Rejaneesh K.V Vs K. Deepa (Transcript of Hearing) 09-Oct-2025

Supreme Court of India

26442 / 2020
C.A. No. 3947/2020

CHIEF JUSTICE’S COURT
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. M. SUNDRESH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K. VINOD CHANDRAN
COURT NO.1
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
C.A. NO. 3947/2020
REJANISH K.V Appellant(s)
VERSUS
K. DEEPA & ORS. Respondent(s)

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: 09-October-2025

CHIEF JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI: There are two judgments concurring.

NIDHESH GUPTA: We don’t need Your Lordship to tell us that, My Lords. We know that My Lords.

CHIEF JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI: One is on behalf of myself, and Justice Aravind Kumar, Justice Satish Sharma and Justice Vinod Chandran. We have considered all the judgements, and we find that the earlier two judgments in Rameshwar Dayal and Chandra Mohan have not been properly considered by all other judgements. We have divided the judgement in various chapters. The first one is with regard to textual and contextual interpretation. Now, in that interpretation which states the textual interpretation matches the contextual has to be preferred. “A statute is best interpreted when the reason and the purpose for its enactment is ascertained. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be considered in isolation.” So, we are held that the Article 233 has to be read in whole. It can’t be read in part. A combined reading of Clause 1 and 2 of Article 233 of the Constitution would reveal that though the Constitution under Clause 2 of Article 233 provides for a qualification for an in-service candidate for direct recruitment, it does not provide for a qualification for those who are already in service. It is held that if the interpretation as sought to be given in the judgements of this Court right from the Satya Narain Singh to Dheeraj Mor is to be accepted, it will render the first part of Clause 2 of Article 233 of the Constitution redundant. It is held that such an interpretation of Clause 2 of Article 233, would not be permissibly blocked. It is held that this course of appointment of all [UNCLEAR] promotes lies in Clause 1 of 233, all coercive power. And 233(2) only provides for qualification. And the word, if we accept the interpretation in the first part, will be rendered redundant. So, we have held that 233 will have to be read, will give meaning to the first part. And therefore, the second part requires that a person to be appointed as a District Judge from an [UNCLEAR] category has to be having a practice of seven years. The first part says that it is not necessary and therefore, the qualifications will have to be provided in the rules framed under 233(1).
Then, we also held that the interpretation of the constitutional provisions cannot be pedantic. It has to be organic. A purposeful interpretation has to be adopted. If the appointment to the District Judge cadre is to be made directly for the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of district judiciary, any interpretation which distils the competition and prohibits the otherwise meritorious candidates from zone of consideration will have to be excused. The interpretation which advances the purpose of bringing in efficiency in the district judiciary, and permitting a broad quiz competition amongst all the eligible candidates will have to be accepted.
Then we learn that the State Government, in consolidation with the respective High Court, will have to frame rules providing eligibility for in-service candidates to apply for the post of District Judge, which will be filled by direct recruitment. We are also of the view that, for bringing the Advocates and the in-service candidates at the same level, it will be appropriate that the rules provide, that an in-service candidate should be eligible for recruitment to the District Judge only if he has a combined experience of seven years as an Advocate and a Judicial Officer. We have rejected the contention of Mr. Naidu that, even after a gap of 10 years, if he completes, that we are not inclined to accept the condition that breaking the practice of a candidate should be ignored, for a person having a total of seven years of practice. Because if such a person has practice for five years, and, thereafter he takes a break for 10 years, and, thereafter, practices for two years, there will be a total disconnect with the legal profession.
Then we have rejected the contention that the 233(2) provides a quota of 25% for the direct recruits. Insofar as Doctrine of stare decisis is concerned, we have held that the Doctrine of stare decisis could permit an incorrect provision, incorrect law, which has been laid down, for many judgements, and totally misconstruing the two constitutional Bench Judgments, it will perpetuate illegality; which has been inexistence for 40 years; merely because the wrong law has been held for 40 years; cannot be a ground to interpret the Constitution in a proper manner. We have held that, an injustice has been meted out to the members of the Judicial Service, thereby depriving them from practicing in the selection process for the past post of District Judges by of direct recruitment. Having found that the law laid down by this Court in the aforementioned cases, does not correctly interpret the provisions of Article 233, if we fail to correct the legal position, we’ll be perpetuating the injustice that has been meted out for the kids. Therefore, rejected the argument on stare decisis as well by the Parties opposing the proposition.
We have clarified, that, the judgement will be applicable only from the date of the judgement, and, in no case, any selection process completed, or any appointments made prior to this judgement, would be affected. Except in cases wherein any interim orders were passed by the High Courts or this Court. In such cases, the issue would now be governed by the orders to be passed by the bench hearing the matter.
We have also interpreted the rules made by the Bar Council of India. We have held that, on being appointed as a Judge, the Advocate only suspends his right to practice, and his roll continues to be… His name continues to be on the roll. And therefore, in view of Rameshwar Dayal, Rameshwar Dayal though the name was not there, by giving suspension, the Court found that in case of those two persons, there deemed to be on the roll. We have sought support from those observations. The result, we have answered the questions as under: Judicial Officers who have already completed seven years. So, it was not necessary to answer the question, but since we had framed, we are answering all the questions. Judicial Officers who have already completed seven years in Bar, before they were recruited in the Subordinate Judicial Service, could be entitled for being appointed as a District Judge, Additional District Judge, the selection process for the post of District Judges in the direct recruitment.
The eligibility for appointment as a District Judge, Additional District Judge, is to be seen at the time of application. Though there is no eligibility prescribed under Article 233(2) for a person already in judicial services of the Union or of the State, albeit appointed as a District Judge, in order to provide a equal level playing field, we direct that the candidate applying as an in-service candidate, could have seven years of combined experience as a Judicial Officer and an Advocate. A person who has been, or, who is in judicial service, and has a combined experience of seven years or more, as an Advocate or Judicial Officer, could be eligible for being considered and appointed as a District Judge, Additional District Judge under Article 233 of the Constitution. In order to ensure level playing field, we further direct that the minimum age for being considered and appointed as a District Judge, Additional District Judge, for both the Advocates and the Judicial Officers, will be 35 years, as on the date of the application.
It is held that the view taken in the judgements of this Court, right from Satya Narain Singh till Dheeraj Mor, which takes a contrary view to what has been held herein above do not lay down the correct proposition of law. The reference is answered accordingly. Consequently, all such rules framed by the State Government in consultation with the High Courts, which are not in accordance with the aforesaid answers shall stand crossed and set aside. It is directed that all the State Governments, in consultation with the High Courts shall frame, amend the rules in accordance with what has been held by us herein above, within a period of three months from today.
The Registry is directed to obtain the necessary orders from the Chief Justice of India on the adversity side to place the matters before the appropriate bench for deciding the same in the light of what has been said herein above.
Before we conclude, we place on record our sincere appreciation for all the learned Senior Counsel, Counsel and also the Junior Counsel for assisting us in such a meticulous manner. Our task was made easier by the assistance rendered by them. We also place on record our appreciation for all the learned Counsels for strictly adhering to the timeline, as a result of which this Court was able to complete the hearing in the prescribed time. We remiss if we do not place on record our appreciation for the Nodal Counsel for collating all the material in an organised manner.

JUSTICE M. M. SUNDRESH: So, I’ll just read only the relevant part. “[UNCLEAR] used in Article 233(2) of the Constitution must be read as “qualified”. As a person who has been an Advocate or a Pleader for not less than seven years, along with the recommendation of the High Court is one of qualification a person with the Judicial Service is one qualification, and the person with other qualification. Both of these qualifications are nothing but mere gateways for being appointed to the post of a District Judge, facilitating a threshold for entry. However, there’s no bar for the High Court to fix the qualification for the persons in the Judicial Service with the approval of the Governor. These qualifications are mainly meant only for consideration for appointment subject to successful completion of the recruitment process.
My conclusion: While interpreting a Constitutional provision, a Court of Law must be conscious not to violate the basic structure of the Constitution and its duty bound to give it a vibrant and organic interpretation.
Article 14 of the Constitution forms an integral part of the basic structure. Though it provides for equality before law, it allows for reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia having an additional nexus to object sought to be achieved. Therefore, construing Article 233(2) of the Constitution to be a provision meant only for a category of an Advocate or a Pleader will be subjectively violative of Article 14 of the Constitution for the purpose of its interpretation. In other words, to contribute amount to creation of a quota for an Advocate or a Pleader an absolute bar on persons within the Judicial Service would certainly prevent meritorious candidates from competing for vacancies earmarked for the direct recruitment, which would be an affirm to the constitutional spirit. A vibrant and qualitative judiciary fosters greater trust in the institution. Thus, it is vital to bring a solid foundation maintaining and enhancing the quality at the bottom of the judicial pyramid would strengthen the faith of the public in the Subordinate Judiciary which in turn would reduce the filing of a suit before the High Court and Supreme Court and therefore, considerably reduce the overall dependency. Building a strong foundation and ensuring that the base is of pristine quality is only possible with the best challenge attracted, letting go of the emerging talent by not identifying and nurturing them at the earliest, would lead to mediocracy as against excellence, which would weaken the foundation and undermine the entire Judicial structure. It is obvious, that greater competition would result in better quality. Excluding a group of persons from competing for a course, which is meant to serve the public will certainly be unconstitutional, when the Constitution itself facilitates its participation. It is my fervent hope that our judgement empowers institution to emerge stronger and maintain the highest standard of justice as it is interest of institution that must prevail above all.”

CHIEF JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI: We are grateful to all of you for your valuable inputs.

COUNSELS: We are very grateful to Your Lordships. Sir, deeply obliged.

CHIEF JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI: Why Mr. Vandrapalli is standing at the corner?

GOPAL SATYANARAYANAN: My Lord, individual appeals will be listed.

CHIEF JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI: Yes.

GOPAL SATYANARAYANAN: Individual appeals will be listed.

CHIEF JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI: You’re not here when this main judgement was announced. How many matters are there?

ALJO JOSEPH: Last six years.

CHIEF JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI: No, no. How many matters are there?

ALJO JOSEPH: 29-30.

GOPAL SATYANARAYANAN: Writ Petitions are number?

ALJO JOSEPH: It can be over in one hour, My Lords. It can be over in one hour.