It must specify the time, place, and scope of the inspection.
The junkyard statute passed the test. New York had a substantial interest in preventing automobile theft. The inspection was limited to business hours. The inspector could look only at the parts of the junkyard that were used for vehicle storage.
Lower courts have applied the Burger test to other industries. Mining is closely regulated. Donovan v. Dewey (1981) . Commercial fishing is closely regulated. United States v. Raub (9th Cir. 1982) . Medical marijuana dispensaries? The courts are split.
Chapter 3: Administrative Subpoenas
Agencies do not need a warrant to demand documents. They can issue a subpoena. An administrative subpoena is a written demand for information. It may require the production of documents. It may require the person to testify.
The Fourth Amendment applies to administrative subpoenas. But the standard is low. The agency must show:
- The subpoena is within the agency’s statutory authority.
- The request is not too indefinite.
- The information sought is relevant to the agency’s inquiry.
In United States v. Morton Salt Co. (1950) , the FTC issued a subpoena to a salt company. The company refused to comply. The Court enforced the subpoena. The FTC did not need to show probable cause. It was enough that the inquiry was within the FTC’s authority and the subpoena was not “arbitrary” or “unreasonable.”
The agency may enforce the subpoena through the courts. If the person refuses to comply, the agency may ask the district court for an order compelling compliance. The court will enforce the subpoena unless it is unreasonable. The person may challenge the subpoena on the ground that it is too broad or that the agency lacks authority. The person may not challenge the subpoena on the ground that the agency is wrong on the merits.
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (1946) , the Court held that the agency need not show probable cause to believe a violation has occurred. The agency may investigate “merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.” The investigation may be “fishing” in the sense of looking for evidence, as long as the agency is not “harassing.”
Chapter 4: The Emergency Exception
No warrant is required when there is an emergency. The agency may enter without a warrant to address an imminent threat to public health or safety.
In Michigan v. Tyler (1978) , a fire broke out in a furniture store. Firefighters extinguished the fire. Fire officials returned to the building later that night to investigate the cause. They did not have a warrant. The Court held that the warrantless entry was justified by the emergency. The fire was a danger to the community. The officials were looking for the cause of the fire to prevent future fires.
But the Court drew a line. Once the emergency passed, the officials needed a warrant. The fire was out. The building was secure. The officials were looking for evidence of a crime, not responding to an immediate threat. That required a warrant.
In City of Los Angeles v. Patel (2015) , the Court struck down a Los Angeles ordinance that allowed police to inspect hotel registries without a warrant. The city argued that the ordinance was a regulatory measure to prevent crime. The Court held that the hotel owners had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their guest registries. The city could not use an administrative scheme to avoid the warrant requirement.
Chapter 5: The Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Proceedings
The exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The rule applies in criminal trials. Does it apply in administrative proceedings?
Yes, but not as broadly. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. The deterrence rationale is weaker in administrative proceedings. The administrative proceeding is civil, not criminal. The agency is not the police.
In INS v. Lopez‑Mendoza (1984) , the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings. The Court weighed the social cost of excluding evidence against the benefit of deterrence. The social cost was high. Deportation proceedings are administrative. The government has a strong interest in removing illegal aliens. The benefit of deterrence was low. The INS agents were not police. They were civil immigration officers.
Lower courts have applied Lopez‑Mendoza to other administrative proceedings. The IRS may use evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in a tax audit. The SEC may use evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in a securities enforcement action. The agency is not the police. The proceeding is civil. The exclusionary rule does not apply.
But the rule has limits. If the agency’s conduct was “egregious,” the court may exclude the evidence. If the agency acted in bad faith, the court may exclude the evidence. The agency is not free to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity. The agency may be subject to a civil rights suit under Bivens or § 1983.
PART TWO: ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES
Chapter 6: Civil Penalties vs. Criminal Penalties
Agencies can impose civil penalties. They cannot impose criminal penalties. Only a court can impose a criminal penalty. The distinction matters because criminal penalties trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self‑incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Civil penalties do not.
The line between civil and criminal penalties is not always clear. In Hudson v. United States (1997) , the Court held that a civil penalty is criminal if:
- The statute labels the penalty as criminal.
- The penalty is so severe that it can only be explained as punishment.
- The statute requires proof of a criminal state of mind (intent or knowledge).
Most administrative penalties are civil. The agency may impose them without a jury trial. The agency may impose them without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The agency may impose them on a person who asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege. The person cannot refuse to testify on the ground that the testimony might lead to a civil penalty.
Chapter 7: The Statutory Framework for Civil Penalties
Each agency’s organic statute sets the maximum civil penalty. The Clean Air Act allows penalties of up to $25,000 per day per violation. The Clean Water Act allows penalties of up to $25,000 per day per violation. The Occupational Safety and Health Act allows penalties of up to $13,653 per serious violation.
The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act requires agencies to adjust their penalties for inflation every year. The adjustments are automatic. The agency does not need to change its regulations. The adjusted penalty applies to violations that occur after the adjustment date.
The agency has discretion to set the penalty below the maximum. The agency must consider:
- The nature and seriousness of the violation.
- The violator’s ability to pay.
- The violator’s prior history.
- The need for deterrence.
In Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (1991) , the Court held that the Secretary of Labor has the authority to set civil penalties without a hearing. The employer may challenge the penalty before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission may reduce the penalty if the employer shows that the penalty is excessive.
Chapter 8: The Excessive Fines Clause
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “excessive fines.” The Clause applies to civil penalties imposed by agencies. Austin v. United States (1993) .
The test for excessiveness comes from United States v. Bajakajian (1998) . A fine is excessive if it is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense.”
In Bajakajian, the defendant tried to leave the country with $357,144 in currency. He did not declare the currency, as required by law. The government sought to forfeit the entire amount. The Court held that the forfeiture was excessive. The offense was a reporting violation. The defendant was not accused of tax evasion or drug trafficking. The forfeiture was grossly disproportional.
Lower courts have applied Bajakajian to administrative penalties. In United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon (9th Cir. 1989) , the government seized a fishing boat and its catch for a regulatory violation. The Ninth Circuit held that the forfeiture was excessive. The value of the boat and the catch was far greater than the maximum fine for the violation.
But the Bajakajian test is deferential. The agency wins unless the penalty is “grossly” disproportionate. A 10‑to‑1 ratio may be acceptable. A 100‑to‑1 ratio may not.
Chapter 9: Penalties for Violations of Agency Orders
An agency may issue an order directing a person to take specific action. The order may require the person to stop a particular practice, to pay a fine, or to take corrective action. If the person fails to comply, the agency may impose an additional penalty for violation of the order.
In ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (1987) , the ICC issued a cease‑and‑desist order against a railroad. The railroad continued the prohibited practice. The ICC imposed a penalty. The Court upheld the penalty. The order was clear. The railroad knew what it was required to do. The penalty was reasonable.
The agency must provide notice of the order. The person must have an opportunity to comply. The agency may not impose a penalty for conduct that occurred before the order was issued. The penalty is for violating the order, not for violating the underlying statute.
Chapter 10: Criminal Penalties for Regulatory Violations
Some regulatory violations are criminal. The Clean Water Act makes it a crime to knowingly discharge a pollutant without a permit. The Occupational Safety and Health Act makes it a crime to willfully violate a standard that causes the death of an employee.
The agency does not prosecute criminal violations. The agency refers the case to the Department of Justice. A federal prosecutor decides whether to bring charges. The defendant has the right to a jury trial. The government must prove the violation beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant has the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, and the privilege against self‑incrimination.
The same conduct may be subject to both a civil penalty and a criminal penalty. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar both. United States v. Ursery (1996) . A person who pays a civil penalty may still be prosecuted criminally for the same conduct. The civil penalty is not punishment. It is a regulatory sanction.
PART THREE: ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Chapter 11: The Right to a Hearing
The Due Process Clause requires a hearing before the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. The hearing must be “appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) .
The Mathews test balances three factors:
- The private interest affected by the agency action.
- The risk of erroneous deprivation under the current procedures.
- The government’s interest in efficiency and economy.
The private interest is the most important factor. A person facing a large fine has a greater interest in a hearing than a person facing a small fine. A person facing loss of a professional license has a greater interest than a person facing a paperwork penalty.
In Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) , the Court held that a welfare recipient was entitled to a hearing before the government terminated his benefits. The private interest was the need for food, shelter, and medical care. The risk of error was high under the existing procedures. The government’s interest in efficiency did not outweigh the recipient’s need.
In Mathews itself, the Court held that a disability recipient was not entitled to a hearing before the government terminated his benefits. The private interest was less urgent. The recipient could still receive other forms of assistance. The government’s interest in efficiency was greater. The cost of a hearing for every termination would be enormous.
The Mathews test applies to administrative hearings as well as court hearings. The agency must provide the level of process that the test requires.
Chapter 12: The Right to an Impartial Decisionmaker
The Due Process Clause requires a neutral and impartial decisionmaker. The decisionmaker must not have a pecuniary interest in the outcome. The decisionmaker must not have been involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case.
The APA codifies this requirement. Section 554(d) prohibits the same person from serving as investigator and adjudicator. The agency must separate its prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. An employee who participates in the investigation may not participate in the adjudication. An employee who advises the agency on the merits may not participate in the hearing.
But the separation of functions does not apply to the agency heads. The commissioners may consult with staff and decide the case, even if the staff participated in the investigation. Withrow v. Larkin (1975) . The risk of bias is less at the top level. The commissioners are insulated from the day‑to‑day work of the investigators.
In Gibson v. Berryhill (1973) , the Court held that a medical board composed of competing optometrists was not impartial. The board was investigating a fellow optometrist. The board members had a financial interest in the outcome. The Court held that the board was not neutral.
Chapter 13: The Right to Present Evidence
A person who is entitled to a hearing has the right to present evidence. The person may call witnesses. The person may cross‑examine the agency’s witnesses. The hearing must be on the record. The agency’s decision must be based on the evidence presented.
The APA provides that the presiding officer may admit evidence that is “relevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious.” 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply. Hearsay is admissible. The presiding officer may consider the “totality of the circumstances.”
The agency may limit the scope of the hearing. The agency may exclude evidence that is irrelevant or cumulative. The agency may also exclude evidence that is privileged. The attorney‑client privilege applies. The work product doctrine applies. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self‑incrimination applies, but only if the proceeding is criminal or quasi‑criminal.
In United States v. Ward (1980) , the Court held that a person could not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil penalty proceeding. The penalty was civil, not criminal. The person had to testify or face sanctions.
Chapter 14: The Role of the Administrative Law Judge
The hearing is presided over by an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ is independent. The ALJ is not supervised by the agency’s enforcement staff. The ALJ may be removed only for good cause, as determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board. 5 U.S.C. § 7521.
The ALJ has the power to:
- Administer oaths and affirmations.
- Issue subpoenas.
- Rule on offers of proof and receive evidence.
- Take depositions.
- Regulate the course of the hearing.
- Issue an initial decision.
The ALJ issues an initial decision. The initial decision includes findings of fact and conclusions of law. The initial decision becomes the final decision of the agency unless the agency reviews it.
The agency may review the initial decision. The agency may adopt it, modify it, or reverse it. The agency may substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s. The agency is not bound by the ALJ’s credibility determinations, but the agency must give them due weight.
In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB (1951) , the Court held that the agency must consider the ALJ’s findings. The agency may reject them, but it must explain why. The agency cannot simply ignore the ALJ’s credibility determinations.
Chapter 15: The Record Rule
The agency’s decision must be based on the record. The record includes:
- The pleadings.
- The evidence presented at the hearing.
- The rulings of the ALJ.
- The initial decision and any exceptions.
- The briefs.
The court reviews the agency’s decision based on the record. The court may not consider evidence that was not before the agency. Camp v. Pitts (1973) . If the agency’s explanation is inadequate, the court must remand for further proceedings.
PART FOUR: WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
Chapter 16: The Whistleblower Protection Act
The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA) protects federal employees who report misconduct. The WPA provides that a federal agency may not take a “personnel action” against an employee because the employee disclosed:
- A violation of law, rule, or regulation.
- Gross mismanagement.
- A gross waste of funds.
- An abuse of authority.
- A substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). A “personnel action” includes firing, demoting, suspending, denying a promotion, or transferring the employee. The employee must have a reasonable belief that the disclosure is true. The employee need not be correct. The employee must have made the disclosure to a person who is not involved in the wrongdoing.
The WPA does not protect disclosures that are specifically prohibited by law. It does not protect disclosures that are required to be kept secret in the interest of national defense. It does not protect disclosures that are made with the knowledge that they are false.
Chapter 17: The Merit Systems Protection Board
The WPA is enforced by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The MSPB is an independent agency. It hears appeals from federal employees who claim retaliation.
The employee must first file a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). The OSC investigates the complaint. If the OSC finds that retaliation occurred, the OSC may seek corrective action from the MSPB. If the OSC does not act, the employee may appeal directly to the MSPB.
The MSPB holds a hearing. The employee has the right to present evidence and cross‑examine witnesses. The MSPB may order:
- Reinstatement to the same or equivalent position.
- Back pay with interest.
- Attorney fees.
- Compensatory damages (up to $300,000).
The MSPB’s decision may be appealed to the Federal Circuit.
Chapter 18: The Burden of Proof
The whistleblower has the burden of proving that the protected activity was a contributing factor to the adverse action. The whistleblower must show that the disclosure was a “substantial factor” in the agency’s decision.
The burden then shifts to the agency. The agency must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected activity. Allen v. Department of Defense (MSPB 2008) . The agency must show that the adverse action was justified by the employee’s performance, conduct, or other legitimate factors.
The clear and convincing standard is higher than the preponderance standard. It requires the agency to show that the truth of its defense is “highly probable.”
Chapter 19: Private Sector Whistleblowers
Several federal statutes protect private sector whistleblowers.
The Sarbanes‑Oxley Act of 2002 protects employees of public companies who report securities fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. The employee must show that the employer took an adverse action because the employee engaged in protected activity. The employee files a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). OSHA investigates. If OSHA finds a violation, OSHA may order reinstatement, back pay, and compensatory damages.
The Consumer Financial Protection Act protects employees who report violations of consumer financial laws. 12 U.S.C. § 5567. The CFPA covers banks, credit unions, mortgage lenders, and other financial institutions. The employee files a complaint with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The Bureau investigates. The Bureau may order reinstatement, back pay, and punitive damages.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act protects employees who report workplace safety violations. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c). The employee files a complaint with OSHA. OSHA investigates. If OSHA finds a violation, OSHA may order reinstatement and back pay.
The surface transportation laws protect railroad and airline employees who report safety violations. 49 U.S.C. § 20109 (railroads); 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (airlines). The employee files a complaint with the Department of Labor. The Department investigates. The Department may order reinstatement, back pay, and compensatory damages.
Chapter 20: Remedies
A whistleblower who prevails may receive:
- Reinstatement to the same or equivalent position.
- Back pay with interest.
- Compensatory damages for emotional distress.
- Attorney fees and costs.
- Punitive damages (under some statutes).
The WPA does not authorize punitive damages. The Sarbanes‑Oxley Act does not authorize punitive damages. The Consumer Financial Protection Act does. The surface transportation laws do not.
Compensatory damages are available for emotional distress. The whistleblower must prove that the retaliation caused emotional harm. The harm may be documented by medical records, testimony from family members, or testimony from the employee.
Attorney fees are mandatory. The agency must pay the whistleblower’s reasonable attorney fees if the whistleblower prevails.
Chapter 21: The Anti‑Gag Rule
Some agencies include “gag clauses” in settlement agreements. The employee agrees not to disclose information about the case. The WPA prohibits gag clauses that prevent an employee from communicating with the OSC or the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(13).
The Department of Defense has a policy of including gag clauses in severance agreements. The OSC has challenged the policy. The MSPB has held that the gag clauses are unenforceable. In re Department of Defense (MSPB 2012) . The employee cannot waive the right to report misconduct to the OSC.
APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY
Administrative hearing – A proceeding before an agency to determine the rights and obligations of a party.
Administrative law judge (ALJ) – An independent presiding officer who conducts hearings under the APA.
Administrative search – An inspection conducted by an agency to ensure compliance with the law. Subject to the Fourth Amendment.
Civil penalty – A fine imposed by an agency for violation of a regulation. Not criminal.
Closely regulated industry – An industry that is subject to comprehensive government supervision. Warrantless inspections are permitted.
Due Process Clause – The constitutional provision that requires a hearing before the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Emergency inspection – An inspection conducted without a warrant to address an imminent threat to public health or safety.
Excessive Fines Clause – The Eighth Amendment provision that prohibits fines that are grossly disproportional to the offense.
Exclusionary rule – The rule that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be used in a criminal trial. Applies to administrative proceedings only in limited circumstances.
Exhaustion – The requirement that a party must seek relief from the agency before going to court.
Inspection – An administrative search. A warrant may be required, depending on the context.
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) – An independent agency that hears appeals from federal employees who claim retaliation for whistleblowing.
Office of Special Counsel (OSC) – An independent agency that investigates whistleblower complaints.
Pervasively regulated industry – An industry that has a long tradition of close government supervision. Warrantless inspections are permitted.
Subpoena – A demand for documents or testimony. An administrative subpoena may be enforced by a court.
Whistleblower – An employee who reports misconduct. Protected from retaliation by federal and state statutes.
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) – The federal statute that protects federal employees who disclose misconduct.
APPENDIX 2: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Supreme Court Cases
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015).
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987).
INS v. Lopez‑Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
Statutes
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211–1232.
Sarbanes‑Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. § 5567.
Books and Treatises
Dellinger, Walter, and Gerald Gunther. The Fourth Amendment and Administrative Inspections. Duke University Press, 1980.
Glicksman, Robert L., and Richard E. Levy. Administrative Law: Agency Action in Legal Context. 3d ed. Foundation Press, 2022.
Mashaw, Jerry L., Richard A. Merrill, and Peter M. Shane. Administrative Law: The American Public Law System. 7th ed. West Academic, 2014.
O’Reilly, James T. Administrative Rulemaking and Adjudication. Thomson Reuters, 2021.
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