Rachana Gangu v. Union of India (2026 INSC 218)

Rachana Gangu v. Union of India (2026 INSC 218)

Citation: 2026 INSC 218
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1220 of 2021 with connected matters
Date of Judgment: March 10, 2026
Bench: Vikram Nath & Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

(1) Facts of the Case

The case arose from a series of petitions filed by families of individuals who died after receiving COVID-19 vaccinations during the pandemic. The lead petitioner, Rachana Gangu, lost both her daughters, aged 18 and 20, shortly after they received their first vaccine doses. Similar tragic incidents were reported from Kerala, where individuals, some young and previously healthy, died after vaccination from conditions such as Cerebral Venous Sinus Thrombosis (CVST), Thrombocytopenia, Intra-cranial bleeding, and Thrombosis with Thrombocytopenia Syndrome (TTS). The petitioners alleged that the government’s vaccination drive, while aimed at public good, lacked transparency, failed to provide informed consent, and left families without any redressal mechanism. They sought the constitution of an independent expert board to investigate such deaths and the formulation of a compensation policy.

The Union of India opposed these petitions, arguing that the vaccines underwent a rigorous regulatory approval process, as upheld by the Supreme Court in Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India. It contended that the Adverse Event Following Immunization (AEFI) surveillance system was robust, conducted by expert committees, and that the incidence of serious side effects like TTS in India was extremely rare (0.001 per one lakh doses). The government maintained that affected families could seek remedies through consumer courts or civil suits, and that any independent inquiry would undermine public confidence in the regulatory system.

The matter came before the Supreme Court through a writ petition under Article 32, a Special Leave Petition challenging an interim order of the Kerala High Court, and transfer petitions from the Kerala High Court.

(2) Issues Before the Court

1. Whether the absence of a uniform policy governing compensation in cases of death or serious injury following COVID-19 vaccination results in a violation of the Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution.
2. If so, whether the Court can direct the respondents (Union of India) to frame such a policy.

(3) Key Legal Findings & Law Points

I. On the Expansive Scope of Article 21 and the Right to Health

• Law Point 1: The Right to Health is an Integral Part of the Right to Life. The Court reaffirmed the settled position that Article 21 is not merely a protection against the unlawful deprivation of life but includes a wide range of rights that facilitate a meaningful existence. The right to health and bodily integrity is a core component of this guarantee. The State bears a positive constitutional obligation to safeguard the health of its people and ensure conditions necessary for the dignified enjoyment of life. The Court cited precedents like Parmanand Katara and State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Chawla to establish that the government has a constitutional duty to provide health facilities and cannot absolve itself of this obligation.

II. On the State’s Positive Obligation Beyond Fault-Based Liability

• Law Point 2: Constitutional Obligations are Not Confined to Proof of Fault. The Court held that the Constitution does not view the right to life solely through the lens of “fault” or negligence. Article 21 embodies a positive obligation on the State to ensure that when grave harm is alleged to have occurred in the course of a State-led public health intervention—undertaken for the collective good—the affected families are not left without an accessible mechanism of redress. The absence of such an institutional framework raises constitutional concerns, regardless of whether the State was negligent.
  • The Court acknowledged that proving “causality” between vaccination and death is a complex scientific question that it could not determine in writ jurisdiction. However, it clarified that this inability does not exhaust its constitutional enquiry. The core issue was the systemic absence of a remedy, not the scientific determination of individual cases.

III. On the Inadequacy of Existing Remedies in the Context of a Mass Program

• Law Point 3: Traditional Tort Remedies are Ill-Suited for Mass Immunization Programs. While the Union of India argued that affected families could approach civil or consumer courts, the Court found this pathway to be constitutionally inadequate. Vaccine injury claims involve complex scientific questions of attribution. Imposing the onus of proving negligence and fault in each individual case places an “onerous burden” on grieving families. Furthermore, a multiplicity of individual proceedings would lead to inconsistent outcomes and unequal access to relief, thereby undermining the guarantee of equality under Article 14. The relationship between the individual and the State in a mass public health campaign cannot be governed purely by the principles of private tort law.

IV. On the Principle of “No-Fault” Compensation

• Law Point 4: The Principle of “No-Fault” Liability is a Recognized Feature of a Welfare State. The Court observed that the concept of providing swift relief without a prolonged inquiry into fault is not alien to Indian law, citing Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act as an example. In the context of public health, where the State itself administers a program for collective benefit, the right to health under Article 21 automatically extends to a corresponding obligation of institutional support in cases of grave outcomes, no matter how rare. When the State acts as the facilitator of a mass intervention, it must also act as a guarantor of support for those who suffer unintended consequences.
  • The Court drew upon international examples (Australia, UK, Japan, and the COVAX facility) to demonstrate that no-fault vaccine injury compensation schemes are a standard feature of a welfare-state response to mass immunization.

V. On the Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Judicial Intervention

• Law Point 5: Separation of Powers Cannot Eclipse the Court’s Duty to Protect Fundamental Rights. The Court acknowledged that policy formulation is primarily the domain of the executive. However, it unequivocally held that this constitutionally protected separation of powers cannot come in the way of the judiciary when fundamental rights are violated due to the absence of executive policy. In such circumstances, the constitutional duty of this Court to safeguard the rights of citizens is paramount and cannot be eclipsed. The Court found that the complete absence of any structured relief mechanism created a constitutional vacuum that required a limited, calibrated judicial response to direct the executive to act.

(4) Decision and Directions

The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petitions and connected matters by issuing the following directions:

1. Direction to Frame a No-Fault Compensation Policy: The Union of India, through the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, was directed to expeditiously formulate and place in the public domain an appropriate “no-fault” compensation framework to address serious adverse events following immunization (AEFI) arising in the context of COVID-19 vaccination.
2. Continuation of Existing Monitoring: The existing mechanisms for monitoring AEFI (National and State AEFI Committees) were held to be adequate for scientific assessment. The Court did not find it necessary to constitute a separate, court-appointed expert body. It reiterated its direction from Jacob Puliyel that relevant data must be periodically and transparently placed in the public domain.
3. Clarification on Liability: The Court clarified that its judgment and the formulation of the no-fault framework shall not be construed as an admission of liability or fault on the part of the Union of India or any authority. It also clarified that this judgment does not preclude any person from pursuing other remedies available in law (such as consumer claims). The no-fault policy is intended as an additional, accessible, and equitable avenue of relief, not a substitute for other legal remedies.