Judge means

S19. “Judge”. – The word “Judge” denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person,- who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definite, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive, or who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment.


ILLUSTRATIONS

(a) A Collector exercising jurisdiction in a suit under Act 10 of 1859, is a Judge.

(b) A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has power to sentence to fine or imprisonment, with or without appeal, is a Judge.

(c) A member of a panchayat which has power, under Regulation VII, 1816, of the Madras Code, to try and determine suits, is a Judge.

(d) A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has power only to commit for trial to another Court, is not a Judge.


Indian Penal Code 1860 [IPC]

All the trappings of a court

All the trappings of a court mean

In Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd, (AIR 1950 SC 188 : (1950) SCR 459) Supreme court opined :-

“7. Now there can be no doubt that the Industrial Tribunal has, to use a well-known expression, “all the trappings of a court” and performs functions which cannot but be regarded as judicial. (…)

27.(…) There can be no doubt that to be a Court, the person or persons who constitute it must be entrusted with judicial functions, that is, of deciding litigated questions according to law. However, by agreement between parties arbitrators may be called upon to exercise judicial powers and to decide a dispute according to law but that would not make the arbitrators a Court. It appears to me that before a person or persons can be said to constitute a Court it must be held that they derive their powers from the State and are exercising the judicial powers of the State. In R. v. London County Council ((1931) 2 K.B. 215), Saville L.J. gave the following meaning to the word “Court” or “judicial authority” :-

‘It is not necessary that it should be a Court in the sense that this Court is a Court, it is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition; and it is not necessary to be strictly a Court if it is a tribunal which has to decide rightly after hearing evidence and opposition.’

28. As pointed out in picturesque language by Lord Sankey L.C. in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, ((1931) A.C. 275), there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. (…) It was pointed out in the above case that a tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision, nor because it hears witnesses on oath, nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide, nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects nor because there is an appeal to a Court, nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body (…).”


Ref: AIR 2009 SC 3256 : (2009) 5 SCR 8 : (2009) 4 SCC 625

ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

International criminal court ICC

ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
PREAMBLE

The States Parties to this Statute,

Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time,

Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,

Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,

Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,

Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes,

Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes,

Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,

Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any State,

Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,

Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions,

Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice,

Have agreed as follows

Continue Reading

Court meaning of

Section 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts that the term “court” includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. The expression “court” is not restricted to courts, Civil, Revenue or Criminal, it includes other tribunals. The expression “court” is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act “court” is defined as including “all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence”. But this definition is devised for the purpose of the Evidence Act and will not necessarily apply to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The expression “Court of Justice” is defined in the Indian Penal Code by Section 20 as denoting “a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially”. That again is not a definition of the expression “court” as used in the Criminal Procedure. The expression “court” in ordinarily parlance is a generic expression and in the context in which it occurs may mean a “body or organizations” invested with power, authority or dignity. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 9, Article 809, at page 342, it is stated :

“Originally the term “court” meant, among other meanings, the sovereign’s place; it has acquired the meaning of the place where justice is administered and, further, has come to mean the persons who exercise judicial functions under authority derived either directly or indirectly from the sovereign. All tribunals, however, are not courts in the sense in which the term is here employed, namely to denote such tribunals as exercise jurisdiction over persons by reason of the sanction of the law, and not merely by reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction. Thus, arbitrators, committees of clubs, and the like, although they may be tribunals exercising judicial functions, are not “courts” in this sense of that term. On the other hand, a tribunal may be a court in the strict sense of the term although the chief part of its duties is not judicial. Parliament is a court. Its duties are mainly deliberative and legislative; the judicial duties are only part of its function.”

In Article 810 it is stated :

“In determining whether a tribunal is a judicial body the facts that it has been appointed by a non-judicial authority, that it has no power to administer an oath, that the chairman has a casting vote, and that third parties have power to intervene are immaterial, especially if the statute setting it up prescribes a penalty for making false statement; element to be considered are (1) the requirement for a public hearing, subject to a power to exclude the public in a proper case, and (2) a provision that member of the tribunal shall not take part in any decision in which he is personally interested, or unless he has been present throughout the proceedings.

A tribunal is not necessary a court in the strict sense exercising judicial power because (1) it gives a final decision; (2) hears witnesses on oath; (3) two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide; (4) it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects; (5) there is an appeal to a court; and (6) it is body to which a matter is referred by another body. Many bodies are not courts, although they have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality, such as the former assessment committees, the former court of referees which was constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts, the benchers of the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, the Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical Council when considering question affecting the conduct of a medical man, a trade union when exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over its members, or the chief officer of a force exercising discipline over member of the force.”

A body required to act judicially in the sense that its proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality may not therefore necessarily be regarded as a court.


Rama Rao And Anr. vs Narayan And Anr – 20/12/1968


Broadly speaking, Court is a place where justice is judicially administered. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs. P. N. Sharma, (1965) 2 SCR 366 Gajendragadkar, C. J., speaking for the majority observed:

“The expression ‘court’ in the context denotes a tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of courts which are invested with the State’s inherent judicial powers. A sovereign State discharges legislative, executive and judicial functions and can legitimately claim corresponding powers which are described as legislative, executive and judicial powers. Under our Constitution, the judicial functions and powers of the State are primarily conferred on the ordinary courts which have been constituted under its relevant provisions. The Constitution recognised a hierarchy of courts and to their adjudication are normally entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the State. These courts can be described as ordinary courts of civil judicature. They are governed by their prescribed rules of procedure and they deal with questions of fact and law raised before them by adopting a process which is described as judicial process. The powers which these courts exercise, are judicial powers, the functions they discharge are judicial functions and the decisions they reach and pronounce are judicial decisions.”

The hierarchy of courts in this country is an organ of the State through which its judicial power is primarily exercised.


 

Rama Rao And Anr. vs Narayan And Anr – 20/12/1968

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA JUDGMENTS

By Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is enacted that certain offences amounting to contempt of lawful authority of public servant i.e., offences falling under Sections 172 to 188, I.P. Code offences against public justice under Sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offences are alleged to have been committed in or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, and offences described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, 475 or 476 when such offences are alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, cannot be taken cognizance of by any court, except in the first class of cases on a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned and in the second and third class of cases on the complaint in writing of such court or some other court to which it is subordinate.

Supreme Court of India

Rama Rao And Anr. vs Narayan And Anr.

Date: 20 December, 1968

Bench: A Grover, J Shah

Acts: Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960

JUDGMENT

Shah, J.

1. The Nagpur District Land Development Bank Ltd. is registered as a society under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. One Narayan Tanbaji Murkute applied for membership of the bank as a “non-borrowing member”. At a meeting of the bank held on June 30, 1964, the application of Murkute and 94 others were granted and they were enrolled as members. But in the list of members entitled to take part in the General Meeting, dated June 30, 1964, the names of the Murkute and others were not included.

2. Murkute and others then applied to the Registrar Co-operative Societies for an order declaring that they were entitled to participate in the election of office-bearers and for an injunction restraining the President and the Secretary from holding the Annual General Meeting. The registrar referred the dispute for adjudication under Section 93 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 to H. V. Kulkarni, his nominee. The nominee decided the dispute on May 7, 1965, and held that Murkute and other applicant were members of the Bank. In the proceeding before the nominee certain document including the minutes book of the bank were produced. It is claimed by Murkute that those books were fabricated the President and the Secretary with a view to make it appears that Murkute and other persons were never elected members of the bank.

3. On August 7, 1965, Murkute filed a complaint in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur, charging the President and Secretary of the bank with committing offences under Sections 465 and 477, I.P. Code. It was alleged in the complaint that the two accused had dishonestly and fraudulently introduced a clause in Resolution no. 3 appearing in the minutes book with the intention of causing it to be believed that the clause was part of the original resolution passed by the Board of Directors in the meeting held on June 30, 1964, whereas it was known to them that at that meeting no such clause was passed.

4. The two accused raised an objection that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint without the previous sanction of the Registered of Co-operative Societies under Section 148(3) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The Trial Magistrate rejected the contention. The order was confirmed by the Court of Session and the High Court of Bombay.

5. In this court counsel for the accused raised two contentions –

(1) that the nominee of the Registrar appointed under Section 95 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, was a “court” within the meaning of Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure and a complaint for offences under Sections 465 and 471, I. P. Code, alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, cannot be entertained except on a complaint in writing of such court, or of a court to which it is subordinate; and (2) that offence charged in the complaint fell within the description of the offences under Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and without the sanction of the Registrar the complaint was not maintainable.

6. Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as it is relevant provides :

“(1) No court shall take cognizance –

(a) X X X X

(b) X X X X

(c) of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471 X X X when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding is any court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the compliant in writing of such court, or of some other some court to which such court it subordinate.
“(2) In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1), the term “Court” includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877.”

Murkute complained that the President and the Secretary of the bank who were parties to the proceeding before the nominee of the Registrar had committed offences under Section 465 and 467, I.P. Code, in respect of documents produced or given in evidence at the trial. If the Registrar’s nominee is a court within the meaning of Section 195 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate could not take cognizance except on the complaint in writing by the Registrar’s nominee or of some court to which he was subordinate. To determine whether the Registrar’s nominee is a court it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, relating to the functions of the nominee and the power with which he is invested. Counsel for the appellants urges that by the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act the power of the Civil Court to entertain disputes with regard to certain matters concerning co-operative societies is expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the Registrar or his nominee is alone competent to determine those question thereby the Registrar and his nominee are invested with the judicial power of the State and they are on that account “courts” within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

7. Section 2(2) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, defines “arbitrator” as meaning” a person appointed under this Act to decide dispute referred to him by the Registrar and includes the Registrar’s nominee or board of nominees”. Section 91 and the following section which occur in Chapter IX relate to disputes and arbitration. By Section 91, in so far as it is material it is provided :

“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, election of the officer-bearer, conduct of general meetings, management or business of a Society shall be referred by any of the parties to the dispute X X X X to the Registrar, if both the parties hereto are one or other of the following :

(a) X X X X

(b) a member, past member or a person claiming through a member, past
member or a deceased member of a society, or a society which is a
member of the society.

(c) X X X X

(d) X X X X

(e) X X X X

(2) When any question arises whether for the purpose of the foregoing sub-section, a matter referred to for decision is a dispute or not, the question shall be considered by the Registrar, whose decision shall be final.

(3) Save as otherwise provided under sub-section (3) of Section 93 the court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of any dispute referred to in sub-section (1).”

Section 93 provides :

“(1) If the Registrar is satisfied that any matter referred to him or brought to his notice is a dispute within meaning of Section 91, the Registrar shall, subject to the rules, decide the dispute himself, or refer it for disposal to a nominee, or a abroad of nominees, appointed by the Registrar.

(2) Where any dispute is referred under the foregoing sub-section, for decision to the Registrar’s nominee or broad of nominees, the Registrar may at any time, for reasons to be recorded in writing with-draw such dispute from his nominee or board of nominees, and may decide the dispute himself or refer it again for decision to any other nominee, or board of nominees, appointed by him.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 91, the Registrar may, if he thinks, fit, suspend proceedings in regard to any dispute, if the question at issue between a society and a claimant or between different claimants, is one involving complicated questions of law and fact, until the question has been tried by a regular suit instituted by one of the parties or by the society.

If any such suit is not instituted within two months from the Registrar’s order suspending proceedings, the Registrar shall take action as it provided in sub-section (1).”

Section 94 provides for the procedure of settlement of disputes and power of the Registrar, his nominee or the board of nominees. It provides, in so far as it is material :

“(1) the Registrar, or his nominee or board of nominees, hearing a dispute under the last proceeding section shall hear the dispute in the manner prescribed, and shall have power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses including the parties interested or any of them and the compel them to give evidence or oath, affirmation or affidavit, and to compel the production of documents by the same means and as far as possible in the same manner, as is provided in the case of a Civil Court by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

(2) Except with the permission of the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees as the case may be no party shall be represented at the hearing of a dispute by a legal practitioner.”

Sub-section (3) of Section 94 authorises the Registrar, his nominee or the board of nominees to join or substitute new parties. Section 95 authorises the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees to pass an order of attachment and other interlocutory orders. Section 96 provides :

“When a dispute is referred to arbitration the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees may, after giving a reasonable opportunity to the parties to the dispute to be heard, make an award on the dispute, on the expenses incurred by the parties to the dispute in connection with the proceedings, and fees and expenses payable to the Registrar or his nominee or as the case may be, board of nominees. Such an award shall not be invalid merely on the ground that it was made after the expiry of the period fixed for deciding the dispute by the Registrar and shall, subject to appeal or review of revision, be binding on the parties to the dispute.”

Section 97 provides :

“Any party aggrieved by any decision of the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees under the last preceding section, or an order passed under Section 95 may, X X X appeal to the Tribunal.”

Section 98 provides that every order passed by the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees or in appeal therefrom shall, if not carried out, on a certificate signed by the Registrar, be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court, and shall be executed in the same manner as a decree of such court or be executed according to the law and under the rules for the time being in force for the recovery of arrears of land revenue. By Section 99 a private transfer or delivery of, or encumbrance of charge on, property made or crated after the issue of the certificate of the Registrar under Section 98 shall be null and void as against the society on whose application the certificate was issued.

8. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court by Section 91(3) to entertain a suit in respect of any dispute referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 91 is expressly excluded and the dispute is required by law to be referred to the Registrar or his nominee. Against the decision of the Registrar’s nominee an appeal lies under Section 97 and the order made for payment of money is enforceable as a decree of the Civil Court. The Registrar or his nominee called upon to decide the dispute are bound to hear it in the manner prescribed and they have power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses and to compel then to give evidence on oath, affirmation or affidavit and to compel production of documents. The effect of these provisions, according to counsel for the appellants, is that the judicial power of the State to deal with and dispose of disputes of a civil nature which fall within the description of Section 91(1) is vested in the Registrar’s nominee and he is on that account made a “court” within the normal connotation of the term.

9. Section 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts that the term “court” includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. The expression “court” is not restricted to courts, Civil, Revenue or Criminal, it includes other tribunals. The expression “court” is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act “court” is defined as including “all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence”. But this definition is devised for the purpose of the Evidence Act and will not necessarily apply to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The expression “Court of Justice” is defined in the Indian Penal Code by Section 20 as denoting “a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially”. That again is not a definition of the expression “court” as used in the Criminal Procedure. The expression “court” in ordinarily parlance is a generic expression and in the context in which it occurs may mean a “body or organizations” invested with power, authority or dignity. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 9, Article 809, at page 342, it is stated :

“Originally the term “court” meant, among other meanings, the sovereign’s place; it has acquired the meaning of the place where justice is administered and, further, has come to mean the persons who exercise judicial functions under authority derived either directly or indirectly from the sovereign. All tribunals, however, are not courts in the sense in which the term is here employed, namely to denote such tribunals as exercise jurisdiction over persons by reason of the sanction of the law, and not merely by reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction. Thus, arbitrators, committees of clubs, and the like, although they may be tribunals exercising judicial functions, are not “courts” in this sense of that term. On the other hand, a tribunal may be a court in the strict sense of the term although the chief part of its duties is not judicial. Parliament is a court. Its duties are mainly deliberative and legislative; the judicial duties are only part of its function.”

In Article 810 it is stated :

“In determining whether a tribunal is a judicial body the facts that it has been appointed by a non-judicial authority, that it has no power to administer an oath, that the chairman has a casting vote, and that third parties have power to intervene are immaterial, especially if the statute setting it up prescribes a penalty for making false statement; element to be considered are (1) the requirement for a public hearing, subject to a power to exclude the public in a proper case, and (2) a provision that member of the tribunal shall not take part in any decision in which he is personally interested, or unless he has been present throughout the proceedings.

A tribunal is not necessary a court in the strict sense exercising judicial power because (1) it gives a final decision; (2) hears witnesses on oath; (3) two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide; (4) it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects; (5) there is an appeal to a court; and (6) it is body to which a matter is referred by another body. Many bodies are not courts, although they have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality, such as the former assessment committees, the former court of referees which was constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts, the benchers of the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, the Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical Council when considering question affecting the conduct of a medical man, a trade union when exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over its members, or the chief officer of a force exercising discipline over member of the force.”

A body required to act judicially in the sense that its proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality may not therefore necessarily be regarded as a court.

10. Counsel for the appellant however invited our attention to a number of decisions in support of his contention that wherever there is a dispute which is required to be resolved by a body invested with power by statute and the body has to act judicially, it must be regarded as a court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Counsel asserted that every quasi-judicial authority is a court within the meaning of Section 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The contention is inconsistent with a large body of authority of this court to which we will presently refer.

11. By Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is enacted that certain offences amounting to contempt of lawful authority of public servant i.e., offences falling under Sections 172 to 188, I.P. Code offences against public justice under Sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offences are alleged to have been committed in or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, and offences described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, 475 or 476 when such offences are alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, cannot be taken cognizance of by any court, except in the first class of cases on a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned and in the second and third class of cases on the complaint in writing of such court or some other court to which it is subordinate.

12. An offence ordinarily signifies a public wrong: it is an act or omission which is a crime against society: it may therefore be brought to the notice of the court by any person, even if he is not personally aggrieved by the act or omission. To that rule there are certain exception which are specified in Sections 195, 196, 197, 198, 198-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and other special statutes. Authority of courts to entertain complaints in respect of the offences so specified is barred in view of the special nature of the offence which vitally affect individuals only or public bodies and in the larger interest of society it is deemed expedient to exempt them from the general rule.

13. The nominee of the Registrar acting under Section 96 performs the functions substantially of an arbitrator to whom a dispute is referred for adjudication. The Registrar may appoint a single nominee or a board of nominees and may at any time, for reasons to be recorded in writing, withdraw such dispute from the nominee or board of nominees, and may decide the dispute himself, or refer it again for decision to another nominee, or board of nominees, appointed by him. Under sub-section (3) of Section 93, it is open to the Registrar to suspend proceedings in regard to any dispute if the question at issue between a society and a claimant or between different claimant, is one involving complicated question of law of fact. The jurisdiction of the nominee or board of nominees arises by reason not of investment by statute, but by appointment made by the Registrar who exercises control ever the proceeding. The nominee, therefore, derives his authority from his appointment by the Registrar: the registrar entitled to withdraw his authority; and the Registrar may fix the time within which a dispute shall be disposed of : his adjudication is again called an award. The nominee is even entitled to make a provision for the expenses payable to the Registrar or to himself. It is true that the procedure of the nominee is assimilated to the procedure followed in the trial of a Civil Proceeding. The nominee has the power to summon witnesses, to compel them to produce documents and he is required to hear the dispute in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereby he is required to act judicially, i.e., fairly and impartially: but the obligation to act judicially will not necessarily make him a court within the meaning of Section 195 of the code. The position of a nominee of the Registrar is analogous to that of an arbitrator designated under a statutory arbitration to which the provisions of Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, apply.

14. The authorities to which our attention was invited by counsel for the appellants may now be considered. It may be sufficient here to observe that the test laid down by his court in certain cases to be presently noticed make many of the cases relied upon of doubtful authority. In Thadi Subbi Reddy v. Emperor (AIR 1930 Mad 369) it was held by a single Judge of the Madras High Court that the Registrar before whom a Co-operative Society files it suit, or its claim for enforcing a bond, is a court within the meaning of Section 195, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the Registrar to whom a dispute touching a debt due to a society by a member is referred has power to administer oaths, to require the attendance of all parties concerned and of witnesses, and to require the production of all books and documents relating to the matter in dispute, and the Registrar is required to give a decision in writing, and when it is given the decision may be enforced on application to the Civil Court having jurisdiction as if it were a decree of the court.

15. In Velayude Mudali and another v. Co-operative Rural Credit Society and others (AIR 1934 Mad 40), a single Judge of the Madras High Court, following the judgment in Thadi Subbi Reddi’s case, (AIR 1930 Mad 369) observed that a Registrar of Co-operative Societies acting under Section 14 of the rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act is a Court, and the rule of lis nendens applied to the proceeding before the Registrar.

16. In Y. Mahabaleswarappa v. M. Gopalasami Mudaliar (AIR 1935 Mad 673) a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras held that an Election Commissioner appointed to decide a dispute with regard to municipal elections is a court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court, in that case, held that the Election Commissioner is a special tribunal to whom the power to make an inquiry relating to the rights of civil nature was entrusted by statute and he is required to deal with the matter in accordance with the procedure of a court. The procedure followed by the Election Commissioner was held to be similar to the procedure of the court since he was required to give a definitive judgment upon the matter in hand and this power was not conferred merely by extending the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court in that case observed at page 677 :

” …………….. we have to look, not to the source of tribunal’s authority, or to any peculiarity in the method adopted of creating it (though it is undoubtedly a consideration that it derives its powers mediately or immediately from the Crown) but to the general character of its powers and activities. If it has power to regulate legal rights by the delivery of definitive judgment and to enforce its orders by legal sanctions, and if it procedure is judicial in character in such matters as the taking of evidence and the administration of the oath then it is a ‘Court’.

The assumption made that an election dispute is a dispute relating to civil rights is, however, not correct, nor is it try to say that because there is an obligation to deal with the matters fairly and impartially and the procedure is assimilated to the procedure for the trial of civil dispute it necessarily makes a body invested with the power to decide the dispute, a ‘Court’.”

17. In Nand Lal Ganguli v. Khetra Mohan Ghose (ILR 45 Cal 585) it was observed that the word “Court” in Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure, has a wider meaning than “Court of Justice” under Section 20 of the Penal Code, and includes a tribunal entitled to deal with a particular matter and authorised to receive evidence bearing thereon in order to enable it to arrive at a determination upon the question. On that account a Tribunal constituted by the Calcutta Improvement Act (Bengal Act V of 1911), as amended by the Calcutta Improvement (Appeals) Act, 18 of 1911 is a “Court” within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

18. But the test which appealed to the Madras and the Calcutta High Courts in determining whether a tribunal was a court has not been accepted by this Court in Jagan Nath Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh. It was held in that case that the Sales Tax Officer under the U.P. Sales Tax Act is not a “Court” within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a complaint for the prosecution of persons committing offences under Section 471, I.P. Code, may lie without a complaint by the Sales Tax Officer. In the view of the Court though the Sales Tax Officer was required to perform certain quasi-judicial functions and to act fairly and impartially he was not a part of the judiciary: he was merely an instrumentality of the State for purpose of assessment and collection of tax. The nature of the functions of a Sales Tax Officer and the manner prescribed for the performance showed that he could not be equated with a court.

19. Attention of course must be directed to Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra and another where this Court took the view that an Income-Tax Officer exercising power under Section 37(1), (2) and (3) was exercising power in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of Sections 193, 196 and 228 Indian Penal Code. The Court, however, expressly observed that it was not necessary to decide the general question whether the Income-tax Officer was a “Court”, for Section 37(4) of the Income-tax Act makes the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer judicial proceedings for the purpose of Section 193, Indian Penal Code and accordingly the proceeding before him must be treated as a proceeding in a court for the purpose of Section 195(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

20. Two other decisions may be referred to. In Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab, this Court held that a Returning Officer action under Sections 33 and 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and deciding on the validity or otherwise of a nomination paper is not a “Court” within the meaning of Sections 195(1)(b), 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Brijandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, this Court held that the Commissioner appointed under the Public Servant (Inquiries) Act, 37 of 1850, is not a “Court” within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. This Court has therefore definitely taken the view that a mere duty to act judicially either expressly imposed or arising by necessary implication of the nature of the duties required to be performed does not of itself make a tribunal judicial or quasi-judicial a “Court” within the meaning of Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure.

21. The judgment of the High Court of Bombay in Hari Pandurang and another v. Secretary of State for India in Council, (ILR 27 Bom 424) in which the Court held that a tribunal crated under the City of Bombay Improvement Act, 1898, upon which powers were conferred to determined compensation payable under the Lan Acquisition Act, was not a “court” and was therefore free from the control and supervision of the High Court.

22. The decision of this court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another, on which strong reliance was placed by counsel does not in our judgment assist him. The appellant in that case in an appeal before the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, alleged that the Assistant Registrar in deciding a matter had discriminated against him and had adopted “double standards”. In proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act the High Courts of Patna held the appellant guilty. An appeal was brought to this court and it was held that the appellant was rightly convicted. The court observed that the Assistant Registrar was functioning as a court in deciding the dispute in question. His adjudication was not based upon a private reference nor was his decision arrived at in a summary manner, but with all the paraphernalia of a court and the powers of an ordinary Civil Court of the land. But the question in that case was not whether the Registrar is a “court” within the meaning of Section 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is necessary also to observe that the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935, were not substantially the same as the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, which fall to be considered in this case. It may be pointed out that Mitter, J., speaking for the court observed :

“It must be borne in mind that we do not propose to lay down that all Registrars of all Co-operative Societies in the different States are “courts” for the purpose of the Contempt of Court Act, 1952. Our decision is expressly limited to the Registrar and the Assistant Registrar like the one before us governed by the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act.”

23. Counsel for the appellants contended that this Court has dissented from the decisions in Malabar Hills Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Bombay v. K. L. Gauba and others , on which the judgment under appeal in this case is founded. In K.L. Gauba’s case, the High Court of Bombay has held that a nominee of a Registrar to whom a dispute is sent for decision under Section 54(1) of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, is not a court within the meaning of Section 3(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It is claimed that this decision has been expressly overruled by this Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha’s case. The assumption made by counsel for the appeals that the decision of the Bombay High Court in Malabar Hills Co-operative Housing Society Ltd’s. case was overruled is, however, not correct. This court set out the facts in some details and observed that the decision of the Bombay High Court that the proceedings before the nominee of the Registrar under Bombay Act were merely in the nature of arbitration proceedings did not compel them to hold that the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935, was not a “court”. It was expressly pointed out that in the Bombay case the matter was referred to the Assistant Registrar as nominee of the Registrar who had to act as an arbitrator and to make an award.

24. After carefully considering the powers conferred and the source of authority of the nominee, we have no doubt that the nominee exercising power to make an award under Section 96 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, derives his authority not from the statute but from investment by the Registrar in his individual discretion. The power so invested is liable to be suspended and may be withdrawn. He is therefore not entrusted the judicial power of the State : he is merely an arbitration authorised within the limits of the power conferred to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to him.

25. The plea that the complaint was not maintainable without the sanction of the Registrar has no substance. By Section 146 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, in so far as it is material it is provided :

“It shall be an offence under this Act if –

X X X X

(p) any officer or member of a society destroy, mutilates, tampers with, or otherwise alters, falsifies or secretes or is privy to the destruction, mutilation, alternation falsification or secreting of any books papers or securities or makes, or is privy to the making of any false or fraudulent entry in any register book of account or document belonging to the society.”

By the Explanation it is enacted that “for the purpose of this section, an officer or a member referred to in this section shall include past officer and past member as the case may be”. By Section 148(3) it is provided :

“No prosecution under this Act shall be lodged except with the previous sanction of the State Government in the case of an offence under clause (b) of Section 146 and of the Registrar in the case of any other offence under this Act. Such sanction shall not be given, except after hearing the party concerned by an officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government by a general or special order.”

It was urged that the ingredient of the offences of forgery punishable under Section 465, I.P. Code and of offence under Section 146(p) are in substance the same, and the general provision is on that account pro tanto repealed, and in any event in view of the provision of Section 148(3) no prosecution may be initiated in respect of those offences otherwise than with the previous sanction of the Registrar. Section 147 which prescribes punishment for offences under Section 146, by clause (p) provides :

“Every society, officer or past officer, member or past member, employee or past employee of a society or any other person who commits an offences under Section 146 shall on conviction, be punished, –

(p) if it is an offence under clause (p of that Section with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or which fine, or with both,”

Under Section 146(p) an offence may be committed by (1) an Officer or member or by a past officer or past member; (2) such officer or member or past officer or past member must have destroyed, mutilated, tampered with or otherwise altered, falsified or secreted; (3) or must have been privy to the destruction, mutilation, alternation, falsification or secreting; (4) or must have made or he makes or is privy to the making of any false or fraudulent entry in any register, book of account or document belonging to the society. The clause does not make intention an ingredient of the offence. Again a person who is privy to the destruction, mutilation, alternation, falsification or secreting of books or making any false or fraudulent entry in any register, book of account or document belonging to the society is make punishable. Even destruction of books of account is penalised under Section 146. Section 465, I.P. Code penalises the offence of forgery. Sections 466, 467, 468 and 469 are more serious offences of forgery when committed in respect of record of court or of public registers, valuable securities, wills or for cheating or harming reputation of persons. Section 477, I.P. Code, penalties dishonest cancellation, destruction, defacement, or attempts to cancel, destroy or deface or secret or attempts to secrete any document which is or purports to be a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or any valuable security, or mischief in respect of such document. Section 477-A penalises falsification of accounts by a clerk, officer or servant or by a person employed in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant. The offence of forgery and its allied offence may be committed if a false document is made with intent to cause damage or injury to public or any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, (Section 463). In Order to attract Section 463 I.P. Code, there must, therefore, be making of a false document with the intention mentioned in that section. By Section 464 it is provided :

“A person is said to make a false document –

Firstly. – Who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document, or makes any mark denoting the execution of a document, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed or executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made signed sealed or executed, or at a time at which he knows that was not made signed, sealed or executed; or

Secondly. – Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part thereof, after it has been made or executed either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or

Thirdly. – who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document, knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration”.

Making of a false document by a person in all the three clauses must be done dishonestly or fraudulently and with the necessary intention or knowledge contemplated by the three clauses.

26. Section 146 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, does not make any such intention as is referred to in Sections 463 and 464, I.P. Code in ingredient of the offence it also renders a person who is merely privy to the destruction, mutilation, alternation, falsification or secreting or to the making of any false or fraudulent entry in any register, book of account or document belonging to the society liable to be punished under Section 146(p). The offence may be committed under Section 146 only by an officer or member-past or present-of the society. even destruction or secreting of a document or security is penalised under Section 146 of the Act.

27. We are unable to accept a contention that these two Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act and Section 465, I.P. Code – are intended to deal with same offence. It is true that certain acts may fall within both the sections. For instance, tampering with or falsifying any register, book of account or security, or making any false or fraudulent entry in the register, book of account or document belonging to the society, may when done with the requisite intention mentioned in Section 464 read with Section 463, I.P. Code, be also an offence under Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. But that, in our judgment, is not a ground for holding that Section 465, I.P. code and the related offences, were intended to be pro tanto repealed by the enactment of Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. When the Indian Penal Code seeks to impose in respect of offences under Section 477, imprisonment which may extend to imprisonment for life or with imprisonment up to a period of seven years for an offence under Section 477-A it would be difficult to hold that when committed by an officer or member of a society the maximum punishment which can be imposed by virtue of Section 146(p) would be three years rigorous imprisonment only.

28. This court in Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((1957) SCR 423), held that the offences under Section 409, I.P. Code and Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are distinct and separate offences and Section 409, I.P. Code, is not repealed by Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

29. In a recent judgment of this court in T. C. Ballish v. T. S. Rangachari (Cr. Ap. Nos. 130-132 of 1968, decided on December 12 ,1968), we had occasion to consider whether Section 177, I.P. Code, was repealed by Section 52 of the Indian Income-tax Act. It was pointed out that in considering the problem the court must consider the true meaning and effect of the two Acts, and unless there is repugnancy or inconsistency between the two enactments or that the two enactments cannot stand together they must be treated as cumulative.

30. It is clear from a perusal of Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and Sections 463 and 464, I.P Code, that they are two distinct offence which are capable of being committed with different intentions by different sets of persons and it could not be contemplated that the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra intended to repeal pro tanto the provisions of Section 465, I.P. Code, by enactment of Section 146 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.

31. It is unnecessary in the circumstances to consider the question whether the Maharashtra State Legislature was competent to repeal the provisions of Section 465, I.P. Code. The law relating to Co-operative Societies may be enacted in exercise of the power under List II, Entry 32 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but if Section 146 is directly intended to trench upon a provision of the Indian Penal Code-falling within List II, Entry 1, sanction of the President under Article 254(2) would apparently be necessary.

32. Both the contentions raised by counsel for the appellants fail. The appeal is dismissed.


Equivalent citations: AIR 1969 SC 724, (1969) 71 BOMLR 696, 1969 CriLJ 1064, (1969) 1 SCC 167, 1969 3 SCR 185

The Language of the Subordinate Courts in India

Chapter XXIII of Cr.P.C deals with evidence in enquiries and trials. Section 272 of Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates that the State Government may determine what shall be for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the language of each Court within the State other than the High Court. In State of Karnataka, Kannada and English are the official language. In case of recording of evidence by the Sessions Court, the provisions of Sections 276, 277 and 278 of Code of Criminal Procedure would apply. The said provisions read as under:

276. Record in trial before Court of Session:

(1) In all trials before a Court of Session, the evidence of each witness shall, as his examination proceeds, be taken down in writing either by the presiding Judge himself or by his dictation in open Court or, under his direction and superintendence, by an officer of the Court appointed by him in this behalf.

(2) Such evidence shall ordinarily be taken down in the form of a narrative but the presiding Judge may in his discretion take down or cause to be taken down, any part of such evidence in the form of question and answer.

(3) The evidence so taken down shall be signed by the presiding Judge and shall form part of the record.

277. Language of record of evidence:

In every case where evidence is taken down u/s 275 or Section 276-

(a) if the witness gives evidence in the language of the Court, it shall be taken down in that language:

(b) if he gives evidence in any other language, it may, if practicable, be taken down in that language, and if it is not practicable to do so. a true translation of the evidence in the language of the Court shall be prepared as the examination of the witness proceeds, signed by the Magistrate or presiding Judge, and shall form part of the record:

(c) where under Clause (b) evidence is taken down in a language other than the language of the Court, a true translation thereof in the language of the Court shall be prepared as soon as practicable, signed by the Magistrate or presiding Judge, and shall form part of the record:

Provided that when under Clause (b) evidence is taken down in English and a translation thereof in the language of the Court is not required by any of the parties, the Court may dispense with such translation.

278. Procedure in regard to such evidence when completed:

(1) As the evidence of each witness taken u/s 275 or Section 276 is completed, it shall be read over to him in the presence of the accused, if in attendance, or of his pleader, if he appears by pleader, and shall, if necessary, be corrected.

(2) If the witness denies the correctness of any part of the evidence when the same is read over to him, the Magistrate or presiding Judge may, instead of correcting the evidence, make a memorandum thereon of the objection made to it by the witness and shall add such remarks as he thinks necessary.

(3) If the record of the evidence is in a language different from that in which it has been given and the witness does not understand that language, the record shall be interpreted to him in the language in which it was given, or in a language which he understands.

Section 276 of Code of Criminal Procedure requires the evidence of each of the witnesses shall, as his examination proceeds, be taken down in writing either by the presiding Judge himself or by his dictation in open Court or, under his direction and superintendence, by an officer of the Court appointed by him in this behalf and evidence so taken down shall be signed by the Presiding Judge and it shall form part of record.

 However, more relevant provision is Section 277, which deals with language of Court. In case the witness gives evidence in the language of the Court, it shall be taken down in that language. If he gives evidence in any other language, if practicable, may be taken down in that language and in case it is not practicable to do so, a true translation of the evidence in the language of the Court shall be prepared as the examination of the witness proceeds signed by the Magistrate or presiding Judge. The scope of Section 277 Clause (b) is that, if the evidence is given by witness in a language other than the Court language, it is permissible for the Court to record the said evidence in the said language. If it is not practicable, it may be translated simultaneously as the examination of the witnesses proceeds.

In the case of SELVI J. JAYALALITHAA Vs. STATE, recording of evidence of 276 witnesses has been done by Special Court at Chennai in Tamil i.e., in the language of the said Court and that complies with the requirement of Section 277 Clause (a) of Code of Criminal Procedure. However, in view of transfer of cases from one State to another and the language of the Court to which they are transferred being different, the evidence has to be in the language of the Court. It is nobody’s case that the Court in Karnataka is recording the evidence of the witnesses whose translation is filed. The said evidence is already on record. There is no fault in recording of the evidence, as it is recorded in the language of that Court and in the language of the witness. That is what required to be complied u/s 277(a) of Code of Criminal Procedure. However, to understand and appreciate the evidence already on record by the Court to which it is transferred, the said evidence has to be in the language of the Court. No doubt, the evidence already on record is in Tamil language, and the said language may not be known to the trial Judge, Prosecutor and the defence lawyer. But to know the evidence and understand and appreciate the same, it does not require the recalling of the witnesses for fresh recording. There is nothing wrong in the evidence already recorded. However, in view of the transfer for the convenience, it is required to be translated. In such case, the recording of fresh evidence is not. the scope of either Section 277 or Section 278 of Code of Criminal Procedure. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that, the trial Judge for all practical purpose will be relying on the translated evidence, it is in these circumstances, the translation has to be correct and accurate.

In Sections 277 and 278 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Court has to record evidence in language of court if witness deposes in that language. If he deposes in other language, it can be recorded in that language, if possible. Otherwise, its true translation in the language of the court is to be prepared at same time as witness continues to depose. Procedure to be followed after recording is in Section 278. Said evidence needs to be read over to witness in the presence of the accused, if in attendance, or of his pleader, if he appears by pleader, and, if necessary, can be corrected. If any witness denies the correctness of any part of the deposition when the same is read over to him, the Court may, instead of correcting the evidence, make a memorandum thereon of the objection to it by the witness and add such remarks as it thinks necessary. The provisions of Section 278(3) are important in present matter. Where the record of the evidence is in a language different from that in which it has been given and the witness does not understand that language, the same is to be interpreted to him in the language in which it was given, or in a language which he understands. In earlier i.e. old Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), these provisions were in Section 360 therein.

Again

Section 364 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows:

364. Examination of accused how recorded.– (1) Whenever the accused is examined by any Magistrate, or by any Court, the whole of such examination, including every question put to him and every answer given by him, shall be recorded in full, in the language in which he is examined, or if that is not practicable, in the language of Court or in English; and such record shall be shown or read to him, or, if he does not understand the language in which it is written, shall be interpreted to him, in a language which he understands, and he shall be at liberty to explain or add to his answers.

(2) When the whole is made conformable to what he declares is the truth, the record shall be singed by the accused and the Magistrate or Judge of such Court, and such Magistrate or Judge shall certify under his own hand that the examination was taken in his presence and hearing and that the record contains a full and true account of the statement made by the accused.

(3) In cases in which the examination of the accused is not recorded by the Magistrate or Judge himself, he shall be bound, as the examination proceeds, to make a memorandum thereof in the language of the court, or in English, if he is sufficiently acquainted with latter language; and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Magistrate or Judge with his own hand, and shall be annexed to record. If the Magistrate or Judge is unable to make a memorandum as above required, he shall record the reason of such inability.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to the examination of an accused person u/s 263.

Non-compliance with provisions of Section 164 or 364.- (1) If any Court, before which a confession or other statement of an accused person recorded or purporting to be recorded u/s 164 or Section 364 is tendered or has been received in evidence, finds that any of the provisions of either of such sections have not been complied with by the Magistrate recording the statement, it shall take evidence that such person duly made the statement recorded; and, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1977, Section 91. such statement shall be admitted If the error has not injured the accused as to his defence on the merits.

(2) The provisions of this section apply to Courts of appeal, reference and revision.

Hon’ble Apex Court in Mir Mohd. Omar v. State of W.B., (1989) 4 SCC 436, at page 440 observes

“15. The object of Section 278 is two fold: firstly to ensure that the evidence of the witness as recorded is accurate and secondly to give the witness concerned an opportunity to point out mistakes, if any. If the correction suggested by the witness is one which the Judge considers necessary he will make it at once as required by subsection (1) but if the correction is such that the Judge does not consider necessary, subsection (2) requires that a memorandum of the objection be made and the Judge add his remarks, if any, thereto. In the present case, the learned trial Judge corrected all the typographical errors which he considered necessary but refused to carry out the substantive part of his deposition. The section is not intended to permit a witness to resile from his statement in the name of correction. The learned trial Judge was justified in refusing to effect the change which he thought was intended to change the earlier version. He did not make a memorandum as the correction slip was unsigned and was not properly filed. Now, since the correction slip as well as the remarks of the learned trial Judge have become a part of the record, nothing more need be done as the provisions of Section 278 are substantially complied with.”

In Willie (William) Slaney Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh[AIR 1956 SC 116 : (1956) CriLJ 291 : (1955) 2 SCR 1140], which reads as under:

as in all procedural laws, certain things are regarded as vital. Disregard of a provision of that nature is fatal to the trial and at once invalidates the conviction. Others are not vital and whatever the irregularity they can be cured; and in that event, the conviction must stand unless the Court is satisfied that there was prejudice. Some of these matters are dealt with by the Code and wherever that is the case full effect must be given to its provisions.

Section 137, Civil Procedure Code is concerned it speaks about the language of the subordinate Courts and not regarding the language of the documents. The documents have to be filed in the language in which they are.

Sub-section (3) of section 137, CPC says that where this Code requires or allows anything other than the recording of evidence to be done in writing in any such Court, such writing may be in English; but if any party or his pleader is unacquainted with English a translation into the language of the Court shall, as at his request, be supplied to him; and the Court shall make such order as it thinks fit in respect of the payment of the cost of such translation.

Suffice to mention here that before the trial Court an objection was taken by counsel for the appellant about non-compliance of the provisions of Section 277, Code of Criminal Procedure, but that was overruled. Learned trial Court noticed that Laltu Manjhi (PW-3), Ashok Manjhi (PW-4) and Sudeep Dey (PW-5) were not having knowledge of Hindi, English or the language of Court and their statements as per provisions of Section 161 Cr.P.C. were recorded by getting the same translated from Bangla to Hindi with the aid of Sanju. The Court before recording the statements of above named persons made a note that the language of Court is not known to them and only language known is Bangla, therefore, the statements given by them were recorded by getting the same translated with the aid of Sanju. The statements were recorded in presence of accused, who is having good knowledge of Bangla as well as the language of Court. No objection was ever raised by him or his counsel about any error in translation at any point of time”. [ RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT  in STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. KUNAL MAJUMDAR (2013) CriLJ 1998 : (2013) 2 CriLR 939 : (2013) 15 RCR(Criminal) 773]

Another Example

In the instant case, the prosecution has examined 12 witnesses. Prosecutrix Parwatibai is P.W. 1. A perusal of deposition of Parwatibai, (P.W. 1) indicates that she was unable to understand even the questions which are put to her. Being a tribal girl, she was not able to follow Hindi language. The Court has recorded that it would be proper to record the statement of the parents first and thereafter to record the statement of Parwatibai and her statement was deferred. When it was again recorded the deposition indicates that she has clearly stated that child was begotten from the accused Darbarisingh. When question was put whether forcible sexual intercourse was committed or it was a case of consent, she answered both the questions in positive. She was unable to state of how many months the child was. The child was of 6 months at the relevant time. When question was put that accused taking advantage when she was alone in the house, and felled her down, she answered in positive. When accused Darbarisingh caught hold of her whether she cried, she had answered the question in positive. When question was put whether at the time of committing wrong, accused assured that he will perform the marriage, she was unable to answer anything. When the question was put whether Darbarisingh committed sexual intercourse, she had answered in ‘yes’. When it was put that several time sexual intercourse was done, she answered the question in positive but was unable to state how many times the sexual intercourse was performed. She has answered in positive the suggestion that she was taken to the Doctor. When in the cross-examination it was put that she was living as the wife of the Darbarisingh, she has answered in positive. When suggestion was put in cross-examination whether she had disclosed the fact of commission of sexual intercourse to the parents, she had answered in negative and she expressed her willingness to live with Darbarisingh. When suggestion was put that she was speaking lie, it is mentioned that she fell in state of sorrow and was unable to answer the question. When suggestion was put that Darbarisingh had committed sexual intercourse with the consent, she had answered in ‘yes’. The entire deposition of Parwatibai shows that she has clearly stated that Darbarisingh has committed sexual intercourse and was treating her as his wife and has performed sexual intercourse number of times. Thus, it is clear that accused has taken the advantage of dumbness of young girl, illiteracy and also the fact that she is a poor tribal girl.

  • The Tamil language is the language of the Court in Tamil Nadu.
  • The language of the Court in Karnataka being Kannada.

Boycotting Court

Justice P. B. Sawant speaking for the Supreme Court In Re: Sanjiv Datta and Other held “our legal system, in fact, acknowledges the fallibility of the courts and provides for both internal and external checks to correct the errors. The law, the jurisprudence and precedente, the open hearings, reasoned judgment, appeals, revisions, references and review constitute the internal checks while objective critiques, debates and discussions of judgments outside the courts and the legislative correctives provide the external check. Together, they go a long way to ensure judicial accountability. The law, thus, provides procedure to correct judicial errors. Abuses, attribution of motives, vituperative terrorism and defiance are no methods to correct the errors of the Courts. In the discharge of their functions, the Courts have to be allowed to operate freely and fearlessly but for which impartial adjudication will be an impossibility. Ours is Constitutional government based on the rule of law. The Constitution entrusts the task of interpreting and administering the law to judiciary whose view on the subject is made legally final and binding on all till it is changed by a higher court or by a permissible legislative measure. The court’s verdict must be respected not necessarily by the authority of its reason, but always by reason of its authority. The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who belong to it are all its honourable members. Although entry to the profession may be held by acquiring a mere qualification on technical competence, the honour as a professional has to be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct, both in and outside the court. The legal profession is different from other professions, in that, what the lawyers do affect not only an individual, but the administration of justice, which is the foundation of the civilised society. Both, as a leading member of the intelligentsia of the society and as a responsible citizen, the lawyers has to conduct himself as a model for others, both in his professional and in his private and public life. The society has a right to expect of him such ideal behaviour. If the profession is to survive, the judicial system has to be vitalised. No service will be too small in making the system efficient, effective and credible.”


In Re: Sanjiv Datta and Others, (1995) CriLJ 2910 : (1995) 3 JT 538 : (1995) 2 SCALE 704 : (1995) 3 SCC 619 : (1995) 3 SCR 450 : (1995) 2 UJ 786

The Chennai City Civil Court Act, 1892

Central Act No. 7 of 1892

An Act to establish an additional Civil Court for the City of [Chennai]. Whereas it is expedient to establish an additional Civil Court for the City of [Chennai]. It is hereby enacted as follows:-

1. Title. – (1) This Act may be called the [Chennai] City Civil Court Act, 1892.
(2) [* * *]

2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,-

(1) “City Courts” means the Court established under the next following section;

(2) “City of [Chennai]” means the area within the local limits for the time being of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court;

(3) “High Court” means the High Court of Judicature at [Chennai]; andContinue Reading

STATUTE  OF THE  INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

International Court of Justice

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Article 1 to 70

CHAPTER I: ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT (Articles 2 – 33)
CHAPTER II: COMPETENCE OF THE COURT (Articles 34 – 38)
CHAPTER III: PROCEDURE (Articles 39 – 64)
CHAPTER IV: ADVISORY OPINIONS (Articles 65 – 68)
CHAPTER V: AMENDMENT (Articles 69 & 70)

Article 1

The International Court of Justice established by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations shall be constituted and shall function in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT

Article 2

The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.

Article 3

1. The Court shall consist of fifteen members, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state.

2. A person who for the purposes of membership in the Court could be regarded as a national of more than one state shall be deemed to be a national of the one in which he ordinarily exercises civil and political rights.

Article 4

1. The members of the Court shall be elected by the General Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in accordance with the following provisions.

2. In the case of Members of the United Nations not represented in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, candidates shall be nominated by national groups appointed for this purpose by their governments under the same conditions as those prescribed for members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by Article 44 of the Convention of The Hague of 1907 for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

3. The conditions under which a state which is a party to the present Statute but is not a Member of the United Nations may participate in electing the members of the Court shall, in the absence of a special agreement, be laid down by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5

1. At least three months before the date of the election, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a written request to the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration belonging to the states which are parties to the present Statute, and to the members of the national groups appointed under Article 4, paragraph 2, inviting them to undertake, within a given time, by national groups, the nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court.

2. No group may nominate more than four persons, not more than two of whom shall be of their own nationality. In no case may the number of candidates nominated by a group be more than double the number of seats to be filled.

Article 6

Before making these nominations, each national group is recommended to consult its highest court of justice, its legal faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national sections of international academies devoted to the study of law.

Article 7

1. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the persons thus nominated. Save as provided in Article 12, paragraph 2, these shall be the only persons eligible.

2. The Secretary-General shall submit this list to the General Assembly and to the Security Council.

Article 8

The General Assembly and the Security Council shall proceed independently of one another to elect the members of the Court.

Article 9

At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.

Article 10

1. Those candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes in the General Assembly and in the Security Council shall be considered as elected.

2. Any vote of the Security Council, whether for the election of judges or for the appointment of members of the conference envisaged in Article 12, shall be taken without any distinction between permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council.

3. In the event of more than one national of the same state obtaining an absolute majority of the votes both of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, the eldest of these only shall be considered as elected.

Article 11

If, after the first meeting held for the purpose of the election, one or more seats remain to be filled, a second and, if necessary, a third meeting shall take place.

Article 12

1. If, after the third meeting, one or more seats still remain unfilled, a joint conference consisting of six members, three appointed by the General Assembly and three by the Security Council, may be formed at any time at the request of either the General Assembly or the Security Council, for the purpose of choosing by the vote of an absolute majority one name for each seat still vacant, to submit to the General Assembly and the Security Council for their respective acceptance.

2. If the joint conference is unanimously agreed upon any person who fulfills the required conditions, he may be included in its list, even though he was not included in the list of nominations referred to in Article 7.

3. If the joint conference is satisfied that it will not be successful in procuring an election, those members of the Court who have already been elected shall, within a period to be fixed by the Security Council, proceed to fill the vacant seats by selection from among those candidates who have obtained votes either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council.

4. In the event of an equality of votes among the judges, the eldest judge shall have a casting vote.

Article 13

1. The members of the Court shall be elected for nine years and may be re-elected; provided, however, that of the judges elected at the first election, the terms of five judges shall expire at the end of three years and the terms of five more judges shall expire at the end of six years.

2. The judges whose terms are to expire at the end of the above-mentioned initial periods of three and six years shall be chosen by lot to be drawn by the Secretary-General immediately after the first election has been completed.

3. The members of the Court shall continue to discharge their duties until their places have been filled. Though replaced, they shall finish any cases which they may have begun.

4. In the case of the resignation of a member of the Court, the resignation shall be addressed to the President of the Court for transmission to the Secretary-General. This last notification makes the place vacant.

Article 14

Vacancies shall be filled by the same method as that laid down for the first election, subject to the following provision: the Secretary-General shall, within one month of the occurrence of the vacancy, proceed to issue the invitations provided for in Article 5, and the date of the election shall be fixed by the Security Council.

Article 15

A member of the Court elected to replace a member whose term of office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of his predecessor’s term.

Article 16

1. No member of the Court may exercise any political or administrative function, or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature.

2. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

Article 17

1. No member of the Court may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case.

2. No member may participate in the decision of any case in which he has previously taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity.

3. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

Article 18

1. No member of the Court can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous opinion of the other members, he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions.

2. Formal notification thereof shall be made to the Secretary-General by the Registrar.

3. This notification makes the place vacant.

Article 19

The members of the Court, when engaged on the business of the Court, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

Article 20

Every member of the Court shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and conscientiously.

Article 21

1. The Court shall elect its President and Vice-President for three years; they may be re-elected.

2. The Court shall appoint its Registrar and may provide for the appointment of such other officers as may be necessary.

Article 22

1. The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague. This, however, shall not prevent the Court from sitting and exercising its functions elsewhere whenever the Court considers it desirable.

2. The President and the Registrar shall reside at the seat of the Court.

Article 23

1. The Court shall remain permanently in session, except during the judicial vacations, the dates and duration of which shall be fixed by the Court.

2. Members of the Court are entitled to periodic leave, the dates and duration of which shall be fixed by the Court, having in mind the distance between The Hague and the home of each judge.

3. Members of the Court shall be bound, unless they are on leave or prevented from attending by illness or other serious reasons duly explained to the President, to hold themselves permanently at the disposal of the Court.

Article 24

1. If, for some special reason, a member of the Court considers that he should not take part in the decision of a particular case, he shall so inform the President.

2. If the President considers that for some special reason one of the members of the Court should not sit in a particular case, he shall give him notice accordingly.

3. If in any such case the member of the Court and the President disagree, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

Article 25

1. The full Court shall sit except when it is expressly provided otherwise in the present Statute.

2. Subject to the condition that the number of judges available to constitute the Court is not thereby reduced below eleven, the Rules of the Court may provide for allowing one or more judges, according to circumstances and in rotation, to be dispensed from sitting.

3. A quorum of nine judges shall suffice to constitute the Court.

Article 26

1. The Court may from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges as the Court may determine, for dealing with particular categories of cases; for example, labour cases and cases relating to transit and communications.

2. The Court may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The number of judges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the parties.

3. Cases shall be heard and determined by the chambers provided for in this article if the parties so request.

Article 27

A judgment given by any of the chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 29 shall be considered as rendered by the Court.

Article 28

The chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 29 may, with the consent of the parties, sit and exercise their functions elsewhere than at The Hague.

Article 29

With a view to the speedy dispatch of business, the Court shall form annually a chamber composed of five judges which, at the request of the parties, may hear and determine cases by summary procedure. In addition, two judges shall be selected for the purpose of replacing judges who find it impossible to sit.

Article 30

1. The Court shall frame rules for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay down rules of procedure.

2. The Rules of the Court may provide for assessors to sit with the Court or with any of its chambers, without the right to vote.

Article 31

1. Judges of the nationality of each of the parties shall retain their right to sit in the case before the Court.

2. If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as judge. Such person shall be chosen preferably from among those persons who have been nominated as candidates as provided in Articles 4 and 5.

3. If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties may proceed to choose a judge as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article.

4. The provisions of this Article shall apply to the case of Articles 26 and 29. In such cases, the President shall request one or, if necessary, two of the members of the Court forming the chamber to give place to the members of the Court of the nationality of the parties concerned, and, failing such, or if they are unable to be present, to the judges specially chosen by the parties.

5. Should there be several parties in the same interest, they shall, for the purpose of the preceding provisions, be reckoned as one party only. Any doubt upon this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

6. Judges chosen as laid down in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this Article shall fulfill the conditions required by Articles 2, 17 (paragraph 2), 20, and 24 of the present Statute. They shall take part in the decision on terms of complete equality with their colleagues.

Article 32

1. Each member of the Court shall receive an annual salary.

2. The President shall receive a special annual allowance.

3. The Vice-President shall receive a special allowance for every day on which he acts as President.

4. The judges chosen under Article 31, other than members of the Court, shall receive compensation for each day on which they exercise their functions.

5. These salaries, allowances, and compensation shall be fixed by the General Assembly. They may not be decreased during the term of office.

6. The salary of the Registrar shall be fixed by the General Assembly on the proposal of the Court.

7. Regulations made by the General Assembly shall fix the conditions under which retirement pensions may be given to members of the Court and to the Registrar, and the conditions under which members of the Court and the Registrar shall have their travelling expenses refunded.

8. The above salaries, allowances, and compensation shall be free of all taxation.

Article 33

The expenses of the Court shall be borne by the United Nations in such a manner as shall be decided by the General Assembly.


CHAPTER II

COMPETENCE OF THE COURT

Article 34

1. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.

2. The Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request of public international organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented by such organizations on their own initiative.

3. Whenever the construction of the constituent instrument of a public international organization or of an international convention adopted thereunder is in question in a case before the Court, the Registrar shall so notify the public international organization concerned and shall communicate to it copies of all the written proceedings.

Article 35

1. The Court shall be open to the states parties to the present Statute.

2. The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other states shall, subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security Council, but in no case shall such conditions place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.

3. When a state which is not a Member of the United Nations is a party to a case, the Court shall fix the amount which that party is to contribute towards the expenses of the Court. This provision shall not apply if such state is bearing a share of the expenses of the Court

Article 36

1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.

2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:

  • the interpretation of a treaty;
  • any question of international law;
  • the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
  • the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.

4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.

5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms.

6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

Article 37

Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice.

Article 38

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

  • international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
  • international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
  • the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
  • subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.


CHAPTER III

PROCEDURE

Article 39

1. The official languages of the Court shall be French and English. If the parties agree that the case shall be conducted in French, the judgment shall be delivered in French. If the parties agree that the case shall be conducted in English, the judgment shall be delivered in English.

2. In the absence of an agreement as to which language shall be employed, each party may, in the pleadings, use the language which it prefers; the decision of the Court shall be given in French and English. In this case the Court shall at the same time determine which of the two texts shall be considered as authoritative.

3. The Court shall, at the request of any party, authorize a language other than French or English to be used by that party.

Article 40

1. Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special agreement or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated.

2. The Registrar shall forthwith communicate the application to all concerned.

3. He shall also notify the Members of the United Nations through the Secretary-General, and also any other states entitled to appear before the Court.

Article 41

1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.

2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council.

Article 42

1. The parties shall be represented by agents.

2. They may have the assistance of counsel or advocates before the Court.

3. The agents, counsel, and advocates of parties before the Court shall enjoy the privileges and immunities necessary to the independent exercise of their duties.

Article 43

1. The procedure shall consist of two parts: written and oral.

2. The written proceedings shall consist of the communication to the Court and to the parties of memorials, counter-memorials and, if necessary, replies; also all papers and documents in support.

3. These communications shall be made through the Registrar, in the order and within the time fixed by the Court.

4. A certified copy of every document produced by one party shall be communicated to the other party.

5. The oral proceedings shall consist of the hearing by the Court of witnesses, experts, agents, counsel, and advocates.

Article 44

1. For the service of all notices upon persons other than the agents, counsel, and advocates, the Court shall apply direct to the government of the state upon whose territory the notice has to be served.

2. The same provision shall apply whenever steps are to be taken to procure evidence on the spot.

Article 45

The hearing shall be under the control of the President or, if he is unable to preside, of the Vice-President; if neither is able to preside, the senior judge present shall preside.

Article 46

The hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall decide otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the public be not admitted .

Article 47

1. Minutes shall be made at each hearing and signed by the Registrar and the President.

2. These minutes alone shall be authentic.

Article 48

The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall decide the form and time in which each party must conclude its arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence.

Article 49

The Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents to produce any document or to supply any explanations. Formal note shall be taken of any refusal.

Article 50

The Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion.

Article 51

During the hearing any relevant questions are to be put to the witnesses and experts under the conditions laid down by the Court in the rules of procedure referred to in Article 30.

Article 52

After the Court has received the proofs and evidence within the time specified for the purpose, it may refuse to accept any further oral or written evidence that one party may desire to present unless the other side consents.

Article 53

1. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim.

2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.

Article 54

1. When, subject to the control of the Court, the agents, counsel, and advocates have completed their presentation of the case, the President shall declare the hearing closed.

2. The Court shall withdraw to consider the judgment.

3. The deliberations of the Court shall take place in private and remain secret.

Article 55

1. All questions shall be decided by a majority of the judges present.

2. In the event of an equality of votes, the President or the judge who acts in his place shall have a casting vote.

Article 56

1. The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based.

2. It shall contain the names of the judges who have taken part in the decision.

Article 57

If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.

Article 58

The judgment shall be signed by the President and by the Registrar. It shall be read in open court, due notice having been given to the agents.

Article 59

The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.

Article 60

The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party.

Article 61

1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application admissible on this ground.

3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision.

4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new fact.

5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment.

Article 62

l. Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene.

2 It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request.

Article 63

1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which states other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such states forthwith.

2. Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it.

Article 64

Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own costs.


CHAPTER IV

ADVISORY OPINIONS

Article 65

1. The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.

2. Questions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked shall be laid before the Court by means of a written request containing an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is required, and accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the question.

Article 66

1. The Registrar shall forthwith give notice of the request for an advisory opinion to all states entitled to appear before the Court.

2. The Registrar shall also, by means of a special and direct communication, notify any state entitled to appear before the Court or international organization considered by the Court, or, should it not be sitting, by the President, as likely to be able to furnish information on the question, that the Court will be prepared to receive, within a time-limit to be fixed by the President, written statements, or to hear, at a public sitting to be held for the purpose, oral statements relating to the question.

3. Should any such state entitled to appear before the Court have failed to receive the special communication referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, such state may express a desire to submit a written statement or to be heard; and the Court will decide.

4. States and organizations having presented written or oral statements or both shall be permitted to comment on the statements made by other states or organizations in the form, to the extent, and within the time-limits which the Court, or, should it not be sitting, the President, shall decide in each particular case. Accordingly, the Registrar shall in due time communicate any such written statements to states and organizations having submitted similar statements.

Article 67

The Court shall deliver its advisory opinions in open court, notice having been given to the Secretary-General and to the representatives of Members of the United Nations, of other states and of international organizations immediately concerned.

Article 68

In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable.


CHAPTER V

AMENDMENT

Article 69

Amendments to the present Statute shall be effected by the same procedure as is provided by the Charter of the United Nations for amendments to that Charter, subject however to any provisions which the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council may adopt concerning the participation of states which are parties to the present Statute but are not Members of the United Nations.

Article 70

The Court shall have power to propose such amendments to the present Statute as it may deem necessary, through written communications to the Secretary-General, for consideration in conformity with the provisions of Article 69.


 

Consumer Forums are not Courts but are quasi-judicial bodies or authorities or agencies

National Commission is not a Court. (See Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, (1995) 3 SCC 583; Charan Singh v. Healing Touch Hospital, (2000) 7 SCC 668; State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society, (2003) 2 SCC 412. This position has been fortified recently by a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association (2010) 11 SCC 1, where this Court has observed:Continue Reading