Constitution Bench outlines limits of discretion, non-justiciability, and rejection of deemed assent under Articles 200 and 201
Nov 20, 2025
The Supreme Court of India delivered its opinion on Presidential Reference No. 1 of 2025, a significant constitutional inquiry concerning the powers of Governors and the President in granting, withholding, or reserving assent to State Bills under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution. The reference, made by the President of India on 13 May 2025 under Article 143(1), sought clarity on fourteen questions arising amid growing disputes between States and the Union regarding delays, discretion, and judicial oversight in the legislative assent process.
The President noted gaps in constitutional procedure, the absence of prescribed timelines for action by Governors and the President, and conflicting judicial precedents on justiciability. The increasing tendency of States to invoke Article 32 in federal disputes, instead of Article 131, also contributed to the need for authoritative clarification. After notices to all States and Union Territories, the matter was heard by a Constitution Bench, with extensive submissions from the Attorney General, Solicitor General, numerous senior advocates, and intervenors representing a broad federal spectrum.
The Court concluded that a Governor has only three constitutional options when presented with a Bill: to assent, to withhold and return the Bill with comments (except in the case of Money Bills), or to reserve it for Presidential consideration. It held that these options do not include any notion of deemed assent and that the first proviso to Article 200 restricts, rather than expands, the Governor’s choices. The Court affirmed that the Governor exercises discretion in choosing among these options and is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when acting under Article 200.
While the Governor’s decisions under Article 200 are not subject to judicial review on merits, the Court ruled that prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite inaction may justify a limited mandamus compelling the Governor to act within a reasonable time, without commenting on the substance of the decision. The Court clarified that Article 361 grants personal immunity to the Governor but does not shield the constitutional office from limited judicial scrutiny in cases of inaction. It declined, however, to prescribe judicial timelines for Governors, noting that such control would exceed constitutional boundaries.
Applying the same reasoning to Article 201, the Court held that the President’s assent is likewise non-justiciable, and judicial timelines cannot be imposed. The President need not seek the Court’s opinion under Article 143 whenever a Bill is reserved by a Governor; such reference is discretionary and dependent on the President’s satisfaction.
The Court further held that decisions of the Governor or President made before a Bill becomes law are not subject to judicial review and that courts cannot examine the contents of a Bill prior to enactment. It emphasized that Article 142 cannot be invoked to substitute constitutional functions or create a regime of deemed assent. A Bill passed by a State Legislature does not become law without the Governor’s assent.
Questions concerning the composition of benches under Article 145(3), the broader scope of Article 142, and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in federal disputes outside Article 131 were returned unanswered, as they fell outside the functional scope of the reference.
The opinion, delivered on 20 November 2025, by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, and Atul S. Chandurkar, provides a definitive constitutional framework on the legislative assent process, reaffirming federal balance while clarifying limits of judicial intervention.
