In Sukhar v. State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507, The Court has explained the provisions of Section 6 of the Evidence Act, 1872 observing that it is an exception to the general rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. However, such evidence must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae, must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter.
Order of Discharge-Sections 120B, 302, 201 r.w. S.34 IPC and Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 of the Arms Act- In the present case, on account of the inconsistency in framing charges by the Sessions Court against the six accused, the trial has got truncated. The trial with respect to three accused i.e. Sachin Bansal, Narendra Mann, and the alleged contract killer – Joginder Singh Sodhi has proceeded in the absence of the other three accused viz. Shiv Charan Bansal, Lalit Mann and Shailendra Singh.
Whether contents of a memory card being electronic record U/S 2(1)(t) of IT Act can be termed as “document”: SC says yes-29/11/2019.
P. Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep Versus State of Kerala and Anr.- Whether contents of a memory card being electronic record under Sec 2(1)(t) of IT Act 2000 would qualify as a “document” Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (forby short, ‘the 1872 Act’) and Section 29 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved”
It is a settled principle of law that when the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings against the accused persons which are based on due appreciation of evidence, this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India would be slow to interfere in such concurrent findings and secondly would not appreciate the evidence de novo unless it is prima facie shown that both the Courts below did not either consider the relevant piece of evidence or there exists any perversity or/and absurdity in the findings recorded by both the Courts below etc.
We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervend since the judgment was entered