Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act 2010

Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh

Ministry of Women and Children Affairs

Notification

SRO No. .- The power vested upon the

government according to the section 37 of the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2010 (Act 58 of 2010), the government hereby published the following act:-

English Version of the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2010 [Act 58 of 2010]


An Act to provide as a signatory state of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979 and the

Convention on the Children’s Right, 1989 and to establish equal rights for women and children guaranteed in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh prevention of domestic violence, protection of women and children from domestic violence and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

WHEREAS it is expedient and necessary as a signatory state of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979 and Convention on the Children’s Right, 1989 and to establish equal rights for women and children guaranteed in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh prevention of domestic violence, protection of women and children from domestic violence and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto:-

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Power of Magistrate to grant interim and ex parte orders under Domestic Violence Act

Section 23 in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Power to grant interim and ex parte orders—

(1) In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper.

(2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under section 18, section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22 against the respondent.


Interim General Order  and Contested Order (Cl-1)

In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper.

Suo Motu X by Application

In any proceeding

before him under this Act,

the Magistrate may pass

such interim order

as he deems just

and proper.

Against the Respondent

Against the Applicant

A balanced order

∑ – X/3 = ∞


Reconstructed 23(1)

In any proceeding before him under this Act if the Magistrate is satisfied Suo Motu or that an application prima facie discloses or on the basis of an affidavit, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper to protect the aggrieved person, the respondent or any conceren person, as the case may be.

In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1953 SC 274, the Supreme Court held that, it is settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase and sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself.


Interim order Ex-parte(Cl-2)

If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under section 18, section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22 against the respondent.

If the Magistrate is satisfied

that an application prima facie discloses

that the respondent is committing

or has committed an act of domestic violence

or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence,

he may grant

an ex parte order

on the basis of the affidavit

in such form as may be prescribed

of the aggrieved person

under section 18,

section 19,

section 20,

section 21 or,

as the case may be, section 22

against the respondent.

∑ – X/1 = Ω


Affidavit: In M.Veerabhadra Rao v. Tek Chand reported in AIR 1985 SC 28, the Supreme Court explained the word, affidavit as follows:

The expression ‘affidavit’ has been commonly understood to mean a sworn statement in writing made especially under oath or on affirmation before an authorised Magistrate or officer. Affidavit has been defined in sub-cl. (3) of Sec. 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to include ‘affirmation and declaration in the case of person by law allowed to affirm or declare instead of swearing.’ The essential ingredients of an affidavit are that the statements or declarations are made by the deponent relevant to the subject matter and in order to add sanctity to it, he swears or affirms the truth of the statements made in the presence of a person who in law is authorised either to administer oath or to accept the affirmation.

 Just: Judicial Dictionary – K.J.Aiyer:

Just. The term ‘just’ is derived from the Latin word justus. It has various meanings which are often governed by the context. The word ‘just’ may apply in nearly all of its senses, either to ethics of law, denoting something which is morally right and fair and sometimes that which is right and fair according to positive law. It cannotes reasonableness and something conforming to rectitude and justice, something equitable and fair. [Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.50, p.1100]. Words and Phrases, West Publishing Co, Vol.23, p.438, the true meaning of the word ‘just’ states in these terms: ‘the word ‘just’ is derived from the Lain ‘justus’ which is from the Latin jus, which means a right and more technically, a legal right-a law. Thus ‘jus dicere’ was to pronounce the judgment to give the legal decision. The word ‘just’ is defined by the Century Dictionary as ‘right in law or ethics’, and in Standard Dictionary as ‘conforming to the requirements of right or of positive law’, and in Anderson’s Law Dictionary as ‘probable, reasonable’. Kinneys’s Law Dictionary defines the word ‘just’ as ‘fair, adequate, probable, reasonable’, and justa causa as ‘a just cause; lawful ground.’ [Bergman v. Kress 81 NYS 1072 (1073), 83 App Div.1].

Proper. Natural; suitably; correct; just; right; becoming. The word is also used in the sense of ‘own’.

The Law Lexicon – P.Ramanatha Aiyar:

Just. As an adjective fair; adequate; reasonable; probable; right in accordance with law and justice; right in law or ethics; rightful, legitimate, well founded; comformable to laws; conforming to the requirements of right or positive law; conformed to rules or principle of justice, 2 Bom. LR 845.

Application – The original application u/s 12 and not any second application apart from an affidavit.

Interpretation: In Visitor Amu v. K.S.Misra reported in 2007 (8) SCC 594, the Supreme Court held that, It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute.

In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755, the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 52, 54, 55 and 56, held as follows:

52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd.

 Thus, in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India [1991 (2) SCC 87] this Court has observed that sometimes courts can supply words which have been accidentally omitted.

In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622, the Supreme Court held as follows:

12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.

The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately ariseKanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907]

Interpretation of Rules: In Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India reported in AIR 1991 SC 284, the Supreme Court explained, as to how, the rules, which are legislative in character, to be interpreted. At Paragraph 3, it held as follows:

3. Since the rules are legislative in character, they must harmoniously be interpreted as a connected whole giving life and force to each word, phrase and rule and no part thereof should be rendered nugatory or a surplusage. Resort to iron out the creases could be had only when the construction of the relevant rule, phrase or word Would lead to unintended absurd results.

Three Doctrine same effect-It is no doubt true that the doctrine of Noscitur A Sociis, meaning thereby, that it is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them i.e. when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general. The philosophy behind it is that the meaning of the doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. This doctrine is broader than the doctrine of ejusdem generis. This doctrine was accepted by this Court in catena of cases but its application is to be made to the context and the setting in which the words came to be used or associated in the statute or the statutory rule. Equally the doctrine of contemporanea expositio is also being invoked to cull out the intendment by removing ambiguity in its understanding of the statute by the executive. This Court (sic) in a latest case Mitra Prakashan Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, 1991 (51) ELT 111 (115, para 15) cited all the decisions up-to-date and applied the doctrine to the understanding by the revenue of the provisions in Income-tax Act. In Desh Bandhu Gupta v. Delhi Stock Exchange, (1979) 3 SCR 373, this Court held that this principle can be invoked, though the same will not always be decisive on the question of construction. But the contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing the statute, although not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight as highly pursuasive. We may also add that if the .interpretation is erroneous, court would without hesitation refuse to follow such construction. This Court also equally expressed the view that its application was in restricted sense to ancient legislation in J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1987) Suppl. SCC 350; and in Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. case, (1988) 2 SCR 962 at page No. 1000 F to H. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. G. S. Dall and Flour Mills, (1992) 1 Suppl. SCC 150 at page No. 153, para 18, this Court doubted the application of the doctrine of contemporanea expositio as given to the construction or its applicability to a recent statute that too in the first few years of its enforcement. In this case also the question whether toilet soap is a household soap had arisen within a short period after the Amendment Act, 1964 came into force. Therefore, the understanding by the executive and its interpretation in bringing toilet soap in sub-item (2) “other sorts” instead of Item I “household” being of formative period of statutory operation the doctrine became inapplicable.

The Division Bench of the High Court culled-out the principles for the applicability of the rule of ejusdem generis from the judgments of this Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (1971) 1 SCC 671 and Amar Chandra Chakkraborty v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1972 SC 1863. Construing S.443 of the Act the High Court found that “theatre, circus, cinema house, dancing hall” have been specifically mentioned followed by the expression “other similar places of public resort, recreation or amusement” which are of general nature. Applying the principles of ejusdem generis, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the general words are intended to have a restricted meaning in the sense that “other similar places” must fall within the class enumerated by the specific words [AIR 1995 SC 419 : (1994) 2 Suppl. SCR 23 : (1994) 5 SCC 690 : JT 1994 (4) SC 463 : (1994) 3 SCALE 456] Read more

Section 165 of Evidence Act: Judge’s power to put questions or order production

Sec 165. Judge’s power to put questions or order production— The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question:

Provided that the Judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved:

Provided also that this section shall not authorize any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question, or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under sections 121 to 131, both inclusive, if the questions were asked or the documents were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under section 148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.


Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women: UN General Assembly resolution 1993

Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women

The term “violence against women” means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

Proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993

The General Assembly ,

Recognizing the urgent need for the universal application to women of the rights and principles with regard to equality, security, liberty, integrity and dignity of all human beings,

Noting that those rights and principles are enshrined in international instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

Recognizing that effective implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women would contribute to the elimination of violence against women and that the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, set forth in the present resolution, will strengthen and complement that process,

Concerned that violence against women is an obstacle to the achievement of equality, development and peace, as recognized in the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, in which a set of measures to combat violence against women was recommended, and to the full implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,

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Shyamlal Devda and Others Vs. Parimala-22/1/2020

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA JUDGMENTS

Section 18 of the Domestic Violence Act relates to protection order. In terms of Section 18 of the Act, intention of the legislature is to provide more protection to woman. Section 20 of the Act empowers the court to order for monetary relief to the “aggrieved party”. When acts of domestic violence is alleged, before issuing notice, the court has to be prima facie satisfied that there have been instances of domestic violence.

ACTS: Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

FROM: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Shyamlal Devda and Others Vs. Parimala

[Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 2020 arising out of SIP (Crl.) No. 4979 of 2019]

R. Banumathi, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of the impugned judgment dated 18.02.2019 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Petition No.5959 of 2015 in and by which the High Court has dismissed the petition filed by the appellants stating that the Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru has the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the respondent under Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (For short “Domestic Violence Act”).

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EVIDENCE CANNOT BE TAKEN ON AFFIDAVIT IN MAINTENANCE PROCEEDING OR UNDER DV ACT-MP HIGH COURT

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Rama Prasanna Tiwari vs Smt. Ashima And Anr.

Dated : 24 February, 2005

Equivalent citations: 2005 (2) MPHT 192

Author: K Lahoti

ORDER K.K. Lahoti, J.

1. Petitioner has challenged order dated 30-10-2004 passed by the Family Court, Rewa in Case No. 1/2004 by which the Family Court has rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.PC’).

2. Before the Family Court, an application under Section 125, Cr.PC has been filed by the respondents for maintenance. In the said proceedings, the respondents filed their affidavit in evidence and petitioner has been directed to cross-examine on the affidavit. At this stage, petitioner raised an objection in writing that in the proceedings, evidence can not be taken on affidavit, but the respondent should be examined in the Court in the presence of petitioner or his Counsel. Family Court relying on Section 10(3) of the Family Court Act found that the Family Court is having jurisdiction to adopt its own procedure for recording evidence and relying on provisions of Code of Civil Procedure held that the affidavit can be received in evidence and rejected the application of the petitioner. This order is under challenge in this petition.

3. Learned Counsel for petitioner submits that under Sub-section (2) of Section 10 there is specific provision that subject to the other provisions of this Act and the Rules, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the Rules made thereunder, shall apply to the proceedings under Chapter IX of that Code before the Family Court. Section 125 falls under Chapter IX of the Cr.PC and the procedure envisaged under Section 126, Cr.PC shall apply in the proceedings and not the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. It is submitted that order passed by the Family Court be set aside and the matter be remitted back to the Family Court to decide the matter in accordance with law.

4. Learned Counsel appearing for respondents supported the order and submitted that in view of Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Court has rightly adopted the procedure and there is no fault in the procedure. Petitioner shall get the opportunity to cross-examine on the affidavit. This will save the time of the Trial Court and no prejudice shall be caused to the petitioner.

5. To consider the rival contentions of the parties, Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 may be seen :

“Section 10. Procedure generally.– (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the Rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and of any other law for the time being in force shall apply to the suits and proceedings (other than the proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) before a Family Court and for the purposes of the said provisions of the Code, a Family Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have all the powers of such Court.

(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the Rules made thereunder, shall apply to the proceedings under Chapter IX of that Code before a Family Court.

(3) Nothing in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall prevent a Family Court from laying down its own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject matter of the suit or proceedings or at the truth of the facts alleged by the one Party and denied by the other.”

Aforesaid provisions specifically provide that in the proceedings under Chapter IX of Cr.PC before a Family Court, provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure and the rules made thereunder shall apply. This is specific provision under the Act which provides the procedure for the proceedings under Chapter IX of the Cr.PC. Though Family Courts are vested with the powers to decide the matter under Hindu Marriage Act and other Acts, but so far as proceedings under Chapter IX of the Cr.PC are concerned, there is specific provision to adopt same procedure as envisaged in the Cr.PC. For the proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr.PC, procedure is envisaged under Section 126 of the Cr.PC. For ready reference, Section 126, Cr.PC reads as under :–

“Section 126. Procedure.– (1) Proceedings under Section 125 may be taken against any person in any district–

(a) where he is, or

(b) where he or his wife resides, or

(c) where he last resided with his wife, or as the case may be, with the mother of the illegitimate child.

(2) All evidence in such proceedings shall be taken in the presence of the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader, and shall be recorded in the manner prescribed for summons-case : Provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made is wilfully avoiding service, or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear and determine the case ex parte and any order so made may be set aside for good cause shown on an application made within three months from the date thereof subject to such terms including terms as to payment of costs to the opposite party as the Magistrate m ay think just and proper.

(3) The Court in dealing with applications under Section 125 shall have power to make such order as to costs as may be just.”

Sub-section (2) of Section 126, Cr.PC specifically provides that all evidence in such proceedings shall be taken in the presence of the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made. In the present case, respondents have sought an order against the petitioner for their maintenance. In these circumstances, evidence has to be recorded in the presence of the petitioner. Affidavit evidence as has been produced by the respondents can not be said to be evidence recorded in the presence of the petitioner. Provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable for the proceedings under Chapter IX of the Cr.PC. In the circumstances, Family Court ought to have adopted the procedure envisaged under Section 126 of the Cr.PC. In view of the aforesaid provision, until and unless provision is made, the Family Court has to follow the procedure as envisaged under Section 126, Cr.PC for the proceedings under Chapter IX, Cr.PC. The Family Court has committed an error in directing the parties to file affidavit in evidence and further in permitting the other party to cross-examine on affidavit. According to provisions under Section 126, Cr.PC, evidence has to be recorded in the presence of the person against whom an order of maintenance is proposed to be made. Consequently, impugned order passed by the Family Court, Rewa is, hereby, set aside and the Family Court, Rewa is directed to record the evidence as envisaged under Section 126 of the Cr.PC.

No order as to costs.

C.C. as per rules.

K.K. Lahoti, J.

24 February, 2005


 

Conduct of parties prior to the coming of PWD Act, could be taken into cognizance

In V.D. Bhanot Vs. Savita Bhanot, In the said case, this Court held as follows:

12. We agree with the view expressed by the High Court that in looking into a complaint u/s 12 of the PWD Act, 2005, the conduct of the parties even prior to the coming into force of the PWD Act, could be taken into consideration while passing an order u/s 18, 19 and 20 thereof. In our view, the Delhi High Court has also rightly held that even if a wife, who had shared a household in the past, but was no longer doing so when the Act came into force, would still be entitled to the protection of the PWD Act, 2005.Continue Reading

THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT 2005

Came into force on 26-10-2006, vide S.O. 1776(E), dated 17th October, 2006, published in the Gazette of India, Extra., Pt. II, Sec. 3(ii), dated 17th October, 2006.

Law of Domestic Violence-Commentary on The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act 2005

1. Short title, extent and commencement.—

(1) This Act may be called the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(3) It shall come into force on such date  as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.Continue Reading

Digest Domestic Violence Act 2005


1. Kunapareddy @Nookala shanka balaji vs Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari & Anr (SC)

Amendment in the complaint was allowed: cognizance not taken, did not change the original nature and summons were yet to be ordered to be issued.

2. Hiralal P. Harsora & Ors. vs Kusum Narotamdas Harsora & Ors. (SC)

Section 2(q) ‘adult male’ struck off before the word person.

3. Krishna Bhatacharjee vs Sarathi Choudhury And Anr (SC)

Retention of Stridhan by husband or any of his family members is a continuing offence.
Claim not barred by limitation that she should have claimed it prior to judicial separation

4. Shalu Ojha versus Prashant Ojha (SC)

Whether the Sessions Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 29 of the Act
has any power to pass interim orders staying the execution of the order appealed before
it is a mater to be examined in an appropriate case. No express grant of power conferred
on the Sessions Court while such power is expressly conferred on the Magistrate under Section 23.

5. Prakash N.D.Saha versus Sou. Meena Prakash D Saha (SC)

S.20,21 Unsuccessful divorce proceedings cannot adversely affect maintainability of application fled under Act.

6. Saraswathy versus Babu (SC)

Compensation and damages for injuries : pay compensation and damages to the
extent of Rs. 5,00,000 in favour of the wife.

7. Indra Sarma versus V.K.V. Sarma (SC)

The Supreme Court para 55 has laid down the tests for judging a live in relationship
following which the expression “ In the nature of marriage” under section 2 (f) of D.V. Act; holding that all live in relationships are not in the nature of marriage and the court shall come to an informed decision on the basis of material available, before passing an order in such cases.

8. V.D.Bhanot versus Savita Bhanot (SC)

Section 2(s) petition under the provisions of the PWD Act, 2005, was maintainable by a woman, who was no longer residing with her husband or who was allegedly subjected to any act of domestic violence prior to the coming into force of the PWD Act on 26th October, 2006.

9. Inderjit Singh Grewal versus State of Punjab & Anr (SC)

Case u/s 12 DV Act afer obtaining divorce by mutual consent and later challenging the same.

10. D.Velusamy versus D.Patachaiammal (SC)

Section 2(f) domestic relationship

11. Japani Sahoo versus Chandra Shekhar Mohanty (SC) 

Provision of limitation in section 468 Cr.P.C. crucial date for computing limitation is not taking of cognizance by the magistrate but the fling of the complaint or initiation of proceedings

12. S.R. Batra & Anr versus Smt. Taruna Batra (SC)

Shared House-Hold (section 2(s)) & Sections 17 and 19(1) ) of the aforesaid Act,
The exclusive property of mother –in-law cannot be called a `shared household’

13. Chitranjan Pd. Singh versus State of Bihar (Patna High Court)

Court not empowered to decide the possession or title of the shared household or
indirectly allow relief of delivery of possession.

14. Rajesh Kumar Chaudhari versus State of U.P. & Anr (Allahabad High Court)

(On the point of limitation ) whether governed by provision of section 468 Cr.P.C.

15. Harbans Lal Malik versus Payal Malik (Delhi High Court)

The Delhi High Court  held that to constitute a family and domestic relationship under D.V. Act. It is necessary that the persons who constitute domestic relationship must be living together in the same house under one head.
The parents can be included in the family of son only when they are dependent upon the son and/or all living along with son in the same house. In case where the shared household have been at USA, the court in India directed the Brother and Father of the husband living in India to pay Rs. 50 thousand to the complainant wife jointly and severally with the husband, is set aside.

16. Sagar Sudhakar Shengde versus Mrs.Naina Sagar Shengde & Ors (Bombay High Court)

Issuance of NBW against for execution of order of maintenance well within the special procedure u/s 28 (2) D.V. Act 2005 .

17. Kunjathiri versus State of Kerela (Kerala High Court)

No necessity that the woman should be related to the person commiting wrong through
matrimony alone..A proceeding against relative of husband perfectly maintainable without husband being in the party array and without relief being sought against him.

Kunapareddy @ nooKala ShanKa Balaji VerSuS Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari & anr


OBJECTIVE SAMPLE QUESTIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005

Powerful Legal Research enterprise

DV act applies to

  1.  Only the victim of the violence
  2. all women who are subject of 125 Cr.P.C
  3. All women who are not staying with the husband
  4. women who are victim of violence within the family

Aggrieved Person includes

  1. woman having domestic relationship
  2. A woman in live- in relations
  3. a mother whom the son not allowed to live with him
  4.  above all

DV act has retrospective effect

  1. yes
  2. no
  3. Prospective effect
  4. no 1 and three are correct

Monetary relief Can be given

  1. if aggrieved woman suffer loss due to domestic violence
  2. if subject of section 125 of Cr.P.C
  3. If husband failed to maintain the woman
  4. Only no 1 is correct

Who can be respondent

  1.  Only adult male having a domestic relationship
  2. any person with whom domestic relationship could be established
  3. relatives of the husband
  4. no 2 and 3 are correct

A divorced woman can claim in a shared household

  1. true
  2. false

A woman in live in relationship resides with her boyfriend in a rented house and later she discovered that her boyfriend is the owner of a flat in salt lake city of kolkata , whether the claim of the woman for residence in the salt lake flat is competent?

  1. yes
  2. no

The Magistrate can not proceed with the complaint u/s 12 without considering DIR

  1. true
  2. false

A woman can claim u/s 17 a residence order

  1. against the shared  house belongs to husband
  2. against the shared house belongs to father -in -law
  3. against a shared house belongs to the joint family
  4. against the shared house belongs to the relative of the husband
  5. no 1 is correct position of law
  6. no 1 and 3 is the correct position of law

An application u/s 12 of DV  Act should be filed

  1. at any time after the cause of action
  2. within three years  as per article 137 of the limitation act
  3. Any limitation has not ben prescribed in DV Act
  4. no 1  and 3 are  correct
  5. no 2 is correct

An application by wife u/s 12 of DV  Act has been disposed of by the Ld Magistrate and inter alia ordered for residence in the husband’s house in Chetla Kolkata. Now the status of the wife

  1. Like divorcee
  2.  Like judicial separation
  3. Same as a full fledge wife
  4. The husband can ask for casual sex with the wife
  5. the wife can deny sexual intercourse by telling “sexual abuse clause” but allowing a man of her choice
  6. no 3 and 4 are correct
  7. no 5 are correct
  8. no 2 and 5 are correct

“Sexual abuse” defined U/s 3 of DV Act in terms of

  1. Violation of the Dignity of woman
  2. any short of sexual advancement by the husband
  3. Husband wants to see pornography with the wife
  4. Husband asks for sodomy
  5. no 1 and 4 are correct
  6. No 1 , 2 , 3, 4 all are correct

U/s 20 of DV Act the Magistrate is competent

  1. to issue an arrest warrant on failure to pay money
  2. can only direct the employer or debtor to pay the money as ordered
  3. can create a charge on the immovable property of the respondent
  4. all are correct
  5. only no 2 is correct

U/s 23 a magistrate can grant interim Relief

  1. for past, present and future domestic violence
  2. only for past and present domestic violence
  3. which one is correct?

U/S 25 of the DV Act , whether a magistrate is competent to Recall his Order?

  1. yes
  2. no

U/s 28 of the DV Act the procedure shall be adopted by the Ld Magistrate is written in 126 of the CR.P.C

  1. true
  2.  false
  3. The magistrate can overlook Cr.P.C and adopt his own procedure
  4. The magistrate can adopt his own procedure if a thing is not provided in Cr.P.C
  5. Which one is a more appropriate answer?

A magistrate proceed with an Application u/s 12 of DV act without jurisdiction

  1. The respondent shall file a Revision as per Cr.P.C
  2.  The Respondent shall prefer an appeal as per section 29 of the DV Act.

Domestic violence is usually a one time, isolated occurrence
A. True

B. False

In DV Case the burden  lies with the Complainant

  1. true
  2. false