The core of the offence of Attempt to Murder lies in the mental element—the mens rea
Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code embodies the offence of attempt to murder, predicated not upon the actual consequence of the act, but upon the intention and knowledge with which it is executed. The statutory text makes it explicit that where an act is done with such intention or knowledge, and in such circumstances, that if death had been caused, the offence of murder would have been established, the act falls within the ambit of this provision. The punishment prescribed may extend to ten years’ imprisonment with fine, and if hurt is caused, the offender may face life imprisonment or even the death penalty if already serving a life sentence. The provision distinguishes between the act and its result, underscoring that the absence of a fatal injury is not determinative of liability.
The core of the offence lies in the mental element—the mens rea—which, in this context, comprises either the intention to commit murder or the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it will, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Intention, being a subjective state of mind, cannot be proved by direct evidence except through confession; it must be inferred from surrounding circumstances such as the nature of the weapon used, the part of the body targeted, the degree of force employed, the persistence of the attack, the opportunity for the act, and the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the incident. Courts rely upon such factors to ascertain whether the mental state corresponds to one of the four categories of intention or knowledge enumerated in Section 300 IPC, for Section 307 does not demand the specific intent to cause death as is required under English law for attempt to murder.
Judicial pronouncements, including the decision of the Kerala High Court in Sanku Sreedharan and the Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil, have clarified that even simple injuries may suffice to sustain a conviction under Section 307 if the circumstances indicate the requisite intention or knowledge. The severity of the injury is only one evidentiary factor; the decisive question is whether the act, viewed in its factual matrix, was committed with such mens rea that, had death ensued, the accused would be guilty of murder. The maxim that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their act operates as a rebuttable inference, not an irrebuttable presumption, and must be applied with due regard to all the evidence.
Supreme Court in the case of Bejoy Chand vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 SC 105 and submitted that where the accused is charged under section 307, Penal Code, he may be convicted under sections 323, 324 and 325 as the case may be even in the absence of a charge in respect of it, if on the facts of the case he could be charged alternatively under sections 307 and 326 IPC.
This position of law firmly dispels the misconception that absence of grievous injury negates the applicability of Section 307. It also distinguishes the offence from those under Sections 323, 324, 325, and 326 IPC, which deal with hurt and grievous hurt, emphasising that the differentiation hinges upon the accused’s mental state and not merely upon the physical harm caused. Thus, in framing charges and evaluating evidence, the prosecuting and investigating agencies must carefully consider whether the act was accompanied by the intention or knowledge contemplated in Section 300, for this is the touchstone by which the gravest form of homicidal attempt is distinguished from lesser forms of assault.
Under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, an act amounts to attempt to murder when committed with the intention or knowledge described in Section 300, in circumstances such that, if death had ensued, the act would amount to murder. Unlike English law, it is unnecessary to prove a narrowly defined intent to kill; any mental state falling within the four clauses of Section 300 suffices. The act must be inherently capable of causing death, and the deliberate use of a deadly knife against a vital organ satisfies that threshold. The intention is inferred from the nature of the weapon, the body part targeted, and the severity of injuries, showing either an intent to cause death or to cause bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No mitigating circumstance under the exceptions to Section 300 is present.
The law of “impossible attempts” illustrates that the critical question is whether the accused’s act, in the circumstances as believed, was capable of producing the intended consequence, even if actual success was impossible. In English criminal law, murder may be proved by “malice aforethought,” which includes both intent to kill and intent to cause grievous bodily harm; however, for attempted murder, the sole permissible mental state is a clear intent to kill. An intent merely to cause grievous bodily harm does not suffice, as confirmed in decisions such as R v Whybrow (1951) and R v Grimwood (1962), where the courts restricted conviction for attempted murder to cases of specific intent to kill. By contrast, Section 307 IPC adopts a broader approach: any mental state under Section 300 IPC suffices, including intent to cause bodily injury likely to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. English precedents are therefore not reliable guides for interpreting Section 307 IPC.
The principle that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their act has been criticised, yet its refined formulation under Section 8 of the UK Criminal Justice Act 1967 is accepted in India. Thus, stabbing a person in the abdomen with a deadly knife can constitute attempt to murder in Indian law, even without proof beyond doubt of a focused intent to kill, because the act was committed with the requisite intention or knowledge that, had death resulted, it would have been murder under Section 300 IPC.
The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao (AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 3901) authoritatively clarified that an offence under Section 307 IPC embodies all the essential ingredients of murder except for the fact that death does not occur. The Court held that it is not a prerequisite for the prosecution to prove that the injury inflicted was actually capable of causing death; rather, the decisive factor is the presence of the mental element—intention or knowledge—as defined in Section 300 IPC. To sustain a conviction under Section 307, the prosecution must establish that the death of a human being was attempted, that the attempt was the direct consequence of the accused’s act, and that such act was executed either with the intention to cause death or with the intention to cause bodily injury known to be likely to cause death, or sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or by committing an imminently dangerous act with no lawful excuse for incurring the risk of death or such injury.
Similarly, in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil, the Apex Court reiterated that the infliction of a bodily injury capable of causing death is not essential for attracting Section 307. The provision draws a deliberate distinction between the act itself and its eventual consequence. An act may result in no injury or only a minor injury, yet still fall within the statutory ambit if done with the requisite intent or knowledge. The determination of such intent may be assisted by the nature of injuries actually caused but may equally be inferred from surrounding circumstances without any reference to wounds. The law recognises that an attempt need not be the final or “penultimate” act towards the commission of murder; it suffices if the accused’s conduct reveals an intent to kill accompanied by an overt act in furtherance of that intent.
The principle was reaffirmed in Lachman Singh v. State of Haryana, where the Supreme Court held that the presence of intent coupled with any overt act in execution thereof is sufficient in law to sustain a conviction under Section 307, regardless of whether the injury inflicted could cause death. The judicial consensus thus firmly establishes that the gravamen of Section 307 lies in the mental state of the accused and not in the degree of injury caused, making the intention or knowledge, proved through direct or circumstantial evidence, the cornerstone of criminal liability for attempt to murder.
In Dhananjoy Chatterjee @ Dhana versus State of West Bengal (1994 (2) SCC 220) it has been indicated by this Court that :
“some criminals get very harsh sentences while many receive grossly different sentence for an essentially equivalent crime and a shockingly large number even go unpunished thereby encourage the criminal and in the ultimate making, justice suffer by weakening the system’s credibility.”
It has also been indicated that :
“In imposing sentences in the absence of specific legislation, Judges must consider variety of factors and after considering all those factors and taking an overall view of the situation, impose sentence which they consider to be an appropriate one. Aggravating factors cannot be ignored and similarly mitigating circumstances have also to be taken into consideration. The measure of punishment in a given case must depend upon the atrocity of the crime; the conduct of the criminal and the defenceless and unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to the society’s cry for justice against the criminal. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and the society at large while considering imposition of appropriate punishment.”