Use of proceeding of the Parliament

In Jyoti Harshad Mehta and others v. Custodian and others, (2009) 10 SCC 564 it has been held that reports of the Joint Parliamentary Committee are admissible only for the purpose of tracing the legal history of the legislation.

In this regard, we may also usefully state that the speeches of Ministers in the Parliament are referred to on certain occasions for limited purposes. A Constitution Bench in State of W.B. v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 has held:-

“It is however well-settled that the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill, when introduced in Parliament, cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the statute. They cannot be used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation. But we cannot use this statement as an aid to the construction of the enactment or to show that the legislature did not intend to acquire the proprietary rights vested in the State or in any way to affect the State Governments’ rights as owners of minerals. A statute, as passed by Parliament, is the expression of the collective intention of the legislature as a whole, and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of the intention and objects of the Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute.”

In K.P. Varghese v. Income-tax Officer, Ernakulam and another, AIR 1981 SC 1922 the Court while referring to the budget speech of the Minister ruled:-

“Now it is true that the speeches made by the Members of the Legislature on the floor of the House when a Bill for enacting a statutory provision is being debated are inadmissible for the purpose of interpreting the statutory provision but the speech made by the Mover of the Bill explaining the reason for the introduction of the Bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted. This is in accord with the recent trend in juristic thought not only in western countries but also in India that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible. In fact there are at least three decisions of this Court, one in Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT, AIR 1976 SC 10 the other in Indian Chamber of Commerce v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1976 SC 348 and the third in Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers’ Association, AIR 1980 SC 387 where the speech made by the Finance Minister while introducing the exclusionary clause in Section 2, clause (15) of the Act was relied upon by the Court for the purpose of ascertaining what was the reason for introducing that clause.”

 Similar references have also been made in Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte, (1996) 1 SCC 130. That apart, Parliamentary debates have also been referred to appreciate the context relating to the construction of a statute in Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1 State of M.P. v. Dadabhoy’s New Chirimiri Ponri Hill Colliery Co. (P) Ltd., (1972) 1 SCC 298 Union of India v. Steel Stock Holders’ Syndicate, (1976) 3 SCC 108 K.P. Varghese (supra) and Surana Steels (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) 4 SCC 306.

We have referred to these authorities to highlight that the said speeches have been referred to or not referred to for the purposes indicated therein and when the meaning of a statute is not clear or ambiguous, the circumstances that led to passing of the legislation can be look into to ascertain the intention of the legislature.

Thus observed, the reference to Constituent Assembly debates, reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee and the speeches made in the Parliament or for that matter, debates held in Parliament are only meant for understanding the Constitution or the legislation, as the case may be. It is quite different than to place reliance upon Parliamentary Standing Committee report as a piece of evidence to establish a fact. We have been commended to the authority by the learned counsel appearing for the Union of India reported in R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and others ex parte Anderson Strathclyde plc, [1983] 2 All ER 233:-

“In my judgment there is no distinction between using a report in Hansard for the purpose of supporting a cause of action arising out of something which occurred outside the House, and using a report for the purpose of supporting a ground for relief in proceedings for judicial review in respect of something which occurred outside the House. In both cases the court would have to do more than take note of the fact that a certain statement was made in the House on a certain date. It would have to consider the statement or statements with a view to determining what was the true meaning of them, and what were the proper inferences to be drawn from them. This, in my judgment, would be contrary to art 9 of the Bill of Rights. It would be doing what Blackstone said was not to be done, namely to examine, discuss and adjudge on a matter which was being considered in Parliament. Moreover, it would be an invasion by the court of the right of every member of Parliament to free speech in the House with the possible adverse effects referred to by Browne J.”

 In this regard, a reference to a three-Judge Bench decision in State Bank of India through General Manager v. National Housing Bank and others, (2013) 16 SCC 538 would be apposite. The Court was dealing with an appeal preferred under Section 10 of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act 27 of 1992. In the said case, this Court noticed that the learned Judge of the Special Court had extensively relied upon the Second Interim of the Janakiraman Committee[27*] on the ground that the same was filed by the first defendant. The Court in that context held:-

[27* Committee set up by RBI on 30.04.1992 which submitted six reports and the Final Report was on 07.05.1993]

“50. It is well settled by a long line of judicial authority that the findings of even a statutory commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 are not enforceable proprio vigore as held in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 and the statements made before such Commission are expressly made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings civil or criminal. The leading judicial pronouncements on that question were succinctly analysed by this Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181 SCC paras 29-34. Para 34 of the judgment inter alia reads:

“34. … In our view, the courts, civil or criminal, are not bound by the report or findings of the Commission of Inquiry as they have to ar- rive at their own decision on the evidence placed before them in accordance with law.”

Therefore, courts are not bound by the conclusions and findings rendered by such commissions. The statements made before such commission cannot be used as evidence before any civil or criminal court. It should logically follow that even the conclusions based on such statements can also not be used as evidence in any court. The Janakiraman Committee is not even a statutory body authorised to collect evidence in the legal sense. It is a body set up by the Governor of Reserve Bank of India obviously in exercise of its administrative functions,

“… the Governor, RBI set up a committee on 30-4-1992 to investigate into the possible irregularities in funds management by commercial banks and financial institutions, and in particular, in relation to their dealings in government securities, public sector bonds and similar instruments. The Committee was required to investigate various aspects of the transactions of SBI and other commercial banks as well as financial institutions in this regard.”[*]

[ Janakiraman Committee’s first interim report, May 1992, p. 1.]

And again:-

“53. The report of such a committee in our view can at best be the opinion of the Committee based on its own examination of the records of the various banks (including the plaintiff and the first defendant) and the statements recorded (by the Committee) of the various persons examined by the Committee. In our considered view the report of the Janakiraman Committee is not evidence within the meaning of Evidence Act which the Special Court is bound to follow.”