National Security United States of America

Protecting our national security is the Department’s top priority. National security encompasses the national defense, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, international and internal security, and foreign relations. This includes countering terrorism; combating espionage and economic espionage conducted  for the benefit of any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent; enforcing export controls and sanctions; and disrupting cyber threats that are perpetrated by nation states, terrorists, or their agents or proxies.

When national security issues arise during a criminal prosecution, they must be resolved through careful coordination by the Department of Justice (Department) with high-level officials from the intelligence, military and foreign affairs communities. In addition, the Attorney General, or the Attorney General’s designee, has certain statutory authority and obligations related to national security prosecutions. That authority and those obligations may be properly exercised and met only with appropriate coordination within the Department by the respective United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs).

Continue Reading

USA FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS IN WHICH THE DEATH PENALTY MAY BE SOUGHT

This Chapter sets forth the policies and procedures for all Federal cases in which a defendant is charged, or could be charged, with an offense subject to the death penalty. The provisions in this Chapter apply regardless of whether the United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General intends to charge the offense subject to the death penalty or to request authorization to seek the death penalty for such an offense. The provisions in this Chapter are effective April 7, 2014, and they apply to any current or future investigations and indicted cases.


9-10.020 – RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Federal death penalty procedure is based on the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 to 3599.

The death penalty procedures introduced by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, codified in Title 21, were repealed on March 6, 2006, when President Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. A district indicting a Title 21 capital offense, see 21 U.S.C. § 848, that occurred before March 6, 2006, should consult with the Capital Case Section of the Criminal Division (hereinafter the “Capital Case Section”) regarding indictment and procedure.

Continue Reading

GRAND JURY PRACTISE: USA

 

At common law, a grand jury enjoyed a certain power to issue reports alleging non-criminal misconduct. A special grand jury impaneled under Title 18 U.S.C. § 3331 is authorized, on the basis of a criminal investigation (but not otherwise), to fashion a report, potentially for public release, concerning either organized crime conditions in the district or the non-criminal misconduct in office of appointed public officers or employees.grand juries are sometimes described as performing accusatory and investigatory functions, the grand jury’s principal function is to determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe that one or more persons committed a certain Federal offense within the venue of the district court.

9-11.010 – INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains the Justice Department’s policy on grand jury practice.

In dealing with the grand jury, the prosecutor must always conduct himself or herself as an officer of the court whose function is to ensure that justice is done and that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer. The prosecutor must recognize that the grand jury is an independent body, whose functions include not only the investigation of crime and the initiation of criminal prosecution but also the protection of the citizenry from unfounded criminal charges. The prosecutor’s responsibility is to advise the grand jury on the law and to present evidence for its consideration. In discharging these responsibilities, the prosecutor must be scrupulously fair to all witnesses and must do nothing to inflame or otherwise improperly influence the grand jurors.

Continue Reading

Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018

It is the policy of the United States to facilitate market-based private sector development and inclusive economic growth in less developed countries through the provision of credit, capital, and other financial support

Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 [BUILD]

H. R. 302

One Hundred Fifteenth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, the third day of January, two thousand and eighteen
An Act
To provide protections for certain sports medicine professionals, to reauthorize Federal aviation programs, to improve aircraft safety certification processes, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018’’.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—AUTHORIZATIONS

DIVISION F—BUILD ACT OF 2018

Sec. 1401. Short title.

Sec. 1402. Definitions.

TITLE I—ESTABLISHMENT

Sec. 1411. Statement of policy.
Sec. 1412. United States International Development Finance Corporation.
Sec. 1413. Management of Corporation.
Sec. 1414. Inspector General of the Corporation.
Sec. 1415. Independent accountability mechanism.

TITLE II—AUTHORITIES

Sec. 1421. Authorities relating to provision of support.
Sec. 1422. Terms and conditions.
Sec. 1423. Payment of losses.
Sec. 1424. Termination.

TITLE III—ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 1431. Operations.
Sec. 1432. Corporate powers.
Sec. 1433. Maximum contingent liability.
Sec. 1434. Corporate funds.
Sec. 1435. Coordination with other development agencies.

TITLE IV—MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND REPORTING

Sec. 1441. Establishment of risk and audit committees.
Sec. 1442. Performance measures, evaluation, and learning.
Sec. 1443. Annual report.
Sec. 1444. Publicly available project information.
Sec. 1445. Engagement with investors.
Sec. 1446. Notifications to be provided by the Corporation.

TITLE V—CONDITIONS, RESTRICTIONS, AND PROHIBITIONS

Sec. 1451. Limitations and preferences.
Sec. 1452. Additionality and avoidance of market distortion.

Sec. 1453. Prohibition on support in countries that support terrorism or violate human rights and with sanctioned persons.
Sec. 1454. Applicability of certain provisions of law.

TITLE VI—TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 1461. Definitions.
Sec. 1462. Reorganization plan.
Sec. 1463. Transfer of functions.

Sec. 1465. superceded authorities.
Transitional authorities.
Sec. 1466. Savings provisions.
Sec. 1467. Other terminations.
Sec. 1468. Incidental transfers.
Sec. 1469. Reference.
Sec. 1470. Conforming amendments.


DIVISION F—BUILD ACT OF 2018

SEC. 1401. SHORT TITLE.

This division may be cited as the ‘‘Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018’’ or the ‘‘BUILD Act of 2018’’.

SEC. 1402. DEFINITIONS.

In this division:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY.—The term ‘‘less developed country’’ means a country with a low-income economy, lower-middle- income economy, or upper -middle-income economy, as defined by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association (collectively referred to as the ‘‘World Bank’’).

(3) PREDECESSOR AUTHORITY.—The term ‘‘predecessor authority’’ means authorities repealed by title VI.

(4) QUALIFYING SOVEREIGN ENTITY.—The term ‘‘qualifying sovereign entity’’ means—

(A) any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state (asdefined in section 1603 of title 28, United States Code) that has a purpose that is similar to the purpose of the Corporation as described in section 1412(b); or

(B) any international financial institution (as defined in section 1701(c) of the International Financial InstitutionsAct (22 U.S.C. 262r(c))).

TITLE I—ESTABLISHMENT

SEC. 1411. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to facilitate market-based private sector development and inclusive economic growth in less developed countries through the provision of credit, capital, and other financial support—

(1) to mobilize private capital in support of sustainable, broad -based economic growth, poverty reduction, and develop-ment through demand-driven partnerships with the private sector that further the foreign policy interests of the United States;

(2) to finance development that builds and strengthens civic institutions, promotes competition, and provides for public accountability and transparency;

(3) to help private sector actors overcome identifiable market gaps and inefficiencies without distorting markets;

(4) to achieve clearly defined economic and social develop-ment outcomes;
(5) to coordinate with institutions with purposes similar to the purposes of the Corporation to leverage resources of those institutions to produce the greatest impact;

(6) to provide countries a robust alternative to state-directed investments by authoritarian governments and United States strategic competitors using best practices with respect to transparency and environmental and social safeguards, and which take into account the debt sustainability of partner coun-tries;

(7) to leverage private sector capabilities and innovative development tools to help countries transition from recipients of bilateral development assistance toward increased self-reli- ance;
and (8) to complement and be guided by overall United States foreign policy, development, and national security objectives, taking into account the priorities and needs of countries receiving support.

SEC. 1412. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the executive branch the United States International Development Finance Cor- poration (in this division referred to as the ‘‘Corporation’’), which shall be a wholly owned Government corporation for purposes of chapter 91 of title 31, United States Code, under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State.

(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Corporation shall be to mobilize and facilitate the participation of private sector capital and skills in the economic development of less developed countries, as described in subsection (c), and countries in transition from nonmarket to market economies, in order to complement the development assistance objectives, and advance the foreign policy interests, of the United States. In carrying out its purpose, the Corporation, utilizing broad criteria, shall take into account in its financing operations the economic and financial soundness and development objectives of projects for which it provides support under title II.
(c) LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY FOCUS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall prioritize the provi-sion of support under title II in less developed countries with a low- income economy or a lower -middle-income economy.

(2) SUPPORT IN UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES.—The Corporation shall restrict the provision of support under title II in a less developed country with an upper- middle -income economy unless—

(A) the President certifies to the appropriate congres-sional committees that such support furthers the national economic or foreign policy interests of the United States; and
(B) such support is designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest population of that country.

SEC. 1413. MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATION.

(a) STRUCTURE OF CORPORATION.—There shall be in the Cor- poration a Board of Directors (in this division referred to as the ‘‘Board’’), a Chief Executive Officer, a Deputy Chief Executive Officer, a Chief Risk Officer, a Chief Development Officer, and such other officers as the Board may determine.

(b) BOARD OF DIRECTORS.—

(1) DUTIES.—All powers of the Corporation shall vest in and be exercised by or under the authority of the Board. The Board—
(A) shall perform the functions specified to be carried out by the Board in this division;

(B) may prescribe, amend, and repeal bylaws, rules, regulations, policies, and procedures governing the manner in which the business of the Corporation may be conducted and in which the powers granted to the Corporation by law may be exercised; and
(C) shall develop, in consultation with stakeholders, other interested parties, and the appropriate congressional committees, a publicly available policy with respect to con-sultations, hearings, and other forms of engagement in order to provide for meaningful public participation in the Board’s activities.

(2) MEMBERSHIP OF BOARD.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Board shall consist of—
(i) the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation;
(ii) the officers specified in subparagraph (B); and
(iii) four other individuals who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, of which—
(I) one individual should be appointed from among a list of at least 5 individuals submitted by the majority leader of the Senate after consulta- tion with the chairman of the Committee on For- eign Relations of the Senate;

(II) one individual should be appointed from among a list of at least 5 individuals submitted by the minority leader of the Senate after consulta-tion with the ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(III) one individual should be appointed from  among a list of at least 5 individuals submitted by  the Speaker of the House of Representatives after  consultation with the chairman of the Com- mittee  on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep- resentatives;
and

(IV) one individual should be appointed from  among a list of at least 5 individuals submitted by  the minority leader of the House of Representatives after consultation with the ranking member of  the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.

(B) OFFICERS SPECIFIED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The officers specified in this  subparagraph are the following: the

(I) The Secretary of State or a designee of  Secretary.

(II) The Administrator of the United States  Agency for International Development or a designee of the Administrator.
(III) The Secretary of the Treasury or a designee of the Secretary.

(IV) The Secretary of Commerce or a designee of the Secretary.

(ii) REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGNEES.—A designee
under clause (i) shall be selected from among officers—
(I) appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate; the
(II) whose duties relate to the programs of
Corporation; and
(III) who is designated by and serving at the
pleasure of the President.

(C) REQUIREMENTS FOR NONGOVERNMENT MEMBERS.—
A member of the Board described in subparagraph (A)(iii)—
(i) may not be an officer or employee of the United
States Government; may
(ii) shall have relevant experience, which
include experience relating to the private sector, the
environment, labor organizations, or international
development, to carry out the purpose of the Corpora-
tion;(iii) shall be appointed for a term of 3 years and may
be reappointed for one additional term;
(iv) shall serve until the member’s successor is
appointed and confirmed;
(v) shall be compensated at a rate equivalent to
that of level IV of the Executive Schedule under section
5315 of title 5, United States Code, when engaged in
the business of the Corporation; and at
(vi) may be paid per diem in lieu of subsistence
the applicable rate under the Federal Travel Regula-
tion under subtitle F of title 41, Code of Federal Regu-
lations, from time to time, while away from the home or
usual place of business of the member.

(3) CHAIRPERSON.—The Secretary of State, or the designee of
the Secretary under paragraph (2)(B)(i)(I), shall serve as the
Chairperson of the Board.

(4) VICE CHAIRPERSON.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, or the designee of the Administrator under paragraph (2)(B)(i)(II), shall serve as the Vice Chairperson of the Board.

(5) QUORUM.—Five members of the Board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business by the Board.
(c) PUBLIC HEARINGS.—The Board shall hold at least 2 public hearings each year in order to afford an opportunity for any person to present views with respect to whether—

(1) the Corporation is carrying out its activities in accord-ance with this division; and

(2) any support provided by the Corporation under title II in any country should be suspended, expanded, or extended.

(d) CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER.—
(1) APPOINTMENT.—There shall be in the Corporation a Chief Executive Officer, who shall be appointed by the Presi- dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall serve at the pleasure of the President.

(2) AUTHORITIES AND DUTIES.—The Chief Executive Officer shall be responsible for the management of the Corporation and shall exercise the powers and discharge the duties of the Corporation subject to the bylaws, rules, regulations, and proce- dures established by the Board.

(3) RELATIONSHIP TO BOARD.—The Chief Executive Officer shall report to and be under the direct authority of the Board.
(4) COMPENSATION.—Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

‘‘Chief Executive Officer, United States International Development Finance Corporation.’’.
(e) DEPUTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER.—There shall be in the Corporation a Deputy Chief Executive Officer, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall serve at the pleasure of the President.

(f) CHIEF RISK OFFICER.—
(1) APPOINTMENT.—Subject to the approval of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation shall appoint a Chief Risk Officer, from among individuals with experience at a senior level in financial risk management, who—

(A) shall report directly to the Board; and
(B) shall be removable only by a majority vote of the
Board.
(2) DUTIES.—The Chief Risk Officer shall, in coordination with the audit committee of the Board established under section 1441, develop, implement, and manage a comprehensive process for identifying, assessing, monitoring, and limiting risks to the Corporation, including the overall portfolio diversification of the Corporation.

(g) CHIEF DEVELOPMENT OFFICER.—
(1) APPOINTMENT.—Subject to the approval of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall appoint a Chief Development Officer, from among individuals with experience in development, who—

(A) shall report directly to the Board; and
(B) shall be removable only by a majority vote of the
Board.

(2) DUTIES.—The Chief Development Officer shall—

(A) coordinate the Corporation’s development policies
and implementation efforts with the United States Agency
for International Development, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, and other relevant United States Government
departments and agencies, including directly liaising with
missions of the United States Agency for International
Development, to ensure that departments, agencies, and
missions have training, awareness, and access to the Cor-
poration’s tools in relation to development policy and projects
in countries;
(B) under the guidance of the Chief Executive Officer,
manage employees of the Corporation that are dedicated to
structuring, monitoring, and evaluating transactions and
projects co-designed with the United States Agency for
International Development and other relevant United States
Government departments and agencies;
(C) authorize and coordinate transfers of funds or other
resources to and from such agencies, departments, or mis-
sions upon the concurrence of those institutions in support of
the Corporation’s projects or activities;
(D) manage the responsibilities of the Corporation
under paragraphs (1) and (4) of section 1442(b) and para-
graphs (1)(A) and (3)(A) of section 1443(b);
(E) coordinate and implement the activities of the Cor-
poration under section 1445; and
(F) be an ex officio member of the Development
Advisory Council established under subsection (i) and
participate in or send a representative to each meeting of
the Council.
(h) OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion, officers, employees, and agents shall be selected and
appointed by the Corporation, and shall be vested with such
powers and duties as the Corporation may determine.
(2) ADMINISTRATIVELY DETERMINED EMPLOYEES.—
(A) APPOINTMENT; COMPENSATION; REMOVAL.—Of offi-
cers and employees employed by the Corporation under
paragraph (1), not more than 50 may be appointed, com-
pensated, or removed without regard to title 5, United States
Code.
(B) R EINSTATEMENT.—Under such regulations as the
President may prescribe, officers and employees appointed to
a position under subparagraph (A) may be entitled, upon
removal from such position (unless the removal was for
cause), to reinstatement to the position occupied at the
time of appointment or to a position of comparable grade and
salary. authorized by
(C) ADDITIONAL POSITIONS.—Positions
subparagraph (A) shall be in addition to those otherwise
authorized by law, including positions authorized under
section 5108 of title 5, United States Code.
(D) RATES OF PAY FOR OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.— The
Corporation may set and adjust rates of basic pay for
officers and employees appointed under subparagraph
(A) without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 or sub-
chapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code,

relating to classification of positions and General Schedule
pay rates, respectively.
(3) LIABILITY OF EMPLOYEES.—
(A) I N GENERAL.—An individual who is a member of the
Board or an officer or employee of the Corporation has no
liability under this division with respect to any claim arising
out of or resulting from any act or omission by the individual
within the scope of the employment of the individual in
connection with any transaction by the Corporation.
(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Subparagraph (A) shall not
be construed to limit personal liability of an individual for
criminal acts or omissions, willful or malicious mis- conduct,
acts or omissions for private gain, or any other acts or
omissions outside the scope of the individual’s employment.
(C) CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—The Corporation shall
establish and publish procedures for avoiding conflicts of
interest on the part of officers and employees of the Cor-
poration and members of the Development Advisory Council
established under subsection (i).
(D) SAVINGS PROVISION.—This paragraph shall not be
construed—
(i) to affect—
(I) any other immunities and protections that
may be available to an individual described in
subparagraph (A) under applicable law with respect
to a transaction described in that subpara- graph; or
(II) any other right or remedy against the
Corporation, against the United States under
applicable law, or against any person other than an
individual described in subparagraph (A)
participating in such a transaction; or
(ii) to limit or alter in any way the immunities that
are available under applicable law for Federal officers
and employees not described in this paragraph.

(i) DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established a Development Advisory Council (in this subsection referred to as the ‘‘Council’’) to advise the Board on development objectives of the Corpora-

tion.(2) MEMBERSHIP.—Members of the Council shall be appointed by the Board, on the recommendation of the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Development Officer, and shall be composed of not more than 9 members broadly representative of nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, advocacy organizations, foundations, and other institutions engaged in international development.

(3) FUNCTIONS.—The Board shall call upon members of the Council, either collectively or individually, to advise the Board regarding the extent to which the Corporation is meeting its development mandate and any suggestions for improvements in with respect to meeting that mandate, including opportuni- ties in countries and project development and implementation challenges and opportunities.
(4) FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.—The Council shall not
be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

SEC. 1414. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CORPORATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 8G(a)(2) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting ‘‘the United States International Development Finance Corporation,’’ after ‘‘the Smithsonian Institution,’’.

(b) OVERSIGHT INDEPENDENCE.—Section 8G(a)(4) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (H), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in subparagraph (I), by striking the semicolon and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(J) with respect to the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, such term means the
Board of Directors of the United States International

Development Finance Corporation;’’.

SEC. 1415. INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Board shall establish a transparent and independent accountability mechanism.

(b) FUNCTIONS.—The independent accountability mechanism established pursuant to subsection (a) shall—

(1) annually evaluate and report to the Board and Congress regarding compliance with environmental, social, labor, human rights, and transparency standards, consistent with Corporation statutory mandates;
(2) provide a forum for resolving concerns regarding the impacts of specific Corporation-supported projects with respect to such standards; and
(3) provide advice regarding Corporation projects, policies, and practices.
TITLE II—AUTHORITIES

SEC. 1421. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO PROVISION OF SUPPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The authorities in this title shall only be exercised to—
(1) carry out of the policy of the United States in section 1411 and the purpose of the Corporation in section 1412;

(2) mitigate risks to United States taxpayers by sharing risks with the private sector and qualifying sovereign entities through co -financing and structuring of tools; and

(3) ensure that support provided under this title is addi-tional to private sector resources by mobilizing private capital that would otherwise not be deployed without such support.

(b) LENDING AND GUARANTIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation may make loans or guaranties upon such terms and conditions as the Corporation may determine.

(2) DENOMINATION.—Loans and guaranties issued under paragraph (1) may be denominated and repayable in United States dollars or foreign currencies. Foreign currency denomi-nated loans and guaranties should only be provided if the

Board determines there is a substantive policy rationale for
such loans and guaranties.
(3) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT OF 1990.—
Loans and guaranties issued under paragraph (1) shall be
subject to the requirements of the Federal Credit Reform Act of
1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.).
(c) EQUITY INVESTMENTS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation may, as a minority
investor, support projects with funds or use other mechanisms for
the purpose of purchasing, and may make and fund commit-
ments to purchase, invest in, make pledges in respect of, or
otherwise acquire, equity or quasi-equity securities or shares or
financial interests of any entity, including as a limited partner or
other investor in investment funds, upon such terms and
conditions as the Corporation may determine.
(2) DENOMINATION.—Support provided under paragraph (1)
may be denominated and repayable in United States dollars or
foreign currency. Foreign currency denominated support pro-
vided by paragraph (1) should only be provided if the Board
determines there is a substantive policy rationale for such
support. G UIDELINES AND CRITERIA.—The Corporation shall develop
(3)
guidelines and criteria to require that the use of the authority
provided by paragraph (1) with respect to a project has a clearly
defined development and foreign policy purpose, taking into
account the following objectives:
(A) The support for the project would be more likely
than not to substantially reduce or overcome the effect of
an identified market failure in the country in which the
project is carried out.
(B) The project would not have proceeded or would have
been substantially delayed without the support.
(C) The support would meaningfully contribute to
transforming local conditions to promote the development of
markets.
(D) The support can be shown to be aligned with
commercial partner incentives.
(E) The support can be shown to have significant
developmental impact and will contribute to long-term
commercial sustainability.
(F) The support furthers the policy of the United States
described in section 1411.

(4) LIMITATIONS ON EQUITY INVESTMENTS.—
(A) PER PROJECT LIMIT.—The aggregate amount of sup-
port provided under this subsection with respect to any
project shall not exceed 30 percent of the aggregate amount
of all equity investment made to the project at the time that
the Corporation approves support of the project.
(B) TOTAL LIMIT.—Support provided pursuant to this
subsection shall be limited to not more than 35 percent of
the Corporation’s aggregate exposure on the date that such
support is provided.
(5) SALES AND LIQUIDATION OF POSITION.—The Corporation

shall seek to sell and liquidate any support for a project pro- vided under this subsection as soon as commercially feasible, commensurate with other similar investors in the project and taking into consideration the national security interests of the  United States.

(6) TIMETABLE .—The Corporation shall create a project specific timetable for support provided under paragraph (1).

(d) INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE.—The Corporation may issue
insurance or reinsurance, upon such terms and conditions as the
Corporation may determine, to private sector entities and qualifying
sovereign entities assuring protection of their investments in whole
or in part against any or all political risks such as currency
inconvertibility and transfer restrictions, expropriation, war, ter-
rorism, civil disturbance, breach of contract, or nonhonoring of
financial obligations. AND SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT

(e) PROMOTION OF  OPPORTUNITIES.— of the

(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to carry out the purpose
Corporation described in section 1412(b), the Corporation may
initiate and support, through financial participation, incen- tive
grant, or otherwise, and on such terms and conditions as the
Corporation may determine, feasibility studies for the planning,
development, and management of, and procurement for,
potential bilateral and multilateral development projects eligible
for support under this title, including training activities
undertaken in connection with such projects, for the purpose of
promoting investment in such projects and the identification,
assessment, surveying, and promotion of private investment
opportunities, utilizing wherever feasible and effective, the
facilities of private investors. to the

(2) CONTRIBUTIONS TO COSTS.—The Corporation shall,
maximum extent practicable, require any person receiving funds
under the authorities of this subsection to—
(A) share the costs of feasibility studies and other
project planning services funded under this subsection; and
(B) reimburse the Corporation those funds provided
under this section, if the person succeeds in project
implementation. PROGRAMS.—The Corporation may
(f) SPECIAL PROJECTS AND
administer and manage special projects and programs in support of
specific transactions undertaken by the Corporation, including
programs of financial and advisory support that provide private
technical, professional, or managerial assistance in the development
of human resources, skills, technology, capital savings, or inter-
mediate financial and investment institutions or cooperatives, and
including the initiation of incentives, grants, or studies for energy,
women’s economic empowerment, microenterprise households, or
other small business activities.
(g) ENTERPRISE FUNDS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation may, following consulta-
tion with the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, and the heads of
other relevant departments or agencies, establish and operate
enterprise funds in accordance with this subsection.
(2) PRIVATE CHARACTER OF FUNDS.—Nothing in this section shall
be construed to make an enterprise fund an agency or
establishment of the United States Government, or to make the
officers, employees, or members of the Board of Directors of an
enterprise fund officers or employees of the United States for purposes of title 5, United States Code.

(3) PURPOSES FOR WHICH SUPPORT MAY BE PROVIDED.— The
Corporation, subject to the approval of the Board, may designate
private, nonprofit organizations as eligible to receive support
under this title for the following purposes:
(A) To promote development of economic freedom and
private sectors, including small- and medium-sized enter-
prises and joint ventures with the United States and host
country participants.
(B) To facilitate access to credit to small- and medium-
sized enterprises with sound business plans in countries
where there is limited means of accessing credit on market
terms.
(C) To promote policies and practices conducive to eco-
nomic freedom and private sector development.
(D) To attract foreign direct investment capital to fur-
ther promote private sector development and economic
freedom.
(E) To complement the work of the United States
Agency for International Development and other donors to
improve the overall business-enabling environment,
financing the creation and expansion of the private busi-
ness sector.
(F) To make financially sustainable investments
designed to generate measurable social benefits and build
technical capacity in addition to financial returns.
(4) OPERATION OF FUNDS.—
(A) EXPENDITURES.—Funds made available to an enter-
prise fund shall be expended at the minimum rate nec-
essary to make timely payments for projects and activities
carried out under this subsection.
(B) ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.—Not more than 3 per – cent
per annum of the funds made available to an enter- prise
fund may be obligated or expended for the administra- tive
expenses of the enterprise fund.
(5) BOARD OF DIRECTORS.—Each enterprise fund established
under this subsection should be governed by a Board of Direc-
tors comprised of private citizens of the United States or the host
country, who—
(A) shall be appointed by the President after consulta-
tion with the chairmen and ranking members of the appro-
priate congressional committees; and
(B) have pursued careers in international business and
have demonstrated expertise in international and emerging
market investment activities.
(6) MAJORITY MEMBER REQUIREMENT.—The majority of the
members of the Board of Directors shall be United States citizens
who shall have relevant experience relating to the purposes
described in paragraph (3).
(7) REPORTS.—Not later than one year after the date of the
establishment of an enterprise fund under this subsection, and
annually thereafter until the enterprise fund terminates in
accordance with paragraph (10), the Board of Directors of the
enterprise fund shall—
(A) submit to the appropriate congressional committees

a report—
(i) detailing the administrative expenses of the
enterprise fund during the year preceding the submis-
sion of the report;
(ii) describing the operations, activities, engage-
ment with civil society and relevant local private sector
entities, development objectives and outcomes, finan-
cial condition, and accomplishments of the enterprise
fund during that year;
(iii) describing the results of any audit conducted
under paragraph (8); and
(iv) describing how audits conducted under para-
graph (8) are informing the operations and activities of
the enterprise fund; and
(B) publish, on a publicly available internet website of
the enterprise fund, each report required by subpara- graph
(A).
(8) OVERSIGHT.—
(A) INSPECTOR GENERAL PERFORMANCE AUDITS.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—The Inspector General of the Cor-
poration shall conduct periodic audits of the activities of
each enterprise fund established under this sub- section.
(ii) CONSIDERATION.—In conducting an audit under
clause (i), the Inspector General shall assess whether
the activities of the enterprise fund—
(I) support the purposes described in para-
graph (3);
(II) result in profitable private sector
investing; and
(III) generate measurable social benefits.
(B) RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS.—The Corporation
shall ensure that each enterprise fund receiving support
under this subsection—
(i) keeps separate accounts with respect to such
support; and
(ii) maintains such records as may be reasonably
necessary to facilitate effective audits under this para-
graph.
(9) RETURN OF FUNDS TO TREASURY.—Any funds resulting from
any liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of an enterprise fund,
in whole or in part, shall be returned to the Treasury of the
United States.
(10) TERMINATION.—The authority of an enterprise fund to
provide support under this subsection shall terminate on the
earlier of— date of the first
(A) the date that is 10 years after the
expenditure of amounts from the enterprise fund; or
(B) the date on which the enterprise fund is liquidated.
(h) SUPERVISION OF SUPPORT.—Support provided under this title
shall be subject to section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)).
(i) SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall undertake, in cooperation with appropriate departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States as well as private entities and others, to broaden the participation of United States small businesses and cooperatives and other small United States

investors in the development of small private enterprise in
less developed friendly countries or areas.

(2) OUTREACH TO MINORITY-OWNED AND WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall collect data on
the involvement of minority- and women-owned businesses
in projects supported by the Corporation, including—
(i) the amount of insurance and financing provided
by the Corporation to such businesses in connection
with projects supported by the Corporation; and
(ii) to the extent such information is available, the
involvement of such businesses in procurement
activities conducted or supported by the Corporation.
(B) INCLUSION IN ANNUAL REPORT.—The Corporation
shall include, in its annual report submitted to Congress
under section 1443, the aggregate data collected under this
paragraph, in such form as to quantify the effectiveness of
the Corporation’s outreach activities to minority- and

women-owned businesses.

SEC. 1422. TERMS AND CONDITIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), support provided by the Corporation under this title shall be on such terms and conditions as the Corporation may prescribe.

(b) REQUIREMENTS.—The following requirements apply to sup- port provided by the Corporation under this title:

(1) The Corporation shall provide support using authorities under this title only if it is necessary—

(A) to alleviate a credit market imperfection; or
(B) to achieve specified development or foreign policy objectives of the United States Government by providing support in the most efficient way to meet those objectives on a case-by-case basis.

(2) The final maturity of a loan made or guaranteed by the Corporation shall not exceed the lesser of—

(A) 25 years; or
(B) debt servicing capabilities of the project to be financed by the loan (as determined by the Corporation).
(3) The Corporation shall, with respect to providing any loan guaranty to a project, require the parties to the project to bear the risk of loss in an amount equal to at least 20 percent of the guaranteed support by the Corporation in the project.
(4) The Corporation may not make or guarantee a loan unless the Corporation determines that the borrower or lender is responsible and that adequate provision is made for servicing the loan on reasonable terms and protecting the financial interest of the United States.

(5) The interest rate for direct loans and interest supple-ments on guaranteed loans shall be set by reference to a bench-mark interest rate (yield) on marketable Treasury securities or other widely recognized or appropriate benchmarks with a similar maturity to the loans being made or guaranteed, as determined in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Secretary of the Treasury.

The Corporation shall establish appropriate minimum interest
rates for loans, guaranties, and other instruments as necessary.
(6) The minimum interest rate for new loans as established
by the Corporation shall be adjusted periodically to take account
of changes in the interest rate of the benchmark financial
instrument.
(7)(A) The Corporation shall set fees or premiums for sup-
port provided under this title at levels that minimize the cost to
the Government while supporting achievement of the objec- tives
of support.
(B) The Corporation shall review fees for loan guaranties
periodically to ensure that the fees assessed on new loan
guaranties are at a level sufficient to cover the Corporation’s
most recent estimates of its costs.
(8) Any loan guaranty provided by the Corporation shall be
conclusive evidence that—
(A) the guaranty has been properly obtained;
(B) the loan qualified for the guaranty; and the
(C) but for fraud or material misrepresentation by
holder of the guaranty, the guaranty is presumed to be
valid, legal, and enforceable.

(9) The Corporation shall prescribe explicit standards for use in periodically assessing the credit risk of new and existing direct loans or guaranteed loans.

(10) The Corporation may not make loans or loan guaran-ties except to the extent that budget authority to cover the costs of the loans or guaranties is provided in advance in an appropriations Act, as required by section 504 of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661c).

(11) The Corporation shall rely upon specific standards to assess the developmental and strategic value of projects for which it provides support and should only provide the minimum level of support necessary in order to support such projects.

(12) Any loan or loan guaranty made by the Corporation should be provided on a senior basis or pari passu with other senior debt unless there is a substantive policy rationale to provide such support otherwise.

SEC. 1423. PAYMENT OF LOSSES.
(a) PAYMENTS FOR DEFAULTS ON GUARANTEED LOANS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Corporation determines holder of a loan guaranteed by the Corporation suffers a
a result of a default by a borrower on the loan, the Corpora shall pay to the holder the percent of the loss, as specified in guaranty contract, after the holder of the loan has made such further collection efforts and instituted such enforce- ment proceedings as the Corporation may require.

(2) SUBROGATION.—Upon making a payment described in paragraph (1), the Corporation shall ensure the Corporation will be subrogated to all the rights of the recipient of the payment.

(3) RECOVERY EFFORTS.—The Corporation shall pursue recovery from the borrower of the amount of any payment made under paragraph (1) with respect to the loan.
(b) LIMITATION ON PAYMENTS.—that thelossas-tionthe

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided by paragraph (2), compensation for insurance, reinsurance, or a guaranty issued under this title shall not exceed the dollar value of the tangible or intangible contributions or commitments made in the project, plus interest, earnings, or profits actually accrued on such contributions or commitments, to the extent provided by such insurance, reinsurance, or guaranty.

(2) EXCEPTION.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation may provide that—
(i) appropriate adjustments in the insured dollar value be made to reflect the replacement cost of project assets; and

(ii) compensation for a claim of loss under insur-ance of an equity investment under section 1421 may be computed on the basis of the net book value attrib-utable to the equity investment on the date of loss.

(3) ADDITIONAL LIMITATION.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(A)(ii) and except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Corpora-tion shall limit the amount of direct insurance and reinsur-ance issued under section 1421 with respect to a project so as to require that the insured and its affiliates bear the risk of loss for at least 10 percent of the amount of the Corporation’s exposure to that insured and its affili- ates in the project.

(B) EXCEPTION.—The limitation under subparagraph
(A) shall not apply to direct insurance or reinsurance of loans provided by banks or other financial institutions to unrelated parties.

(c) ACTIONS BY ATTORNEY GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall take such action as may be appropriate to enforce any right accruing to the United States as a result of the issuance of any loan or guaranty under this title.
(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude any forbearance for the benefit of a borrower that may be agreed upon by the parties to a loan guaranteed by the Corporation if budget authority for any resulting costs to the United States Government (as defined in section 502 of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a)) is available.

SEC. 1424. TERMINATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The authorities provided under this title terminate on the date that is 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) TERMINATION OF CORPORATION.—The Corporation shall terminate on the date on which the portfolio of the Corporation is liquidated.
TITLE III—ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 1431. OPERATIONS.

(a) BILATERAL A GREEMENTS.—The Corporation may provide support under title II in connection with projects in any country the government of which has entered into an agreement with the

United States authorizing the Corporation to provide such support in that country.
(b) CLAIMS SETTLEMENT.—
(1) I N GENERAL.—Claims arising as a result of support provided under title II or under predecessor authority may be settled, and disputes arising as a result thereof may be arbitrated with the consent of the parties, on such terms and conditions as the Corporation may determine.

(2) SETTLEMENTS CONCLUSIVE.—Payment made pursuant to any settlement pursuant to paragraph (1), or as a result of an arbitration award, shall be final and conclusive notwith-standing any other provision of law.
(c) PRESUMPTION OF COMPLIANCE.—Each contract executed by such
officer or officers as may be designated by the Board shall be conclusively presumed to be issued in compliance with the requirements of this division.
(d) ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS AND DOCUMENTS.—The Corporation

shall implement policies to accept electronic documents and elec-tronic payments in all of its programs.

SEC. 1432. CORPORATE POWERS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation—
(1) may adopt, alter, and use a seal, to include an identifi-able symbol of the United States;

(2) may make and perform such contracts, including no- cost contracts (as defined by the Corporation), grants, and other agreements notwithstanding division C of subtitle I of title 41, United States Code, with any person or government however designated and wherever situated, as may be necessary for carrying out the functions of the Corporation;
(3) may lease, purchase, or otherwise acquire, improve, and use such real property wherever situated, as may be nec- essary for carrying out the functions of the Corporation, except that, if the real property is for the Corporation’s own occupancy, the lease, purchase, acquisition, improvement, or use of the real property shall be entered into or conducted in consultation with the Administrator of General Services;

(4) may accept cash gifts or donations of services or of property (real, personal, or mixed), tangible or intangible, for the purpose of carrying out the functions of the Corporation;
(5) may use the United States mails in the same manner and on the same conditions as the Executive departments (as defined in section 101 of title 5, United States Code);

(6) may contract with individuals for personal services, who shall not be considered Federal employees for any provision of law administered by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management;

(7) may hire or obtain passenger motor vehicles;
(8) may sue and be sued in its corporate name;
(9) may acquire, hold, or dispose of, upon such terms and conditions as the Corporation may determine, any property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or any interest in such property, except that, in the case of real property that is for the Corporation’s own occupancy, the acquisition, holding, or

disposition of the real property shall be conducted in consultation with the Administrator of General Services;

(10) may lease office space for the Corporation’s own use, with the obligation of amounts for such lease limited to the current fiscal year for which payments are due until the expira-tion of the current lease under predecessor authority, as of the day before the date of the enactment of this Act;

(11) may indemnify directors, officers, employees, and agents of the Corporation for liabilities and expenses incurred in connection with their activities on behalf of the Corporation;

(12) notwithstanding any other provision of law, may rep-resent itself or contract for representation in any legal or arbitral proceeding;

(13) may exercise any priority of the Government of the United States in collecting debts from bankrupt, insolvent, or decedents’ estates;

(14) may collect, notwithstanding section 3711(g)(1) of title 31, United States Code, or compromise any obligations assigned to or held by the Corporation, including any legal or equitable rights accruing to the Corporation;

(15) may make arrangements with foreign governments (including agencies, instrumentalities, or political subdivisions of such governments) or with multilateral organizations or institutions for sharing liabilities;
(16) may sell direct investments of the Corporation to pri-vate investors upon such terms and conditions as the Corpora-tion may determine; and

(17) shall have such other powers as may be necessary and incident to carrying out the functions of the Corporation.

(b) TREATMENT OF PROPERTY.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating to the acquisition, handling, or disposal of property by the United States, the Corporation shall have the right in its discretion to complete, recondition, reconstruct, renovate, repair, maintain, operate, or sell any property acquired by the Corporation pursuant to the provisions of this division, except that, in the case of real property that is for the Corporation’s own occupancy, the completion, reconditioning, reconstruction, renova-tion, repair, maintenance, operation, or sale of the real property shall be conducted in consultation with the Administrator of General Services.

SEC. 1433. MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.

The maximum contingent liability of the Corporation out-standing at any one time shall not exceed in the aggregate $60,000,000,000.

SEC. 1434. CORPORATE FUNDS.

(a) CORPORATE CAPITAL ACCOUNT.—There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund to be known as the ‘‘Corporate Capital Account’’ to carry out the purposes of the Corporation.

(b) FUNDING.—The Corporate Capital Account shall consist of—
(1) fees charged and collected pursuant to subsection (c);
(2) any amounts received pursuant to subsection (e);
(3) investments and returns on such investments pursuant to subsection (g);
(4) unexpended balances transferred to the Corporation pursuant to subsection (i);

(5) payments received in connection with settlements of all insurance and reinsurance claims of the Corporation; and

(6) all other collections transferred to or earned by the
Corporation, excluding the cost, as defined in section 502 of the
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a), of loans and
loan guaranties.

(c) FEE AUTHORITY.—Fees may be charged and collected for
providing services in amounts to be determined by the Corporation.
(d) USES.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to Acts making appropriations, the
Corporation is authorized to pay—
(A) the cost, as defined in section 502 of the Federal
Credit Reform Act of 1990, of loans and loan guaranties;
(B) administrative expenses of the Corporation;
(C) for the cost of providing support authorized by
subsections (c), (e), (f), and (g) of section 1421;
(D) project-specific transaction costs.

(2) INCOME AND REVENUE.—In order to carry out the pur – poses
of the Corporation, all collections transferred to or earned by the
Corporation, excluding the cost, as defined in section
502 of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, of loans and loan
guaranties, shall be deposited into the Corporate Capital Account
and shall be available to carry out its purpose, including without
limitation—
(A) payment of all insurance and reinsurance claims
of the Corporation;
(B) repayments to the Treasury of amounts borrowed
under subsection (e); and
(C) dividend payments to the Treasury under sub-
section (f).
(e) FULL F AITH AND CREDIT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—All support provided pursuant to prede-
cessor authorities or title II shall continue to constitute obliga-
tions of the United States, and the full faith and credit of the
United States is hereby pledged for the full payment and
performance of such obligations.

(2) AUTHORITY TO BORROW.—The Corporation is authorized to
borrow from the Treasury such sums as may be necessary to
fulfill such obligations of the United States and any such
borrowing shall be at a rate determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury, taking into consideration the current average market yields on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities, for a period jointly determined by the Corporation and the Secretary, and subject to such terms and conditions as the Secretary may require.

(f) DIVIDENDS.—The Board, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall annually assess a dividend payment to the Treasury if the Corporation’s insurance portfolio is more than 100 percent reserved.
(g) INVESTMENT AUTHORITY.—

(1) I N GENERAL.—The Corporation may request the Sec-retary of the Treasury to invest such portion of the Corporate Capital Account as is not, in the Corporation’s judgment, required to meet the current needs of the Corporate Capital Account.

(2) FORM OF INVESTMENTS.—Such investments shall be made by the Secretary of the Treasury in public debt obliga- tions, with maturities suitable to the needs of the Corporate Capital Account, as determined by the Corporation, and bearing
interest at rates determined by the Secretary, taking into consideration current market yields on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities.

(h) COLLECTIONS.—Interest earnings made pursuant to sub-section (g), earnings collected related to equity investments, and amounts, excluding fees related to insurance or reinsurance, col-lected pursuant to subsection (c), shall not be collected for any fiscal year except to the extent provided in advance in appropria- tions Acts.
(i) TRANSFER FROM PREDECESSOR AGENCIES AND PROGRAMS.— By
the end of the transition period described in title VI, the unex- pended balances, assets, and responsibilities of any agency specified in the plan required by section 1462 shall be transferred to the Corporation.

(j) TRANSFER OF FUNDS.—In order to carry out this division, funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out the Foreign Assist- ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) may be transferred to the Corporation and funds authorized to be appropriated to the Corporation may be transferred to the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development.

(k) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘project-specific transaction costs’’—

(1) means those costs incurred by the Corporation for travel, legal expenses, and direct and indirect costs incurred in claims settlements associated with the provision of support under title II and shall not be considered administrative expenses for the purposes of this section; and

(2) does not include information technology (as such term is defined in section 11101 of title 40, United States Code).

SEC. 1435. COORDINATION WITH OTHER DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES.

It is the sense of Congress that the Corporation should use relevant data of the Department of State, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the United States Agency for International Develop-ment, and other departments and agencies that have development functions to better inform the decisions of the Corporation with respect to providing support under title II.
TITLE IV—MONITORING, EVALUATION,
AND REPORTING

SEC. 1441. ESTABLISHMENT OF RISK AND AUDIT COMMITTEES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—To assist the Board to fulfill its duties and responsibilities under section 1421(a), the Corporation shall estab-lish a risk committee and an audit committee.

(b) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF RISK COMMITTEE.—Subject to
the direction of the Board, the risk committee established under subsection (a) shall have oversight responsibility of—

(1) formulating risk management policies of the operations of the Corporation;
(2) reviewing and providing guidance on operation of the Corporation’s global risk management framework;

(3) developing policies for enterprise risk management, monitoring, and management of strategic, reputational, regu-latory, operational, developmental, environmental, social, and financial risks;

(4) developing the risk profile of the Corporation, including a risk management and compliance framework and governance structure to support such framework; and

(5) developing policies and procedures for assessing, prior to providing, and for any period during which the Corporation provides, support to any foreign entities, whether such entities have in place sufficient enhanced due diligence policies and practices to prevent money laundering and corruption to ensure the Corporation does not provide support to persons that are—
(A) knowingly engaging in acts of corruption;
(B) knowingly providing material or financial support
for terrorism, drug trafficking, or human trafficking; or
(C) responsible for ordering or otherwise directing
serious or gross violations of human rights.
(c) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUDIT COMMITTEE.—Sub- ject

to the direction of the Board, the audit committee established under subsection (a) shall have the oversight responsibility of—

(1) the integrity of the Corporation’s financial reporting and systems of internal controls regarding finance and accounting;
(2) the integrity of the Corporation’s financial statements;
(3) the performance of the Corporation’s internal audit function; and
(4) compliance with legal and regulatory requirements related to the finances of the Corporation.

SEC. 1442. PERFORMANCE MEASURES, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall develop a performance measurement system to evaluate and monitor projects supported by the Corporation under title II and to guide future projects of the Corporation.

(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the performance measure-ment system required by subsection (a), the Corporation shall—
(1) develop a successor for the development impact measurement system of the Overseas Private Investment Cor-poration (as such system was in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act);

(2) develop a mechanism for ensuring that support provided by the Corporation under title II is in addition to private investment;

(3) develop standards for, and a method for ensuring, appro-priate financial  erformance of the Corporation’s portfolio; and

(4) develop standards for, and a method for ensuring, appro-priate development performance of the Corporation’s portfolio, including—
(A) measurement of the projected and ex post develop-
ment impact of a project; and
(B) the information necessary to comply with section 1443.

(c) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.—The Corporation shall make available to the public on a regular basis information about support provided by the Corporation under title II and performance metrics about such support on a country-by- country basis.

(d) CONSULTATION.—In developing the performance measure-ment system required by subsection (a), the Corporation shall con-sult with the Development Advisory Council established under sec-tion 1413(i) and other stakeholders and interested parties engaged in sustainable economic growth and development.

SEC. 1443. ANNUAL REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—After the end of each fiscal year, the Corpora-tion shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a complete and detailed report of its operations during that fiscal year, including an assessment of—

(1) the economic and social development impact, including with respect to matters described in subsections (d), (e), and
(f) of section 1451, of projects supported by the Corporation
under title II;

(2) the extent to which the operations of the Corporation complement or are compatible with the development assistance programs of the United States and qualifying sovereign entities;

(3) the Corporation’s institutional linkages with other rel-evant United States Government department and agencies, including efforts to strengthen such linkages; and

(4) the compliance of projects supported by the Corporation under title II with human rights, environmental, labor, and social policies, or other such related policies that govern the Corporation’s support for projects, promulgated or otherwise administered by the Corporation.

(b) ELEMENTS.—Each annual report required by subsection (a) shall include analyses of the effects of projects supported by the Corporation under title II, including—
(1) reviews and analyses of—
(A) the desired development outcomes for projects and
whether or not the Corporation is meeting the associated
metrics, goals, and development objectives, including, to the
extent practicable, in the years after conclusion of projects;
and
(B) the effect of the Corporation’s support on access to
capital and ways in which the Corporation is addressing
identifiable market gaps or inefficiencies and what impact, if
any, such support has on access to credit for a specific project,

(2) an explanation of any partnership arrangement or cooperation with a qualifying sovereign entity in support of each project;
(3) projections of—
(A) development outcomes, and whether or not support
for projects are meeting the associated performance meas-
ures, both during the start-up phase and over the duration
of the support, and to the extent practicable, measures of
such development outcomes should be on a gender-
disaggregated basis, such as changes in employment, access
to financial services, enterprise development and growth,
and composition of executive boards and senior leadership of
enterprises receiving support under title II; and
(B) the value of private sector assets brought to bear
relative to the amount of support provided by the Corpora-

tion and the value of any other public sector support; and

(4) an assessment of the extent to which lessons learned from the monitoring and evaluation activities of the Corpora-tion, and from annual reports from previous years compiled by the Corporation, have been applied to projects.

SEC. 1444. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE PROJECT INFORMATION.
The Corporation shall—
(1) maintain a user -friendly, publicly available, machine-readable database with detailed project-level information, as appropriate and to the extent practicable, including a descrip-tion of the support provided by the Corporation under title II, including, to the extent feasible, the information included in the report to Congress under section 1443 and project-level performance metrics; and

(2) include a clear link to information about each project supported by the Corporation under title II on the internet website of the Department of State, ‘‘ForeignAssistance.gov’’, or a successor website or other online publication.

SEC. 1445. ENGAGEMENT WITH INVESTORS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation, acting through the Chief Development Officer, shall, in cooperation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development—
(1) develop a strategic relationship with private sector enti-ties focused at the nexus of business opportunities and develop-ment priorities;
(2) engage such entities and reduce business risks primarily through direct transaction support and facilitating investment partnerships;

(3) develop and support tools, approaches, and inter-mediaries that can mobilize private finance at scale in the developing world;
(4) pursue highly developmental projects of all sizes, espe-cially those that are small but designed for work in the most underdeveloped areas, including countries with chronic suf-fering as a result of extreme poverty, fragile institutions, or a history of violence; and

(5) pursue projects consistent with the policy of the United States described in section 1411 and the Joint Strategic Plan and the Mission Country Development Cooperation Strategies of the United States Agency for International Development.
(b) ASSISTANCE.—To achieve the goals described in subsection (a), the Corporation shall—
(1) develop risk mitigation tools;
(2) provide transaction structuring support for blended finance models;
(3) support intermediaries linking capital supply and
demand;
(4) coordinate with other Federal agencies to support or accelerate transactions;
(5) convene financial, donor, civil society, and public sector partners around opportunities for private finance within development priorities;

(6) offer strategic planning and programming assistance to catalyze investment into priority sectors;

(7) provide transaction structuring support;
(8) deliver training and knowledge management tools for engaging private investors;

(9) partner with private sector entities that provide access to capital and expertise; and
(10) identify and screen new investment partners.
(c) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Corporation shall coordinate with the United States Agency for International Development and other agencies and departments, as necessary, on projects and programs supported by the Corporation that include technical assistance.

SEC. 1446. NOTIFICATIONS TO BE PROVIDED BY THE CORPORATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days prior to the Corpora- tion making a financial commitment associated with the provision of support under title II in an amount in excess of $10,000,000, the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report in writing that contains the information required by subsection (b) .

(b) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—The information required by this subsection includes—

(1) the amount of each such financial commitment;
(2) an identification of the recipient or beneficiary; and
(3) a description of the project, activity, or asset and the development goal or purpose to be achieved by providing sup-port by the Corporation.

(c) BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.—The Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation shall notify the appropriate congressional commit- tees not later than 30 days after entering into a new bilateral agreement described in section 1431(a).
TITLE V—CONDITIONS, RESTRICTIONS,
AND PROHIBITIONS

SEC. 1451. LIMITATIONS AND PREFERENCES.
(a) LIMITATION ON SUPPORT FOR SINGLE ENTITY.—No entity
receiving support from the Corporation under title II may receive more than an amount equal to 5 percent of the Corporation’s maximum contingent liability authorized under section 1433.
(b) PREFERENCE FOR SUPPORT FOR PROJECTS SPONSORED BY UNITED STATES PERSONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation should give preferential consideration to projects sponsored by or involving private sector entities that are United States persons.
(2) UNITED STATES PERSON DEFINED.—In this subsection,
the term ‘‘United States person’’ means—
(A) a United States citizen; or
(B) an entity owned or controlled by an individual
or individuals described in subparagraph (A).
(c) PREFERENCE FOR SUPPORT IN COUNTRIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADE OBLIGATIONS.—
(1) CONSULTATIONS WITH UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENT-

ATIVE.—Not less frequently than annually, the Corporation shall consult with the United States Trade Representative with respect to the status of countries eligible to receive support from the Corporation under title II and the compliance of those countries with their international trade obligations.

(2) PREFERENTIAL CONSIDERATION.—The Corporation shall give preferential consideration to providing support under title

II for projects in countries in compliance with or making
substantial progress coming into compliance with their inter-
national trade obligations.
(d) WORKER RIGHTS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall only support projects
under title II in countries that are taking steps to adopt and
implement laws that extend internationally recog- nized worker
rights (as defined in section 507 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
U.S.C. 2467)) to workers in that country, including any
designated zone in that country.
(2) REQUIRED CONTRACT LANGUAGE.—The Corporation shall also
include the following language, in substantially the fol- lowing
form, in all contracts which the Corporation enters into with
persons receiving support under title II: ‘‘The person receiving
support agrees not to take actions to prevent employees of the
foreign enterprise from lawfully exercising their right of
association and their right to organize and bargain collectively.
The person further agrees to observe applicable laws relating to
a minimum age for employment of children, acceptable conditions
of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational health and safety, and not to use forced labor or
the worst forms of child labor (as defined in section 507 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2467)) . The person is not
responsible under this paragraph for the actions of a foreign
government.’’.
(e) IMPACT NOTIFICATION.—The Board shall not vote in favor
of any project proposed to be supported by the Corporation under title
II that is likely to have significant adverse environmental or social
impacts that are sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented, unless—
(1) at least 60 days before the date of the vote, an environ-
mental and social impact assessment or initial environmental
and social audit, analyzing the environmental and social impacts
of the proposed project and of alternatives to the pro- posed
project, including mitigation measures, is completed;
(2) such assessment or audit has been made available to
the public of the United States, locally affected groups in the
country in which the project will be carried out, and non-
governmental organizations in that country; and to
(3) the Corporation, applying best practices with respect
environmental and social safeguards, includes in any contract
relating to the project provisions to ensure the mitigation of any
such adverse environmental or social impacts. its authorities
(f) WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT.—In utilizing
under title II, the Corporation shall consider the impacts of its
support on women’s economic opportunities and outcomes and shall
prioritize the reduction of gender gaps and maximize development
impact by working to improve women’s economic opportunities.
(g) PREFERENCE FOR PROVISION OF SUPPORT IN COUNTRIES
EMBRACING PRIVATE ENTERPRISE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation should give preferential
consideration to projects for which support under title II may be
provided in countries the governments of which have dem-onstrated consistent support for economic policies that promote

the development of private enterprise, both domestic and for-
eign, and maintaining the conditions that enable private enter-
prise to make a full contribution to the development of such
countries, including—
(A) market-based economic policies;
(B) protection of private property rights;
(C) respect for the rule of law; and
(D) systems to combat corruption and bribery.
(2) SOURCES OF INFORMATION.—The Corporation should rely
on both third-party indicators and United States Govern- ment
information, such as the Department of State’s Invest- ment
Climate Statements, the Department of Commerce’s Country
Commercial Guides, or the Millennium Challenge Cor- poration’s
Constraints Analysis, to assess whether countries meet the
conditions described in paragraph (1). PARTICIPATION.—In
(h) C ONSIDERATION OF FOREIGN BOYCOTT
providing support for projects under title II, the Corporation shall
consider, using information readily available, whether the project is
sponsored by or substantially affiliated with any person taking or
knowingly agreeing to take actions, or having taken or knowingly
agreed to take actions within the past 3 years, which demonstrate or
otherwise evidence intent to comply with, further, or support any
boycott described in section 1773(a) of the Export Control Reform Act
of 2018 (subtitle B of title XVII of Public Law 115– 232).
(i) ENSURING O PPORTUNITIES FOR SMALL BUSINESSES IN FOR- EIGN
DEVELOPMENT.—The Corporation shall, using broad criteria, make, to
the maximum extent possible consistent with this division, efforts—
(1) to give preferential consideration in providing support
under title II to projects sponsored by or involving small
businesses; and by
(2) to ensure that the proportion of projects sponsored
or involving United States small businesses, including women-, minority-, and veteran-owned small businesses, is not less than 50 percent of all projects for which the Corporation provides support and that involve United States persons.

SEC. 1452. ADDITIONALITY AND AVOIDANCE OF MARKET DISTORTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Before the Corporation provides support for a project under title II, the Corporation shall ensure that private sector entities are afforded an opportunity to support the project.

(b) SAFEGUARDS, POLICIES, AND GUIDELINES.—The Corporation
shall develop appropriate safeguards, policies, and guidelines to ensure that support provided by the Corporation under title II—
(1) supplements and encourages, but does not compete with, private sector support;
(2) operates according to internationally recognized best practices and standards with respect to ensuring the avoidance of market distorting government subsidies and the crowding out of private sector lending; and

(3) does not have a significant adverse impact on United States employment.
SEC. 1453. PROHIBITION ON SUPPORT IN COUNTRIES THAT SUPPORT TERRORISM OR VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS AND WITH SANCTIONED PERSONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation is prohibited from providing support under title II for a government, or an entity owned or controlled by a government, if the Secretary of State has determined that the government—

(1) has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism for purposes of—
(A) section 1754(c)(1)(A)(i) of the Export Control
Reform Act of 2018 (subtitle B of title XVII of Public Law 115–232);
(B) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a));
(C) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)); or
(D) any other relevant provision of law; or

(2) has engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights for purposes of sec- tion 116(a) or 502B(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(a) and 2304(a)(2)) or any other relevant provi- sion of law.

(b) PROHIBITION ON SUPPORT OF SANCTIONED PERSONS.—The Corporation is prohibited from all dealings related to any project under title II prohibited under United States sanctions laws or regulations, including dealings with persons on the list of specially designated persons and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury, except to the extent otherwise authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of State.

(c) PROHIBITION ON SUPPORT OF ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS.—The Corporation shall require any person receiving support under title II to certify that the person, and any entity owned or controlled by the person, is in compliance with all United States sanctions laws and regulations.

SEC. 1454. APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF LAW.

Subsections (g), (l), (m), and (n) of section 237 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2197) shall apply with respect to the Corporation to the same extent and in the same manner as

such subsections applied with respect to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.
TITLE VI—TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 1461. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:
(1) AGENCY.—The term ‘‘agency’’ includes any entity, organizational unit, program, or function.
(2) TRANSITION PERIOD.—The term ‘‘transition period’’ means the period—
(A) beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(B) ending on the effective date of the reorganization plan required by section 1462(e).

SEC. 1462. REORGANIZATION PLAN.

(a) SUBMISSION OF PLAN.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a reorganization plan regarding the following:
(A) The transfer of agencies, personnel, assets, and
obligations to the Corporation pursuant to this title.
(B) Any consolidation, reorganization, or streamlining
of agencies transferred to the Corporation pursuant to this
title.
(C) Any efficiencies or cost savings achieved or addi-
tional costs incurred as a result of the transfer of agencies,
personnel, assets, and obligations to the Corporation pursu-

ant to this title, including reductions in unnecessary or

(2) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 15 days before the date on which the plan is transmitted pursuant to this subsection, the President shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees on such plan.
(b) PLAN ELEMENTS.—The plan transmitted under subsection
(a) shall contain, consistent with this division, such elements as the President deems appropriate, including the following:

(1) Identification of any functions of agencies transferred to the Corporation pursuant to this title that will not be trans-ferred to the Corporation under the plan.
(2) Specification of the steps to be taken to organize the Corporation, including the delegation or assignment of functions transferred to the Corporation.

(3) Specification of the funds available to each agency that will be transferred to the Corporation as a result of transfers under the plan.

(4) Specification of the proposed allocations within the Cor-poration of unexpended funds transferred in connection with transfers under the plan.

(5) Specification of any proposed disposition of property, facilities, contracts, records, and other assets and obligations of agencies transferred under the plan.

(6) Specification of the number of authorized positions and personnel employed before the end of the transition period that will be transferred to the Corporation, including plans to mitigate the impact of such transfers on the United States Agency for International Development.
(c) REPORT ON COORDINATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The transfer of functions authorized by this section may occur only after the President and Chief Execu- tive Officer of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter- national Development jointly submit to the Committee on For- eign Affairs and Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a report in writing that contains the information required by paragraph (2).

(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—The information required by this paragraph includes a description in detail of the procedures to be followed after the transfer of functions authorized by
this section have occurred to coordinate between the Corpora-tion and the United States Agency for International Develop-ment in carrying out the functions so transferred.

(d) MODIFICATION OF PLAN.—The President shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees before making any mate- rial modification or revision to the plan before the plan becomes effective in accordance with subsection (e).
(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The reorganization plan described in this section, including any modifications or revisions of the plan under subsection (c), shall become effective for an agency on the date specified in the plan (or the plan as modified pursuant to subsection (d)), except that such date may not be earlier than 90 days after the date the President has transmitted the reorganization plan to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to subsection (a) .

(2) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION .—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to require the transfer of functions, personnel, records, balances of appropriations, or other assets of an agency on a single date.

SEC. 1463. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Effective at the end of the transition period,
there shall be transferred to the Corporation the functions, per-
sonnel, assets, and liabilities of—
(1) the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, as in
existence on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act;
and (2) the following elements of the United States Agency for
International Development:
(A) The Development Credit Authority.
(B) The existing Legacy Credit portfolio under the
Urban Environment Program and any other direct loan
programs and non-Development Credit Authority guaranty
programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or other predecessor Acts, as in
existence on the date of the enactment of this Act, other than
any sovereign loan guaranties. end of

(b) ADDITIONAL TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—Effective at the
the transition period, there is authorized to be transferred to the
Corporation, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, the functions,
personnel, assets, and liabilities of the following elements of the
United States Agency for International Development:
(1) The Office of Private Capital and Microenterprise.
(2) The enterprise funds.

(c) SOVEREIGN LOAN GUARANTY TRANSFER.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Effective at the end of the transition period,
there is authorized to be transferred to the Corporation or any
other appropriate department or agency of the United States
Government the loan accounts and the legal rights and
responsibilities for the sovereign loan guaranty portfolio held by
the United States Agency for International Development as in
existence on the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act. (2) INCLUSION IN REORGANIZATION PLAN.—The President shall

include in the reorganization plan submitted under section

1462 a description of the transfer authorized under paragraph
(1).

(d) BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.—Any bilateral agreement of the United States in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act that serves as the basis for programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Development Credit Authority shall be considered as satisfying the requirements of section 1431(a).

(e) TRANSITION.—During the transition period, the agencies specified in subsection (a) shall—
(1) continue to administer the assets and obligations of those agencies; and

(2) carry out such programs and activities authorized under this division as may be determined by the President.

SEC. 1464. TERMINATION OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT COR-PORATION AND OTHER SUPERCEDED AUTHORITIES.
Effective at the end of the transition period—
(1) the Overseas Private Investment Corporation is termi-nated; and
(2) title IV of chapter 2 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2191 et seq.) (other than subsections (g), (l), (m), and (n) of section 237 of that Act) is repealed.

SEC. 1465. TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITIES.

(a) PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE BY OFFICIALS.—Until the transfer of
an agency to the Corporation under section 1463, any official having
authority over, or functions relating to, the agency on the day before
the date of the enactment of this Act shall provide to the
Corporation such assistance, including the use of personnel and
assets, as the Corporation may request in preparing for the transfer
and integration of the agency into the Corporation.
(b) SERVICES AND PERSONNEL.—During the transition period, upon
the request of the Corporation, the head of any executive agency may,
on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis, provide services or
detail personnel to assist with the transition.

(c) ACTING OFFICIALS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—During the transition period, pending the
advice and consent of the Senate to the appointment of an
officer required by this division to be appointed by and with
such advice and consent, the President may designate any
officer whose appointment was required to be made by and with
such advice and consent and who was such an officer before the
end of the transition period (and who continues in office) or
immediately before such designation, to act in such office until
the same is filled as provided in this division. While so acting,
such officers shall receive compensation at the higher of—
(A) the rates provided by this division for the respective offices in which they act; or
(B) the rates provided for the offices held at the time of designation.

(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this division shall be
construed to require the advice and consent of the Senate to the
appointment by the President to a position in the Cor- poration of any officer whose agency is transferred to the Cor- poration pursuant to this title and whose duties following such transfer are germane to those performed before such transfer.

(d) TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL, ASSETS, OBLIGATIONS, AND FUNCTIONS.—Upon the transfer of an agency to the Corporation under section 1463—

(1) the personnel, assets, and obligations held by or avail-able in connection with the agency shall be transferred to the Corporation for appropriate allocation, subject to the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and in accordance with section 1531(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code; and

(2) the Corporation shall have all functions—

(A) relating to the agency that any other official could by
law exercise in relation to the agency immediately before
such transfer; and
law. (B) vested in the Corporation by this division or other

SEC. 1466. SAVINGS PROVISIONS.

(a) COMPLETED ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Completed administrative actions of an
agency shall not be affected by the enactment of this Act or
the transfer of such agency to the Corporation under section
1463, but shall continue in effect according to their terms until
amended, modified, superseded, terminated, set aside, or
revoked in accordance with law by an officer of the United States
or a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law.

(2) COMPLETED ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION DEFINED.—In this
subsection, the term ‘‘completed administrative action’’ includes
orders, determinations, rules, regulations, personnel actions,
permits, agreements, grants, contracts, certificates, policies,
licenses, registrations, and privileges.

(b) PENDING PROCEEDINGS.—
(1) I N GENERAL.—Pending proceedings in an agency,
including notices of proposed rulemaking, and applications for
licenses, permits, certificates, grants, and financial assistance,
shall continue notwithstanding the enactment of this Act or the
transfer of the agency to the Corporation, unless discon- tinued
or modified under the same terms and conditions and to the
same extent that such discontinuance could have occurred if such
enactment or transfer had not occurred.
(2) ORDERS.—Orders issued in proceedings described in
paragraph (1), and appeals therefrom, and payments made
pursuant to such orders, shall issue in the same manner and on
the same terms as if this division had not been enacted or the
agency had not been transferred, and any such orders shall
continue in effect until amended, modified, superseded,
terminated, set aside, or revoked by an officer of the United
States or a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of
law.
(c) PENDING CIVIL ACTIONS.—Pending civil actions shall continue
notwithstanding the enactment of this Act or the transfer of an
agency to the Corporation, and in such civil actions, proceedings shall be had, appeals taken, and judgments rendered and enforced in the same manner and with the same effect as if such enactment or transfer had not occurred.

(d) REFERENCES.—References relating to an agency that is transferred to the Corporation under section 1463 in statutes, Executive orders, rules, regulations, directives, or delegations of authority that precede such transfer or the date of the enactment of this Act shall be deemed to refer, as appropriate, to the Corpora- tion,
to its officers, employees, or agents, or to its corresponding
organizational units or functions. Statutory reporting requirements
that applied in relation to such an agency immediately before the
effective date of this division shall continue to apply following such
transfer if they refer to the agency by name.

(e) EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS.—
(1) REGULATIONS.—The Corporation may, in regulations
prescribed jointly with the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, adopt the rules, procedures, terms, and condi-
tions, established by statute, rule, or regulation before the date
of the enactment of this Act, relating to employment in any
agency transferred to the Corporation under section 1463.
(2) EFFECT OF TRANSFER ON CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.—
Except as otherwise provided in this division, or under authority
granted by this division, the transfer pursuant to this title of
personnel shall not alter the terms and conditions of
employment, including compensation, of any employee so
transferred. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—Any statutory

(f) STATUTORY -reporting requirement that applied to an agency transferred to the
Corporation under this title immediately before the date of the
enactment of this Act shall continue to apply following that transfer if the statutory requirement refers to the agency by name.

SEC. 1467. OTHER TERMINATIONS.

Except as otherwise provided in this division, whenever all the functions vested by law in any agency have been transferred pursuant to this title, each position and office the incumbent of which was authorized to receive compensation at the rates pre- scribed for an office or position at level II, III, IV, or V of the Executive Schedule under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, shall terminate.

SEC. 1468. INCIDENTAL TRANSFERS.

The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in con-sultation with the Corporation, is authorized and directed to make such additional incidental dispositions of personnel, assets, and liabilities held, used, arising from, available, or to be made avail- able, in connection with the functions transferred by this title, as the Director may determine necessary to accomplish the purposes of this division.

SEC. 1469. REFERENCE.

With respect to any function transferred under this title (including under a reorganization plan under section 1462) and exercised on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, reference in any other Federal law to any department, commission, or agency or any officer or office the functions of which are so transferred shall be deemed to refer to the Corporation or official or component of the Corporation to which that function is so transferred.

SEC. 1470. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) EXEMPT PROGRAMS.—Section 255(g) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 905(g)) is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Noncredit Account (71–4184–0–3–151).’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corporation.’’.

(b) EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.—Title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in section 5314, by striking ‘‘President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation.’’;

(2) in section 5315, by striking ‘‘Executive Vice President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation.’’; and

(3) in section 5316, by striking ‘‘Vice Presidents, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (3).’’.
(c) OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION.—Section 22 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 649) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘the President of the Overseas Private Invest- ment Corporation, Director’’ and inserting ‘‘the Board of Direc- tors of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Director’’; and

(2) by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corporation’’.

(d) UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE.—Section
2301 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 4721) is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corporation’’.

(e) TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COMMITTEE.—Section
2312(d)(1)(K) of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 4727(d)(1)(K)) is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Develop-ment Finance Corporation’’.

(f) INTERAGENCY TRADE DATA ADVISORY COMMITTEE.—Section

5402(b) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 4902(b)) is amended by striking ‘‘the President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation’’.

(g) MISUSE OF NAMES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES.—Section 709 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘ ‘Overseas Private Investment’, ‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’, or ‘OPIC’,’’ and inserting ‘‘ ‘United States International Development Finance Corporation’ or ‘DFC’ ’’.

(h) ENGAGEMENT ON CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE AND ECONOMIC
POLICIES.—Section 701(c)(1)(A) of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (19 U.S.C. 4421(c)(1)(A)) is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corporation’’.

(i) INTERNSHIPS WITH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

POLICY.—Section 625 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1131c(a)) is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Invest-ment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corporation’’.

(j) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961.—The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in section 116—

(A) in subsection (a), by inserting ‘‘, and no support may be provided under title II of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018,’’ after ‘‘this part’’;

(B) in the first subsection (b)—
(i) by inserting ‘‘or title II of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018’’ after ‘‘this part’’;

(ii) by inserting ‘‘or the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, as applicable,’’ after ‘‘this Act’’;

(iii) by inserting ‘‘or support’’ after ‘‘the assistance’’; and (iv) by inserting ‘‘or support’’ after ‘‘such assistance’’ each place it appears;

(C) in the second subsection (b), by inserting ‘‘under this part, and no support may be provided under title II of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018,’’ after ‘‘provided’’; and

(D) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘under this part, the Administrator’’ and inserting ‘‘under this part, or sup- port provided under title II of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018, the Administrator, or the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, as applicable,’’;

(2) in section 449B(b)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2296b(b)(2)), by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corpora-tion’’; and

(3) in section 481(e)(4)(A) (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)(4)(A)), in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ‘‘(including programs under title IV of chapter 2, relating to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation)’’ and inserting ‘‘(and any support under title II of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018, relating to the United States International Development Finance Corporation)’’.

(k) ELECTRIFY AFRICA ACT OF 2015.—Sections 5 and 7 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) are amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Cor – poration’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘United States Inter- national Development Finance Corporation’’.
(l) FOREIGN AID TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF
2016.—Section 2(3) of the Foreign Aid Transparency and Account-ability Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–191; 22 U.S.C. 2394c note) is amended—
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘except for’’ and all that follows through ‘‘chapter 3’’ and insert ‘‘except for chapter 3’’;
(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end;
(3) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(E) the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to

Development Act of 2018.’’.
(m) SUPPORT FOR EAST EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY (SEED) PRO-
GRAM.—The Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5401 et seq.) is amended—
(1) in section 2(c) (22 U.S.C. 5401(c)), by striking paragraph
(12) and inserting the following:
‘‘(12) UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FINANCE CORPORATION.—Programs of the United States Inter-
national Development Finance Corporation.’’; and
(2) in section 201 (22 U.S.C. 5421), by striking subsection
(e) and inserting the following:
‘‘(e) GRANTS TO ENTERPRISE FUNDS.—Funds appropriated to the President pursuant to subsection (b) shall be granted to the Enterprise Funds to carry out the purposes specified in subsection

(a) and for the administrative expenses of each Enterprise Fund— ‘‘(1) except as provided in paragraph (2), by the United
States Agency for International Development; or
‘‘(2) if the Enterprise Funds are transferred to the United States International Development Finance Corporation pursu-ant to section 1463(b) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018, by the Corporation.’’.
(n) CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) ACT

OF 1996.—Section 202(b)(2)(B)(iv) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6062(b)(2)(B)(iv)) is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Invest-ment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corporation’’.
(o) INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1998.—Section

405(a)(10) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6445(a)(10)) is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Invest-ment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corporation’’.
(p) TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT OF 2000.—Section
103(8)(A) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22
U.S.C. 7102(8)(A)) is amended in clause (viii) to read as follows:
‘‘(viii) any support under title II of the Better
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act
of 2018 relating to the United States International
Development Finance Corporation; and’’.
(q) TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.—

Section 732(b) of the Global Environmental Protection Assistance Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 7902(b)) is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States Inter- national Development Finance Corporation’’.
(r) EXPANDED NONMILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR UKRAINE.—Section

7(c)(3) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926(c)(3)) is amended—
(1) in the paragraph heading, by striking ‘‘OVERSEAS PRI-

VATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION’’ and inserting ‘‘UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION’’;

(2) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corpora-tion’’; and

(3) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘by eligible investors (as defined in section 238 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2198))’’.
(s) GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 2016.—Section 4(7) of the Global Food Security Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9303(7)) is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Cor- poration’’.
(t) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN ENERGY
SECURITY.—Section 257(c)(2)(B) of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (22 U.S.C. 9546(c)(2)(B)) is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corporation’’.
(u) WHOLLY OWNED GOVERNMENT CORPORATION.—Section
9101(3) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corporation’’.
(v) ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT OF 2007.—Title IX

of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17321 et seq.) is amended—
(1) in section 914 (42 U.S.C. 17334)—
(A) in the section heading, by striking ‘‘OVERSEAS PRI-

VATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION’’ and inserting ‘‘UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION’’;

(B) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding paragraph
(1), by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation’’
and inserting ‘‘United States International Development
Finance Corporation’’; and
(C) in subsection (b), in the matter preceding paragraph
(1), by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation
shall include in its annual report required under section
240A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2200a)’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International
Development Finance Corporation shall include in its annual
report required under section 1443 of the Better Utilization
of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018’’; and
(2) in section 916(a)(2)(I) (42 U.S.C. 17336(a)(2)(I)), by striking ‘‘Overseas Private Investment Corporation:’’ and inserting ‘‘United States International Development Finance Corporation;’’.

[w] EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect at the end of the transition period.

of this Act shall be deemed to refer, as appropriate, to the Adminis-trator of the Transportation Security Administration.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.

Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch is an American private NGO with its Headquarters at the Empire State Building in New York City, New York. U.S. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International(another Private NGO) works in a similar field.

Human Rights Watch is controlled by US laws and works as a self-appointed Human rights Guardian throughout the world. It publishes annual reports and financial reports.

The NGO faces criticism for its Lobbying tactics in the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and other international frameworks, promoting false, distorted, and unverifiable allegations against a targeted nation[www.ngo-monitor.org]

Address: 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor
New York, NY 10118-3299 USA
Tel: +1-212-290-4700
Fax: +1-212-736-1300

 

US House Intelligence Committee Releases Whistleblower Complaint

House Representatives`impeachment Inquiry

Washington, September 26, 2019

The  US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released the declassified whistleblower complaint. The complaint can be viewed below, and the Intelligence Community Inspector General letter regarding the complaint can also be viewed below.

Chairman Adam Schiff (D-CA) made the following statement:

“The Committee this morning will be releasing the declassified whistleblower complaint that it received late last night from the ODNI. It is a travesty that it was held up this long.

“This complaint should never have been withheld from Congress. It exposed serious wrongdoing, and was found both urgent and credible by the Inspector General.

“This complaint is a roadmap for our investigation, and provides significant information for the Committee to follow up on with other witnesses and documents. And it is corroborated by the call record released yesterday.

“I want to thank the whistleblower for having the courage to come forward, despite the reprisals they have already faced from the president and his acolytes. We will do everything in our power to protect this whistleblower, and every whistleblower, who comes forward.

“The public has a right to see the complaint and what it reveals.”

  1. Intelligence Community Inspector General letter regarding the complaint
  2. whistleblower complaint unclassified

 

Ranking Member Nunes Opening Statement for Whistleblower Disclosure Hearing

September 26, 2019

I want to congratulate the Democrats on the rollout of their latest information warfare operation against the President, and their extraordinary ability once again to enlist the mainstream media in their campaign.

This operation began with media reports—from the prime instigators of the Russian collusion hoax—that a whistleblower is claiming President Trump made a nefarious “promise” to a foreign leader. The released transcript of the call has already debunked that central assertion, but that didn’t matter. The Democrats simply moved the goalposts and began claiming that there doesn’t need to be a quid pro quo for this conversation to serve as the basis for impeaching the president.

Speaker Pelosi went even further when asked earlier if she’d put the brakes on impeachment if the transcript turned out to be benign. She responded, “We have many other candidates for impeachable offenses.” So there you go—if their whistleblower operation doesn’t work out, the Democrats and their media assets can always drum up something else.

And what other information has come to light since the original false report of a “promise” being made? We’ve learned the following:

  • The complaint relied on hearsay evidence provided by the whistleblower.
  • The Inspector General did not know the contents of the phone call at issue.
  • The Inspector General found that the whistleblower displayed “arguable political bias” against Trump.
  • The Department of Justice investigated the complaint and determined no action was warranted.
  • The Ukrainian President denies being pressured by President Trump.

So, once again, this supposed scandal ends up being nothing like what we were told. And once again, the Democrats, their media mouthpieces, and a cabal of leakers are ginning up a fake story, with no regard to the monumental damage they’re causing to our public institutions and to trust in government, and without acknowledging all the false stories they propagated in the past, including countless allegations that the Trump campaign colluded with Russia to hack the 2016 election. We’re supposed to forget about all those stories but believe this one. In short, what we have with this storyline is another Steele dossier.

I’ll note here that, in the Democrats’ mania to overturn the 2016 elections, everything they touch gets hopelessly politicized. With the Russia hoax it was our intelligence agencies, which were turned into a political weapon to attack the president. And today, the whistleblower process is the casualty. Until about a week ago, the need to protect that process was a primary bipartisan concern of this committee. But if the Democrats were really concerned with defending that process, they would have pursued this matter with quiet and sober inquiries, as we always do for whistleblowers.

But that would’ve been useless for them. They don’t want answers, they want a public spectacle. And so we’ve been treated to an unending parade of press releases, press conferences, and fake news stories.

This hearing itself is another example—whistleblower inquiries should not be held in public at all, as our Senate counterparts, both Democrats and Republicans, obviously understand—their hearing with Mr. Maguire is behind closed doors. But again, that only makes sense when your goal is to get information, not to create a media frenzy.

The current hysteria has something else in common with the Russia hoax. Back then, they accused the Trump campaign of colluding with Russians when the Democrats themselves were colluding with Russians in preparing the Steele dossier. Today, they accuse the president of pressuring Ukrainians to take actions that would help himself or hurt his political opponents. And yet, there are numerous examples of Democrats doing the exact same thing. For example:

  • Joe Biden bragged that he extorted the Ukrainians into firing a prosecutor, who happened to be investigating Biden’s own son.
  • Three Democrat senators wrote a letter pressuring the Ukrainian general prosecutor to reopen investigations it reportedly froze on former Trump campaign officials.
  • Another Democratic senator went to Ukraine and pressured the Ukrainian President not to investigate corruption allegations involving Biden’s son.
  • According to Ukrainian officials, Democratic National Committee contractor Alexandra Chalupa tried to get Ukrainian officials to provide dirt on Trump associates and tried to get the former Ukrainian President to comment publicly on their alleged ties to Russia.
  • Ukrainian official Serhiy Leshchenko was a source for Nellie Ohr, wife of Department of Justice official Bruce Ohr, as she worked on the anti-Trump operation conducted by Fusion GPS and funded by the Democrats.
  • And of course, Democrats on this very committee negotiated with people they thought were Ukrainians in order to obtain nude pictures of Trump.

As you see, it’s a reliable rule of thumb in these information operations that whatever the Democrats accuse you of doing, they’re doing themselves.

People can reasonably ask why the Democrats are so determined to impeach this president when in just a year they’ll have a chance to vote him out of office. In fact, one Democratic congressman—one of the first to call for Trump’s impeachment—gave us the answer when he said, “I’m concerned that if we don’t impeach the president, he will get reelected.”

Yes, winning elections is hard, and when you compete you have no guarantee you’ll win. But the American people should have a say in all this, and they made their voices heard in the election. This latest gambit by the Democrats to overturn the people’s mandate is unhinged and dangerous.

They should end this entire dishonest, grotesque spectacle and get back to solving problems, which is what every member of this committee was sent here to do. Judging by today’s charade, however, the chances of that happening anytime soon are zero to none.

Business and Commercial Laws in the United States of America [USA]









Difference between Murder and Manslaughter under the USA Law

(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or children; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
Any other murder is murder in the second degree.

(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life;

Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

(c) For purposes of this section—
(1) the term “assault” has the same meaning as given that term in section 113;
(2) the term “child” means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years and is—
(A) under the perpetrator’s care or control; or
(B) at least six years younger than the perpetrator;
(3) the term “child abuse” means intentionally or knowingly causing death or serious bodily injury to a child;
(4) the term “pattern or practice of assault or torture” means assault or torture engaged in on at least two occasions;
(5) the term “serious bodily injury” has the meaning set forth in section 1365; and
(6) the term “torture” means conduct, whether or not committed under the color of law, that otherwise satisfies the definition set forth in section 2340(1).


(a) Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of two kinds:
Voluntary—Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

Involuntary—In the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.

(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
Whoever is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both;

Whoever is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.


Protection :

Whoever kills or attempts to kill any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government (including any member of the uniformed services) while such officer or employee is engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties, or any person assisting such an officer or employee in the performance of such duties or on account of that assistance, shall be punished—
(1) in the case of murder, as provided under section 1111;
(2) in the case of manslaughter, as provided under section 1112; or
(3) in the case of attempted murder or manslaughter, as provided in section 1113.

Source: 18 U.S. Code § 1111-1112, 1114

GERALD P. MITCHELL v. WISCONSIN – 27/06/ 2019

Whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

In both Missouri v. McNeely and Birchfield v. North Dakota, this Court referred approvingly to “implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply” with tests for alcohol or drugs when they have been arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. 569 U.S. at 141, 161 (2013); 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016). But a majority of states, including Wisconsin, have implied-consent laws that do something else entirely: they authorize blood draws without a warrant, without exigency, and without the assent of the motorist, under a variety of circumstances-most commonly when the motorist is unconscious. State appellate courts have sharply divided on whether such laws comport with the Fourth Amendment.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MITCHELL v. WISCONSIN

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

No. 18–6210. Argued April 23, 2019—Decided June 27, 2019

Petitioner Gerald Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated after a preliminary breath test registered a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) that was triple Wisconsin’s legal limit for driving. As is standard practice, the arresting officer drove Mitchell to a police station for a more reliable breath test using evidence-grade equipment. By the time Mitchell reached the station, he was too le-thargic for a breath test, so the officer drove him to a nearby hospital for a blood test. Mitchell was unconscious by the time he arrived at the hospital, but his blood was drawn anyway under a state law that presumes that a person incapable of withdrawing implied consent to BAC testing has not done so. The blood analysis showed Mitchell’s BAC to be above the legal limit, and he was charged with violating two drunk-driving laws. Mitchell moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that it violated his Fourth Amendment right against “unreasonable searches” because it was conducted without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, and Mitchell was convicted. On certification from the intermediate appellate court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lawfulness of Mitchell’s blood test.

Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded.

2018 WI 84, 383 Wis. 2d 192, 914 N. W. 2d 151, vacated and remanded. JUSTICE ALITO, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concluded that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant. Pp. 5–17.
(a) BAC tests are Fourth Amendment searches. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U. S. ___, ___. A warrant is normally required for a lawful search, but there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, in-cluding the “exigent circumstances” exception, which allows warrant- less searches “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Mis-souri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. 141, 149. In McNeely, this Court held that the fleeting nature of blood-alcohol evidence alone was not enough to bring BAC testing within the exigency exception. Id., at 156. But in Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, the dissipation of BAC did justify a blood test of a drunk driver whose accident gave po-lice other pressing duties, for then the further delay caused by a war-rant application would indeed have threatened the destruction of ev-idence. Like Schmerber, unconscious-driver cases will involve a heightened degree of urgency for several reasons. And when the driver’s stupor or unconsciousness deprives officials of a reasonable opportunity to administer a breath test using evidence-grade equip-ment, a blood test will be essential for achieving the goals of BAC testing. Pp. 5–7.

(b) Under the exigent circumstances exception, a warrantless search is allowed when “ ‘there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’ ” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 149. Pp. 7–

(1) There is clearly a “compelling need” for a blood test of drunk-driving suspects whose condition deprives officials of a reasonable opportunity to conduct a breath test. First, highway safety is a vital public interest—a “compelling” and “paramount” interest, Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U. S. 1, 17–18. Second, when it comes to promoting that interest, federal and state lawmakers have long been convinced that legal limits on a driver’s BAC make a big difference. And there is good reason to think that such laws have worked. Birchfield, 579 U. S., at ___. Third, enforcing BAC limits obviously requires a test that is accurate enough to stand up in court. Id., at ___. And such testing must be prompt because it is “a biological certainty” that “[a]lcohol dissipates from the bloodstream,” “literally disappearing by the minute.” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 169 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring). Finally, when a breath test is unavailable to promote the interests served by legal BAC limits, “a blood draw becomes necessary.” Id., at 170. Pp. 9–12.
(2) Schmerber demonstrates that an exigency exists when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates press-ing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application. Because both conditions are met when a drunk-driving suspect is unconscious, Schmerber controls. A driver’s unconsciousness does not just create pressing needs; it is itself a med-ical emergency. In such a case, as in Schmerber, an officer could “reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergen-cy.” 384 U. S., at 771. And in many unconscious-driver cases, the ex-igency will be especially acute. A driver so drunk as to lose consciousness is quite likely to crash, giving officers a slew of urgent tasks beyond that of securing medical care for the suspect—tasks that would require them to put off applying for a warrant. The time needed to secure a warrant may have shrunk over the years, but it has not disappeared; and forcing police to put off other urgent tasks for even a relatively short period of time may have terrible collateral costs. Pp. 12–16.

(c) On remand, Mitchell may attempt to show that his was an unu-sual case, in which his blood would not have been drawn had police not been seeking BAC information and police could not have reason-ably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties. Pp. 16–17.

JUSTICE THOMAS would apply a per se rule, under which the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream “creates an exigency once police have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk,” re-gardless of whether the driver is conscious. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. 141, 178 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Pp. 1–4.

ALITO, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and BREYER and K AVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. SO-TOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 18–6210

GERALD P. MITCHELL, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

[June 27, 2019]

JUSTICE ALITO announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH join.

In this case, we return to a topic that we have addressed twice in recent years: the circumstances under which a police officer may administer a warrantless blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test to a motorist who appears to have been driving under the influence of alcohol. We have previously addressed what officers may do in two broad categories of cases. First, an officer may conduct a BAC test if the facts of a particular case bring it within the exigent-circumstances exception to the Fourth Amend-ment’s general requirement of a warrant. Second, if an officer has probable cause to arrest a motorist for drunk driving, the officer may conduct a breath test (but not a blood test) under the rule allowing warrantless searches of a person incident to arrest.

Today, we consider what police officers may do in a narrow but important category of cases: those in which the driver is unconscious and therefore cannot be given a breath test. In such cases, we hold, the exigent-circumstances rule almost always permits a blood test

MITCHELL v. WISCONSIN

Opinion of ALITO, J.

without a warrant. When a breath test is impossible, enforcement of the drunk-driving laws depends upon the administration of a blood test. And when a police officer encounters an unconscious driver, it is very likely that the driver would be taken to an emergency room and that his blood would be drawn for diagnostic purposes even if the police were not seeking BAC information. In addition, police officers most frequently come upon unconscious drivers when they report to the scene of an accident, and under those circumstances, the officers’ many responsibili-ties—such as attending to other injured drivers or passen-gers and preventing further accidents—may be incompati-ble with the procedures that would be required to obtain a warrant. Thus, when a driver is unconscious, the general rule is that a warrant is not needed.

I

A

In Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U. S. ___ (2016), we recounted the country’s efforts over the years to address the terrible problem of drunk driving. Today, “all States have laws that prohibit motorists from driving with a [BAC] that exceeds a specified level.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2). And to help enforce BAC limits, every State has passed what are popularly called implied-consent laws. Ibid. As “a condition of the privilege of ” using the public roads, these laws require that drivers submit to BAC testing “when there is sufficient reason to believe they are violating the State’s drunk-driving laws.” Id., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 2, 6).

Wisconsin’s implied-consent law is much like those of the other 49 States and the District of Columbia. It deems drivers to have consented to breath or blood tests if an officer has reason to believe they have committed one of several drug- or alcohol-related offenses.1 See Wis. Stat. §§343.305(2), (3). Officers seeking to conduct a BAC test must read aloud a statement declaring their intent to administer the test and advising drivers of their options and the implications of their choice. §343.305(4). If a driver’s BAC level proves too high, his license will be suspended; but if he refuses testing, his license will be revoked and his refusal may be used against him in court. See ibid. No test will be administered if a driver refuses— or, as the State would put it, “withdraws” his statutorily presumed consent. But “[a] person who is unconscious or otherwise not capable of withdrawing consent is presumed not to have” withdrawn it. §343.305(3)(b). See also §§343.305(3)(ar)1–2. More than half the States have provisions like this one regarding unconscious drivers.

B

The sequence of events that gave rise to this case began when Officer Alexander Jaeger of the Sheboygan Police Department received a report that petitioner Gerald Mitchell, appearing to be very drunk, had climbed into a van and driven off. Jaeger soon found Mitchell wandering near a lake. Stumbling and slurring his words, Mitchell could hardly stand without the support of two officers. Jaeger judged a field sobriety test hopeless, if not danger-ous, and gave Mitchell a preliminary breath test. It regis-tered a BAC level of 0.24%, triple the legal limit for driv-ing in Wisconsin. Jaeger arrested Mitchell for operating a


1 Wisconsin also authorizes BAC testing of drivers involved in acci-dents that cause significant bodily harm, with or without probable cause of drunk driving. See Wis. Stat. §343.305(3)2 (2016). We do not address those provisions. And while Wisconsin’s and other implied-consent laws permit urine tests, those tests are less common, see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U. S. ___, ___, n. 1 (2016) (slip op., at 6, n. 1), and we do not consider them here.


vehicle while intoxicated and, as is standard practice, drove him to a police station for a more reliable breath test using better equipment.

On the way, Mitchell’s condition continued to deterio-rate—so much so that by the time the squad car had reached the station, he was too lethargic even for a breath test. Jaeger therefore drove Mitchell to a nearby hospital for a blood test; Mitchell lost consciousness on the ride over and had to be wheeled in. Even so, Jaeger read aloud to a slumped Mitchell the standard statement giving drivers a chance to refuse BAC testing. Hearing no re-sponse, Jaeger asked hospital staff to draw a blood sam-ple. Mitchell remained unconscious while the sample was taken, and analysis of his blood showed that his BAC, about 90 minutes after his arrest, was 0.222%.
Mitchell was charged with violating two related drunk-driving provisions. See §§346.63(1)(a), (b). He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that it violated his Fourth Amendment right against “unreason-able searches” because it was conducted without a warrant. Wisconsin chose to rest its response on the notion that its implied- consent law (together with Mitchell’s free choice to drive on its highways) rendered the blood test a consensual one, thus curing any Fourth Amendment problem. In the end, the trial court denied Mitchell’s motion to suppress, and a jury found him guilty of the charged offenses. The intermediate appellate court certified two questions to the Wisconsin Supreme Court: first, whether compliance with the State’s implied-consent law was sufficient to show that Mitchell’s test was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and, second, whether a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious person violates the Fourth Amendment. See 2018 WI 84, ¶15, 383 Wis. 2d 192, 202–203, 914 N. W. 2d 151, 155–156 (2018). The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed Mitchell’s convictions, and we granted certiorari, 586 U. S. ___ (2019), to decide “[w]hether a statute author- izing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-ment,” Pet. for Cert. ii.

II

In considering Wisconsin’s implied-consent law, we do not write on a blank slate. “Our prior opinions have re-ferred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply.” Birch-field, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 36). But our decisions have not rested on the idea that these laws do what their popular name might seem to suggest—that is, create actual consent to all the searches they authorize. Instead, we have based our decisions on the precedent regarding the specific constitutional claims in each case, while keep-ing in mind the wider regulatory scheme developed over the years to combat drunk driving. That scheme is cen-tered on legally specified BAC limits for drivers—limits enforced by the BAC tests promoted by implied-consent laws.

Over the last 50 years, we have approved many of the defining elements of this scheme. We have held that forcing drunk-driving suspects to undergo a blood test does not violate their constitutional right against self-incrimination. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 765 (1966). Nor does using their refusal against them in court. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 563 (1983). And punishing that refusal with automatic license revocation does not violate drivers’ due process rights if they have been arrested upon probable cause, Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U. S. 1 (1979); on the contrary, this kind of summary penalty is “unquestionably legitimate.” Neville, supra, at 560.

These cases generally concerned the Fifth and Four-teenth Amendments, but motorists charged with drunk driving have also invoked the Fourth Amendment’s ban on “unreasonable searches” since BAC tests are “searches.” See Birchfield, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Though our precedent normally requires a warrant for a lawful search, there are well- defined exceptions to this rule. In Birchfield, we applied precedent on the “search-incident-to-arrest” exception to BAC testing of conscious drunk-driving suspects. We held that their drunk-driving ar-rests, taken alone, justify warrantless breath tests but not blood tests, since breath tests are less intrusive, just as informative, and (in the case of conscious suspects) readily available. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 35).

We have also reviewed BAC tests under the “exigent circumstances” exception—which, as noted, allows war-rantless searches “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. 141, 149 (2013). In McNeely, we were asked if this exception covers BAC testing of drunk-driving suspects in light of the fact that blood-alcohol evidence is always dissipating due to “natu-ral metabolic processes.” Id., at 152. We answered that the fleeting quality of BAC evidence alone is not enough. Id., at 156. But in Schmerber it did justify a blood test of a drunk driver who had gotten into a car accident that gave police other pressing duties, for then the “further delay” caused by a warrant application really “would have threatened the destruction of evidence.” McNeely, supra, at 152 (emphasis added).

Like Schmerber, this case sits much higher than McNeely on the exigency spectrum. McNeely was about the minimum degree of urgency common to all drunk-driving cases. In Schmerber, a car accident heightened that urgency. And here Mitchell’s medical condition did just the same.

Mitchell’s stupor and eventual unconsciousness also deprived officials of a reasonable opportunity to adminis-ter a breath test. To be sure, Officer Jaeger managed to conduct “a preliminary breath test” using a portable ma-chine when he first encountered Mitchell at the lake. App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a. But he had no reasonable opportunity to give Mitchell a breath test using “evidence-grade breath testing machinery.” Birchfield, 579 U. S., at ___

(SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 10). As a result, it was reasonable for Jaeger to seek a better breath test at the station; he acted with reasonable dispatch to procure one; and when Mitchell’s condition got in the way, it was reasonable for Jaeger to pursue a blood test. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR explained in her partial dissent in Birchfield:

“There is a common misconception that breath tests are conducted roadside, immediately after a driver is arrested. While some preliminary testing is conducted roadside, reliability concerns with roadside tests con-fine their use in most circumstances to establishing probable cause for an arrest. . . . The standard eviden-tiary breath test is conducted after a motorist is ar-rested and transported to a police station, governmen-tal building, or mobile testing facility where officers can access reliable, evidence- grade breath testing ma-chinery.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10).

Because the “standard evidentiary breath test is conducted after a motorist is arrested and transported to a police station” or another appropriate facility, ibid., the im-portant question here is what officers may do when a driver’s unconsciousness (or stupor) eliminates any rea-sonable opportunity for that kind of breath test.

III

The Fourth Amendment guards the “right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” A blood draw is a search of the person, so we must determine if its administration here without a warrant was reasonable. See Birchfield, 579 U. S. at ___ (slip op., at 14). Though we have held that a warrant is normally required, we have also “made it clear that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U. S. 326, 330 (2001). And under the exception for exigent circumstances, a warrantless search is allowed when “‘there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’” McNeely, supra, at 149 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978)). In McNeely, we considered how the exigent-circumstances exception applies to the broad category of cases in which a police officer has probable cause to be-lieve that a motorist was driving under the influence of alcohol, and we do not revisit that question. Nor do we settle whether the exigent-circumstances exception covers the specific facts of this case.2 Instead, we address how


2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s dissent argues that Wisconsin waived the argument that we now adopt, but the dissent paints a misleading picture of both the proceedings below and the ground for our decision.

First, as to the proceedings below, the dissent contends that the sole question certified to the Wisconsin Supreme Court was “ ‘whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wiscon-sin’s implied consent law, where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violates the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Post, at 3 (quoting App. 61). That is indeed how the intermediate appellate court under-stood the issue in the case, but the State Supreme Court took a broader view, as was its right. It regarded the appeal as presenting two ques-tions, one of which was “whether a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious person pursuant to Wis. Stat. §343.305(3)(b) violates the Fourth Amendment.” See 383 Wis. 2d 192, 202–203, 914 N. W. 2d 151,155–156 (2018). This broad question easily encompasses the rationale that we adopt today.

Second, after noting that the State did not attempt below to make a case-specific showing of exigent circumstances, the dissent claims that our decision is based on this very ground. But that is not at all the basis for our decision. We do not hold that the State established that the facts of this particular case involve exigent circumstances under


the exception bears on the category of cases encompassed by the question on which we granted certiorari—those involving unconscious drivers.3 In those cases, the need for a blood test is compelling, and an officer’s duty to attend to more pressing needs may leave no time to seek a warrant.

A

The importance of the needs served by BAC testing is hard to overstate. The bottom line is that BAC tests are needed for enforcing laws that save lives. The specifics, in short, are these: Highway safety is critical; it is served by laws that criminalize driving with a certain BAC level;


McNeely. Rather, we adopt a rule for an entire category of cases— those in which a motorist believed to have driven under the influence of alcohol is unconscious and thus cannot be given a breath test. This rule is not based on what happened in petitioner’s particular case but on the circumstances generally present in cases that fall within the scope of the rule. Those are just the sorts of features of unconscious-driver cases that Wisconsin brought to our attention, see Brief for Respondent 54–55; Tr. of Oral Arg. at 32–34, 48–51, which petitioner addressed, see Reply Brief at 14–15; Tr. of Oral Arg. at 15–20, 23–24, 29–31, 63–66. So it is entirely proper for us to decide the case on this ground. See Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U. S. 27, 29–30 (1984).

3 While our exigent-circumstances precedent requires a “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ ” analysis, “the circumstances in drunk driving cases are often typical, and the Court should be able to offer guidance on how police should handle cases like the one before us.” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 166 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, our exigency case law is full of general rules providing such guidance. Thus, we allow police to proceed without a warrant when an occupant of a home requires “emergency assistance,” Brigham City v.

Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006); when a building is on fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978); and when an armed robber has just entered a home, see United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38 (1976). “In each of these cases, the requirement that we base our decision on the ‘totality of the circumstances’ has not prevented us from spelling out a general rule for the police to follow.” McNeely, supra, at 168 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). Neither does it prevent us here.


and enforcing these legal BAC limits requires efficient testing to obtain BAC evidence, which naturally dissi-pates. So BAC tests are crucial links in a chain on which vital interests hang. And when a breath test is unavail-able to advance those aims, a blood test becomes essential. Here we add a word about each of these points.

First, highway safety is a vital public interest. For decades, we have strained our vocal chords to give ade-quate expression to the stakes. We have called highway safety a “compelling interest,” Mackey, 443 U. S., at 19; we have called it “paramount,” id., at 17. Twice we have referred to the effects of irresponsible driving as “slaugh-ter” comparable to the ravages of war. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 439 (1957); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657, 672 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part). We have spoken of “carnage,” Neville, 459 U. S., at 558–559, and even “fright-ful carnage,” Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) . The frequency of preventable collisions, we have said, is “tragic,” Neville, supra, at 558, and “astounding,” Breithaupt, supra, at 439. And behind this fervent language lie chilling figures, all captured in the fact that from 1982 to 2016, alcohol-related accidents took roughly 10,000 to 20,000 lives in this Nation every single year. See National Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (NHTSA), Traffic Safety Facts 2016, p. 40 (May 2018). In the best years, that would add up to more than one fatality per hour.

Second, when it comes to fighting these harms and promoting highway safety, federal and state lawmakers have long been convinced that specified BAC limits make a big difference. States resorted to these limits when earlier laws that included no “statistical definition of intoxication” proved ineffectual or hard to enforce. See Birchfield, 579 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 2–3). The maximum permissible BAC, initially set at 0.15%, was first lowered to 0.10% and then to 0.08%. Id., at ___, ___– ___ (slip op., at 3, 6–7). Congress encouraged this process by conditioning the award of federal highway funds on the establishment of a BAC limit of 0.08%, see 23 U. S. C. §163(a); 23 CFR §1225.1 (2012), and every State has adopted this limit.4 Not only that, many States, including Wisconsin, have passed laws imposing increased penalties for recidivists or for drivers with a BAC level that exceeds a higher threshold. See Wis. Stat. §346.65(2)(am); Birch-field, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7).

There is good reason to think this strategy has worked. As we noted in Birchfield, these tougher measures corre-sponded with a dramatic drop in highway deaths and injuries: From the mid-1970’s to the mid -1980’s, “the number of annual fatalities averaged 25,000; by 2014 . . . , the number had fallen to below 10,000.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6).
Third, enforcing BAC limits obviously requires a test that is accurate enough to stand up in court, id., at ___–
___ (slip op., at 3–5); see also McNeely, 569 U. S., at 159– 160 (plurality opinion). And we have recognized that “[e]xtraction of blood samples for testing is a highly effec-tive means of ” measuring “the influence of alcohol.” Schmerber, 384 U. S., at 771.

Enforcement of BAC limits also requires prompt testing because it is “a biological certainty” that “[a]lcohol dissi-pates from the bloodstream at a rate of 0.01 percent to 0.025 percent per hour. . . . Evidence is literally disappear-ing by the minute.” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 169 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). As noted, the ephemeral nature of BAC was “essential to our holding in Schmerber,” which itself allowed a warrantless blood test for BAC. Id., at 152


4 See NHTSA, Alcohol and Highway Safety: A Review of the State of Knowledge 167 (DOT HS 811 374, Mar. 2011).


(opinion of the Court). And even when we later held that the exigent-circumstances exception would not permit a warrantless blood draw in every drunk-driving case, we acknowledged that delays in BAC testing can “raise ques-tions about . . . accuracy.” Id., at 156.

It is no wonder, then, that the implied-consent laws that incentivize prompt BAC testing have been with us for 65 years and now exist in all 50 States. Birchfield, supra, at

___ (slip op., at 6). These laws and the BAC tests they require are tightly linked to a regulatory scheme that serves the most pressing of interests.

Finally, when a breath test is unavailable to promote those interests, “a blood draw becomes necessary.” McNeely , 569 U. S., at 170 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). Thus, in the case of unconscious drivers, who cannot blow into a breathalyzer, blood tests are essential for achieving the compelling interests described above.

Indeed, not only is the link to pressing interests here tighter; the interests themselves are greater: Drivers who are drunk enough to pass out at the wheel or soon after-ward pose a much greater risk. It would be perverse if the more wanton behavior were rewarded—if the more har-rowing threat were harder to punish.

For these reasons, there clearly is a “compelling need” for a blood test of drunk-driving suspects whose condition deprives officials of a reasonable opportunity to conduct a breath test. Id., at 149 (opinion of the Court) (internal quotation marks omitted) . The only question left, under our exigency doctrine, is whether this compelling need justifies a warrantless search because there is, further-more, “‘no time to secure a warrant.’” Ibid.

B

We held that there was no time to secure a warrant before a blood test of a drunk-driving suspect in Schmerber because the officer there could “reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evi-dence.” 384 U. S., at 770 (internal quotation marks omit-ted). So even if the constant dissipation of BAC evidence alone does not create an exigency, see McNeely, supra, at 150–151, Schmerber shows that it does so when combined with other pressing needs:

“We are told that [1] the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where [2] time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the at-tempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case [without a warrant] was . . . appropriate . . . .” 384 U. S., at 770–771.

Thus, exigency exists when (1) BAC evidence is dissipat-ing and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application. Both conditions are met when a drunk-driving suspect is unconscious, so Schmerber controls: With such suspects, too, a warrantless blood draw is lawful.

1

In Schmerber, the extra factor giving rise to urgent needs that would only add to the delay caused by a war-rant application was a car accident; here it is the driver’s unconsciousness. Indeed, unconsciousness does not just create pressing needs; it is itself a medical emergency.5 It means that the suspect will have to be rushed to the hos-pital or similar facility not just for the blood test itself but for urgent medical care.6 Police can reasonably anticipate that such a driver might require monitoring, positioning, and support on the way to the hospital;7 that his blood may be drawn anyway, for diagnostic purposes, immedi-ately on arrival;8 and that immediate medical treatment could delay (or otherwise distort the results of) a blood draw conducted later, upon receipt of a warrant, thus reducing its evidentiary value. See McNeely, supra, at 156 (plurality opinion). All of that sets this case apart from


5 See National Institutes of Health, U. S. National Library of Medi-cine, MedlinePlus, Unconsciousness (June 3, 2019), https://medlineplus. gov/ency/article/000022.htm (all Internet materials as last visited June 25, 2019).

6 Limmer et al., Emergency Care 598 (13th ed. 2016).
7 See id., at 593–594.
8 See J. Kwasnoski, G. Partridge, & J. Stephen, Officer’s DUI Hand-book 142 (6th ed. 2013) (“[M]ost hospitals routinely withdraw blood from the driver immediately upon admittance”); see also E. Mitchell & R. Medzon, Introduction to Emergency Medicine 269 (2005) (“Serum glucose and blood alcohol concentrations are two pieces of information that are of paramount importance when an apparently intoxicated patient arrives at the [emergency room]”); Mayo Clinic, Alcohol Poison-ing: Diagnosis & Treatment (2019), https://www.mayoclinic.org/ diseases-conditions/alcohol-poisoning/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20354392. In this respect, the case for allowing a blood draw is stronger here than in Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966). In the latter, it gave us pause that blood draws involve piercing a person’s skin. See id., at 762, 770. But since unconscious suspects will often have their skin pierced and blood drawn for diagnostic purposes, allowing law enforce-ment to use blood taken from that initial piercing would not increase the bodily intrusion. In fact, dispensing with the warrant rule could lessen the intrusion. It could enable authorities to use blood obtained by hospital staff when the suspect is admitted rather than having to wait to hear back about a warrant and then order what might be a second blood draw.


the uncomplicated drunk-driving scenarios addressed in McNeely. Just as the ramifications of a car accident pushed Schmerber over the line into exigency, so does the condition of an unconscious driver bring his blood draw under the exception. In such a case, as in Schmerber, an officer could “reasonably have believed that he was con-fronted with an emergency.” 384 U. S., at 770.

Indeed, in many unconscious-driver cases, the exigency will be more acute, as elaborated in the briefing and ar-gument in this case. A driver so drunk as to lose con-sciousness is quite likely to crash, especially if he passes out before managing to park. And then the accident might give officers a slew of urgent tasks beyond that of securing (and working around) medical care for the suspect. Police may have to ensure that others who are injured receive prompt medical attention; they may have to provide first aid themselves until medical personnel arrive at the scene. In some cases, they may have to deal with fatalities. They may have to preserve evidence at the scene and block or redirect traffic to prevent further accidents. These press-ing matters, too, would require responsible officers to put off applying for a warrant, and that would only exacerbate the delay—and imprecision—of any subsequent BAC test.

In sum, all these rival priorities would put officers, who must often engage in a form of triage, to a dilemma. It would force them to choose between prioritizing a warrant application, to the detriment of critical health and safety needs, and delaying the warrant application, and thus the BAC test, to the detriment of its evidentiary value and all the compelling interests served by BAC limits. This is just the kind of scenario for which the exigency rule was born—just the kind of grim dilemma it lives to dissolve.

2

Mitchell objects that a warrantless search is unneces-sary in cases involving unconscious drivers because warrants these days can be obtained faster and more easily.

But even in our age of rapid communication,

“[w]arrants inevitably take some time for police offic-ers or prosecutors to complete and for magistrate judges to review. Telephonic and electronic warrants may still require officers to follow time-consuming formalities designed to create an adequate record, such as preparing a duplicate warrant before calling the magistrate judge. . . . And improvements in com-munications technology do not guarantee that a mag-istrate judge will be available when an officer needs a warrant after making a late-night arrest.” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 155.

In other words, with better technology, the time required has shrunk, but it has not disappeared. In the emergency scenarios created by unconscious drivers, forcing police to put off other tasks for even a relatively short period of time may have terrible collateral costs. That is just what it means for these situations to be emergencies.

IV

When police have probable cause to believe a person has committed a drunk-driving offense and the driver’s uncon-sciousness or stupor requires him to be taken to the hospi-tal or similar facility before police have a reasonable op-portunity to administer a standard evidentiary breath test, they may almost always order a warrantless blood test to measure the driver’s BAC without offending the Fourth Amendment. We do not rule out the possibility that in an unusual case a defendant would be able to show that his blood would not have been drawn if police had not been seeking BAC information, and that police could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties. Because Mitchell did not have a chance to attempt to make that showing, a remand for that purpose is necessary.

* * *

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 18–6210

GERALD P. MITCHELL, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

WISCONSIN

[June 27, 2019]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.

Today, the plurality adopts a difficult-to-administer rule: Exigent circumstances are generally present when police encounter a person suspected of drunk driving— except when they aren’t. Compare ante, at 13, with ante, at 16. The plurality’s presumption will rarely be rebutted, but it will nevertheless burden both officers and courts who must attempt to apply it. “The better (and far sim-pler) way to resolve” this case is to apply “the per se rule” I proposed in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. 141 (2013) (dissenting opinion). Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U. S.

___, ___ (2016) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 3). Under that rule, the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream “‘creates an exigency once police have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk,’” regardless of whether the driver is conscious. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 4) . Be-cause I am of the view that the Wisconsin Supreme Court should apply that rule on remand, I concur only in the judgment.

I

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Although the Fourth Amendment does not, by its text, require that searches be supported by a warrant, see Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551, 571–573 (2004) (THOMAS, J., dissenting), “this Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured” for a search to comply with the Fourth Amendment, Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 459 (2011). We have also recognized, how-ever, that this warrant presumption “may be overcome in some circumstances because ‘[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.”’” Ibid. Accordingly, we have held that “the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.” Ibid.

In recent years, this Court has twice considered whether warrantless blood draws fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. First, in McNeely, a divided court held that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not present a per se exigency that justi-fies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 569 U. S., at 145. Then, in Birchfield, we held that blood draws may not be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving. 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 35). The question we face in this case is whether the blood draw here fell within one of the “reasonable exceptions” to the warrant requirement.

II

The “exigent circumstances” exception applies when “the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” King, 563 U. S., at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this doctrine, the Court has held that officers may conduct a warrantless search when failure to act would result in “the imminent destruction of evidence.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

As I have explained before, “the imminent destruction of evidence” is a risk in every drunk-driving arrest and thus “implicates the exigent-circumstances doctrine.” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 178. “Once police arrest a suspect for drunk driving, each passing minute eliminates probative evi-dence of the crime” as alcohol dissipates from the blood-stream. Id., at 177. In many States, this “rapid destruc-tion of evidence,” id., at 178, is particularly problematic because the penalty for drunk driving depends in part on the driver’s blood alcohol concentration, see ante, at 11. Because the provisions of Wisconsin law at issue here allow blood draws only when the driver is suspected of impaired driving, ante, at 2–3, they fit easily within the exigency exception to the warrant requirement.

Instead of adopting this straightforward rule, the plu-rality makes a flawed distinction between ordinary drunk-driving cases in which blood alcohol concentration evi-dence “is dissipating” and those that also include “some other [pressing] factor.” Ante, at 6, 13, 16. But whether “some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law-enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application” is irrelevant. Ante, at 13. When police have probable cause to conclude that an individual was driving drunk, probative evidence is dissipating by the minute. And that evidence dissipates regardless of whether police had another reason to draw the driver’s blood or whether “a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties.” Ante, at 16. The destruction of evidence alone is sufficient to justify a warrantless search based on exigent circumstances. See generally McNeely, 569 U. S., at 176–179 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).

Presumably, the plurality draws these lines to avoid overturning McNeely. See id., at 156 (majority opinion) (holding that “the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood” does not “categorically” support a finding of exi-gency). But McNeely was wrongly decided, see id., at 176–183 (opinion of THOMAS, J.), and our decision in Birchfield has already undermined its rationale. Specifically, the Court determined in McNeely that “[t]he context of blood testing is different in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in which the police are truly confronted with a now or never situation.” 569 U. S., at 153 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Court stated in Birchfield that a distinction between “an arrestee’s active destruction of evidence and the loss of evidence due to a natural process makes little sense.” 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 31); see also ante, at 11–12. Moreover, to the extent McNeely was grounded in the belief that a per se rule was inconsistent with the “case by case,” “totality of the circumstances” analysis ordinarily applied in exigent- circumstances cases, see 569 U. S., at 156, that rationale was suspect from the start. That the exigent-circumstances exception might ordinarily require “an evaluation of the particular facts of each case,” Birch-field, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 32), does not foreclose us from recognizing that a certain, dispositive fact is always present in some categories of cases. In other words, ac-knowledging that destruction of evidence is at issue in every drunk-driving case does not undermine the general totality-of-the-circumstances approach that McNeely and Birchfield endorsed. Cf. ante, at 9, n. 3.

* * *

The Court has consistently held that police officers may perform searches without a warrant when destruction of evidence is a risk. United States v. Banks, 540 U. S. 31, 38 (2003); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 395 (1997); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 295–296 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770–772 (1966). The rule should be no different in drunk-driving cases. Because the plurality instead adopts a rule more likely to confuse than clarify, I concur only in the judgment.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 18–6210

GERALD P. MITCHELL, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

WISCONSIN

[June 27, 2019]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

The plurality’s decision rests on the false premise that today’s holding is necessary to spare law enforcement from a choice between attending to emergency situations and securing evidence used to enforce state drunk-driving laws. Not so. To be sure, drunk driving poses significant dangers that Wisconsin and other States must be able to curb. But the question here is narrow: What must police do before ordering a blood draw of a person suspected of drunk driving who has become unconscious? Under the Fourth Amendment, the answer is clear: If there is time, get a warrant.

The State of Wisconsin conceded in the state courts that it had time to get a warrant to draw Gerald Mitchell’s blood, and that should be the end of the matter. Because the plurality needlessly casts aside the established protec-tions of the warrant requirement in favor of a brand new presumption of exigent circumstances that Wisconsin does not urge, that the state courts did not consider, and that contravenes this Court’s precedent, I respectfully dissent.

I

In May 2013, Wisconsin police received a report that Gerald Mitchell, seemingly intoxicated, had driven away from his apartment building. A police officer later found

Mitchell walking near a lake, slurring his speech and walking with difficulty. His van was parked nearby. The officer administered a preliminary breath test, which revealed a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.24%. The officer arrested Mitchell for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

Once at the police station, the officer placed Mitchell in a holding cell, where Mitchell began to drift into either sleep or unconsciousness. At that point, the officer decided against administering a more definitive breath test and instead took Mitchell to the hospital for a blood test. Mitchell became fully unconscious on the way. At the hospital, the officer read Mitchell a notice, required by Wisconsin’s so-called “implied consent” law, which gave him the opportunity to refuse BAC testing. See Wis. Stat. §343.305 (2016). But Mitchell was too incapacitated to respond. The officer then asked the hospital to test Mitch-ell’s blood. Mitchell’s blood was drawn about 90 minutes after his arrest, and the test revealed a BAC of 0.22%1 At no point did the officer attempt to secure a warrant.

Mitchell was charged with violating two Wisconsin drunk-driving laws. See §§346.63(1)(a), (b). He moved to suppress the blood-test results, arguing that the warrant-less blood draw was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. In response, Wisconsin conceded that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless blood draw. As the State’s attorney told the trial court, “There is nothing to suggest that this is a blood draw on a[n] exigent circumstances situation when there has been a concern for exigency. This is not that case.” App. 134.


1 Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court referred to the lapse in time between the arrest and the blood draw as lasting “approximately one hour,” App. 11, the state appellate court explained that Mitchell was arrested around 4:26 p.m. and that the blood draw took place at 5:59 p.m., id., at 63–64.


Instead, Wisconsin argued that the warrantless blood draw was lawful because of Wisconsin’s implied-consent statute. Id., at 133.

The trial court denied Mitchell’s motion to suppress, and a jury convicted him of the charged offenses. On appeal, the State Court of Appeals noted that Wisconsin had “expressly disclaimed that it was relying on exigent cir-cumstances to justify the draw,” id., at 64, and that this case offered a chance to clarify the law on implied consent because the case “is not susceptible to resolution on the ground of exigent circumstances,” id., at 66. The Court of Appeals then certified the appeal to the Wisconsin Su-preme Court, identifying the sole issue on appeal as “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law, where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 61.
On certification from the state appellate court, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the search.2 The Court granted certiorari to decide whether a statute like Wisconsin’s, which allows police to draw blood from an unconscious drunk-driving suspect, provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

II

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreason-able searches and seizures.” When the aim of a search is to uncover evidence of a crime, the Fourth Amendment generally requires police to obtain a warrant. Vernonia


2 The Wisconsin Supreme Court rephrased the certified question, but, like the Court of Appeals, it recognized the State’s concession that the exigency exception did not apply and, accordingly, did not consider the issue in reaching its decision. See 2018 WI 84, ¶12, 383 Wis. 2d 192, 202, 914 N. W. 2d 151, 155.


School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 653 (1995).

The warrant requirement is not a mere formality; it ensures that necessary judgment calls are made “‘by a neutral and detached magistrate,’” not “‘by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770 (1966). A warrant thus serves as a check against searches that violate the Fourth Amendment by ensuring that a police officer is not made the sole interpreter of the Consti-tution’s protections. Accordingly, a search conducted without a warrant is “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted); see Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373, 382 (2014) (“In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement”).

The carefully circumscribed exceptions to the warrant requirement, as relevant here, include the exigent-circumstances exception, which applies when “‘the exigen-cies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively rea-sonable,” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460 (2011) (some internal quotation marks omitted); the consent exception for cases where voluntary consent is given to the search, see, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103, 109 (2006); and the exception for “searches incident to arrest,” see, e.g., Riley, 573 U. S., at 382.

A

Blood draws are “searches” under the Fourth Amend-ment. The act of drawing a person’s blood, whether or not he is unconscious, “involve[s] a compelled physical intru-sion beneath [the] skin and into [a person’s] veins,” all for the purpose of extracting evidence for a criminal investi-gation. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. 141, 148 (2013).

The blood draw also “places in the hands of law enforce-ment authorities a sample that can be preserved and from which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple BAC reading,” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U. S. ___,
___ (2016) (slip op., at 23), such as whether a person is pregnant, is taking certain medications, or suffers from an illness. That “invasion of bodily integrity” disturbs “an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 148.

For decades, this Court has stayed true to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and the narrowness of its exceptions, even in the face of attempts categorically to exempt blood testing from its protections. In Schmerber, a man was hospitalized following a car accident. 384 U. S., at 758. At the scene of the accident and later at the hospi-tal, a police officer noticed signs of intoxication, and he arrested Schmerber for drunk driving. Id., at 768–769. Without obtaining a warrant, the officer ordered a blood draw to measure Schmerber’s BAC, and Schmerber later challenged the blood test as an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 758–759. The Court reinforced that search warrants are “ordinarily required

. . . where intrusions into the human body are concerned,” id., at 770, but it ultimately held that exigent circum-stances justified the particular search at issue because certain “special facts”—namely, an unusual delay caused by the investigation at the scene and the subsequent hospital trip—left the police with “no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant” before losing the evi-dence. Id., at 770–771.

More recently, in McNeely, the Court held that blood tests are not categorically exempt from the warrant re-quirement, explaining that exigency “must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” 569 U. S., at 156. “[T]he natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case,” but “it does not do so categorically.” Ibid. If officers “can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the effi-cacy of the search,” the Court made clear, “the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.” Id., at 152; see id., at 167 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in part and dissent-ing in part) (“The natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream . . . would qualify as an exigent circumstance, except that there may be time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn. If there is, an officer must seek a warrant”).

In Birchfield, the Court rejected another attempt cate-gorically to exempt blood draws from the warrant re-quirement. 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 33). The Court considered whether warrantless breath and blood tests to determine a person’s BAC level were permissible as searches incident to arrest. The Court held that warrant-less breath tests were permitted because they are insuffi-ciently intrusive to outweigh the State’s need for BAC testing. See ibid. As to blood tests, however, the Court held the opposite: Because they are significantly more intrusive than breath tests, the warrant requirement applies unless particular exigent circumstances prevent officers from obtaining a warrant. Ibid.; see id., at ___

(slip op., at 34) (“Nothing prevents the police from seeking a warrant for a blood test when there is sufficient time to do so in the particular circumstances or from relying on the exigent circumstances exception . . . when there is not”).3


3 The Court in Birchfield concluded as much even while acknowledg-ing that, in some cases, the suspect would be unconscious and thus unable to perform a breath test. 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 35) (“It is true that a blood test, unlike a breath test, may be administered to a person who is unconscious (perhaps as a result of a crash) or who is unable to do what is needed to take a breath test due to profound


B

Those cases resolve this one. Schmerber and McNeely establish that there is no categorical exigency exception for blood draws, although exigent circumstances might justify a warrantless blood draw on the facts of a particu-lar case. And from Birchfield, we know that warrantless blood draws cannot be justified as searches incident to arrest. The lesson is straightforward: Unless there is too little time to do so, police officers must get a warrant before ordering a blood draw. See 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 34); McNeely, 569 U. S., at 152.

Against this precedential backdrop, Wisconsin’s primary argument has always been that Mitchell consented to the blood draw through the State’s “implied -consent law.” Under that statute, a motorist who drives on the State’s roads is “deemed” to have consented to a blood draw, breath test, and urine test, and that supposed consent allows a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious motorist as long as the police have probable cause to be-lieve that the motorist has violated one of the State’s impaired driving statutes. See Wis. Stat. §343.305.
The plurality does not rely on the consent exception here. See ante, at 5. With that sliver of the plurality’s reasoning I agree. I would go further and hold that the state statute, however phrased, cannot itself create the actual and informed consent that the Fourth Amendment requires. See Randolph, 547 U. S., at 109 (describing the “voluntary consent” exception to the warrant requirement as “‘jealously and carefully drawn’”); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543, 548 (1968) (stating that consent must be “freely and voluntarily given”); see also Schneck-loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 226–227 (1973) (ex-plaining that the existence of consent must “be determined from the totality of all the circumstances”). That should be the end of this case.


intoxication or injuries. But we have no reason to believe that such situations are common in drunk-driving arrests, and when they arise, the police may apply for a warrant if need be”).


III

Rather than simply applying this Court’s precedents to address—and reject—Wisconsin’s implied-consent theory, the plurality today takes the extraordinary step of relying on an issue, exigency, that Wisconsin has affirmatively waived.4 Wisconsin has not once, in any of its briefing before this Court or the state courts, argued that exigent circumstances were present here. In fact, in the state proceedings, Wisconsin “conceded” that the exigency ex-ception does not justify the warrantless blood draw in this case. App. 66; see 2018 WI 84, ¶12, 383 Wis. 2d 192, 202, 914 N. W. 2d 151, 155 (“The State expressly stated that it was not relying on exigent circumstances to justify the blood draw”). Accordingly, the state courts proceeded on the acknowledgment that no exigency is at issue here. As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals put it:

“In particular, this case is not susceptible to resolu-tion on the ground of exigent circumstances. No tes-timony was received that would support the conclu-


4 The plurality criticizes me for supposedly suggesting that today’s decision is based on a “case-specific showing of exigent circumstances.” Ante, at 8, n. 2. But I acknowledge that the plurality does not go so far as to decide that exigent circumstances justify the search in Mitchell’s case, perhaps because the facts here support no such conclusion. See infra, at 16. Indeed, rather than confine itself to the facts and legal issues actually presented in this case, the plurality instead creates a new de facto categorical rule out of thin air. The plurality does so without any evidence that such a rule is necessary in all, or even most, cases. See infra, at 16–17. That the plurality reaches out to determine the rights of all drivers, rather than just Mitchell, makes today’s decision more misguided, not less.


sion that exigent circumstances justified the warrant-less blood draw. [The officer] expressed agnosticism as to how long it would have taken to obtain a war-rant, and he never once testified (or even implied) that there was no time to get a warrant.” App. 66.

The exigency issue is therefore waived—that is, knowingly and intentionally abandoned, see Wood v. Milyard, 566 U. S. 463, 474 (2012)—and the Court should not have considered it. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 468, n. 12 (1983); cf. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U. S. 654, 674 (2002) (“We confine our review to the ruling the Alabama Supreme Court made in the case as presented to it”).

Rather than hold Wisconsin to a concession from which it has never wavered, the plurality takes on the waived theory. As “‘a court of review, not of first view,’” however, this Court is not in the business of volunteering new ra-tionales neither raised nor addressed below, and even less ones that no party has raised here. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 8); see, e.g., Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 6); cf. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U. S. 730, 747– 748, n. 22 (1987) (declining to review a respondent’s previ-ously unraised claim “[b]ecause the judgment [was] that of a state court” and no “exceptional” circumstances were present).

There are good reasons for this restraint. Ensuring that an issue has been fully litigated allows the Court “the benefit of developed arguments on both sides and lower court opinions squarely addressing the question.” Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 538 (1992). It also reflects a central “‘premise of our adversarial system’”: Courts sit to resolve disputes among the parties, not “‘as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research.’” Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374, 408 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F. 2d 171, 177 (CADC 1983) (Scalia, J.)).
These rules, in other words, beget more informed deci-sionmaking by the Court and ensure greater fairness to litigants, who cannot be expected to respond pre-emptively to arguments that live only in the minds of the Justices. Cf. Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 306, and n. 14 (2010); Yee, 503 U. S., at 535–536. These principles should apply with greater force when the issues were not merely forfeited but affirmatively “conceded” below, App. 66, and where, as here, the question is one of constitutional dimension. The plurality acts recklessly in failing to honor these fundamental principles here.5

IV

There are good reasons why Wisconsin never asked any court to consider applying any version of the exigency exception here: This Court’s precedents foreclose it. According to the plurality, when the police attempt to obtain a blood sample from a person suspected of drunk driving, there will “almost always” be exigent circumstances if the person falls unconscious. Ante, at 1. As this case demon-strates, however, the fact that a suspect fell unconscious at some point before the blood draw does not mean that there was insufficient time to get a warrant. And if the police have time to secure a warrant before the blood draw, “the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 152. In discarding that rule for its own, the plurality may not “revisit” McNeely, ante, at 8, but the plurality does ignore it.


5 A related but distinct point: The issue on which the plurality re-solves this case is not “fairly included” in the question on which the Court granted certiorari. See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a). The Court granted certiorari to answer “[w]hether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” Pet. for Cert. ii; accord, ante, at 4–

5. The answer to that question is no. Whether exigent circumstances nevertheless require that the warrantless blood draw be upheld is an independent issue. True, that issue might affect the same “category of cases,” ante, at 8, n. 2, but that would be true of all sorts of matters not fairly included in the question on which this Court granted certiorari. “Both [issues] might be subsidiary to a question embracing both—[Was suppression appropriate?]—but they exist side by side, neither encom-passing the other.” Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 537 (1992). This Court applies a “heavy presumption against” venturing beyond the question presented, even when the parties ask it to do so. Ibid. Here, of course, the plurality ventures forth to provide guidance entirely of its own accord. One wonders why the Court asked for briefing and oral argument at all.


A

The exigent-circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies if the State can demonstrate a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978); see also King, 563 U. S., at 460 (The exception applies “when ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable” (some inter-nal quotation marks omitted)). The Court has identified exigencies when officers need to enter a home without a warrant to provide assistance to a “seriously injured” occupant or one facing an imminent threat of such injury, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006); when officers are in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42–43 (1976); and when officers need to enter a burning building to extinguish a fire, Tyler, 436 U. S., at 509.

Blood draws implicate a different type of exigency. The Court has “recognized that in some circumstances law enforcement officers may conduct a search without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 149. To determine whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search, the Court “looks to the totality of circumstances” in the particular case. Ibid. “The critical point is that . . . the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.” Riley, 573 U. S., at 402.

In McNeely, Missouri urged the Court to adopt a cate-gorical rule that the natural dissipation of alcohol from a person’s bloodstream will always create exigent circum-stances that allow police officers to order a blood draw without obtaining a warrant. 569 U. S., at 149–150. The Court declined. Even though the gradual dissipation of a person’s BAC means that “a significant delay in testing will negatively affect the probative value” of a blood test, eight Justices hewed to the traditional, “case-by-case assessment of exigency,” given that police will at least in some instances have time to get a warrant. Id., at 152; see id., at 166–167 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); id., at 175 (“The majority answers ‘It depends,’ and so do I”).

In that way, cases involving blood draws are “different in critical respects” from the typical destruction- of-evidence case that presents police officers with a “‘“now or never”’” situation. Id., at 153 (opinion of the Court). Unlike situations in which “police are just outside the door to a home” and “evidence is about to be destroyed, a per-son is about to be injured, or a fire has broken out,” some delay is inherent when officers seek a blood test regardless of whether officers are required to obtain a warrant first. Id., at 171 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); see id., at 153 (opinion of the Court). In the typical situation, the police cannot test a person’s blood as soon as the person is ar-rested; police officers do not draw blood roadside. Rather, they generally must transport the drunk -driving suspect to a hospital or other medical facility and wait for a medi-cal professional to draw the blood. That built-in delay may give police officers time to seek a warrant, especially if the suspect is brought to the hospital by an officer or emergency -response professional other than the one who applies for the warrant.

Moreover, although “the alcohol level in a person’s blood begins to dissipate once the alcohol is fully absorbed, id., at 152, it does so “over time in a gradual and relatively predictable manner,” id., at 153. Thus, even though BAC evidence is of course critical for law enforcement purposes, “the fact that the dissipation persists for some time means that the police—although they may not be able to do any-thing about it right away—may still be able to respond to the ongoing destruction of evidence later on.” Id., at 172 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). For one, there may well be time for police officers to get a warrant before a person’s BAC drops significantly. See id., at 172–173. In addition, assuming delays do not stretch so long as to cause accuracy concerns, “experts can work backwards from the BAC at the time the sample was taken to determine the BAC at the time of the alleged offense.” Id., at 156 (opinion of the Court). Contrary to the plurality’s fear mongering, in other words, a small delay to obtain a warrant is hardly a recipe for lawless roadways.
Meanwhile, as the Court has observed, significant tech-nological advances have allowed for “more expeditious processing of warrant applications.” Id., at 154; see Riley, 573 U. S., at 401. In the federal system, magistrate judges can issue warrants based on sworn testimony communi-cated over the phone or through “‘other reliable electronic means.’” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 154 (quoting Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 4.1). In a sizable majority of States, police officers can apply for warrants “remotely through various means, including telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video con-ferencing.” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 154; see ibid., n. 4 (collecting state statutes). And the use of “standard- form warrant applications” has streamlined the warrant process in many States as well, especially in this context. Id., at 154–155. As a result, judges can often issue warrants in 5 to 15 minutes. Id., at 173 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). Of course, securing a warrant will always take some time, and that time will vary case to case. But “[t]here might . . . be time to obtain a warrant in many cases.” Id., at

172. Thus, as McNeely made clear, the exigency exception is appropriate only in those cases in which time is not on the officer’s side.

B

The reasons the Court gave for rejecting a categorical exigency exception in McNeely apply with full force when the suspected drunk driver is (or becomes) unconscious.

In these cases, there is still a period of delay during which a police officer might take steps to secure a war-rant. Indeed, as the plurality observes, see ante, at 13–14, that delay is guaranteed because an unconscious person will need to be transported to the hospital for medical attention. Such a delay occurred in Mitchell’s case, even more so than it did in McNeely’s. See McNeely, 569 U. S., at 145–146 (explaining that the police officer transported McNeely first to the police station and then to the hospital for blood testing, taking approximately 25 minutes); App. 63–64 (explaining that the police officer arrested Mitchell, drove him to the police station, placed him in a holding cell, and then transported him to the hospital and ob-tained a blood sample over the course of 90 minutes).

Likewise, an unconscious person’s BAC dissipates just as gradually and predictably as a conscious person’s does. Furthermore, because unconsciousness is more likely to occur at higher BACs, see Martin, Measuring Acute Alco-hol Impairment, in Forensic Issues in Alcohol Testing 1, 8 (S. Karch ed. 2008), the BACs of suspected drunk drivers who are unconscious will presumably be higher above the legal limit—and thus remain above the legal limit for longer—than is true for suspects who are conscious and close to sobering up. And, of course, the process for get-ting a warrant remains the same.

All told, the mere fact that a person is unconscious does not materially change the calculation that the Court made in McNeely when it rejected a categorical exigency excep-tion for blood draws. In many cases, even when the sus-pect falls unconscious, police officers will have sufficient time to secure a warrant—meaning that the Fourth Amendment requires that they do so.

C

The plurality distinguishes unconscious drunk- driving suspects from others based on the fact that their uncon-sciousness means that they will, invariably, need urgent medical attention due to their loss of consciousness. See ante, at 13–14. But the need for medical care is not unique to unconscious suspects. “Drunk drivers often end up in an emergency room,” whether or not they are uncon-scious when the police encounter them. See McNeely, 569 U. S., at 171 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). The defendant in Schmerber was hospitalized, yet the Court did not, in that case or in McNeely decades later, promulgate a categorical exception for every warrantless blood draw. That Mitchell was hospitalized is likewise insufficient here. Even if the plurality is right that every suspect who loses conscious-ness will need medical care, not every medical response will interfere with law enforcement’s ability to secure a warrant before ordering a blood draw. See McNeely, 569 U. S., at 153–154; id., at 171–172 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.).6


6 The plurality’s new rule, in addition to requiring a defendant to prove that the officer had no time to get a warrant, also appears to require the defendant to show that his blood would not have been drawn absent law enforcement’s need for a blood sample. See ante, at


Because the precedent is so squarely against it, the plurality devotes much of its opinion instead to painting a dire picture: the scene of a drunk- driving-related accident, where police officers must tend to the unconscious person, others who need medical attention, oncoming traffic, and investigatory needs. See ante, at 15. There is no indica-tion, however, in the record or elsewhere that the tableau of horribles the plurality depicts materializes in most cases. Such circumstances are certainly not present in this case, in which the police encountered Mitchell alone, after he had parked and left his car; indeed, Mitchell lost consciousness over an hour after he was found walking along the lake. The potential variation in circumstances is a good reason to decide each case on its own facts, as McNeely instructs and as the Court did in Schmerber. See McNeely, 569 U. S., at 149–151, 156. The plurality in-stead bases its de facto categorical exigency exception on nothing more than a “‘considerable overgeneralization,’” id., at 153, as well as empirical assumptions that the parties not only lacked a chance to address, but that are


16. That is, a suspect can never prevail under the new rule if the hospital staff draws his blood for its own noninvestigatory medical reasons. But, again, the relevant question is whether the evidence is likely to dissipate before the police can obtain a warrant. This particu-lar aspect of the plurality’s approach offers no help in answering that question. The plurality separately suggests that, because an uncon-scious person may well undergo a blood test for medical purposes regardless, its de facto categorical exception “could lessen the intrusion” of a blood draw. See ante, at 14, n. 8. But the fact that “people volun-tarily submit to the taking of blood samples as part of a physical examination,” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 22), does not make the process any less intrusive when per-formed at the behest of law enforcement. Although one piercing is of course less cumbersome than two, the privacy interests at stake go well beyond physical discomfort. See supra, at 4–5; Birchfield, 579 U. S., at

___ (slip op., at 23); McNeely, 569 U. S., at 148.


also belied by Wisconsin’s concession in this case.7

If and when a case like the one the plurality imagines does arise, however, the police officers would not be “force[d] . . . to choose between” the “rival priorities” of getting a warrant and attending to “critical health and safety needs.” Ante, at 15. Of course, the police and other first responders must dutifully attend to any urgent medi-cal needs of the driver and any others at the scene; no one suggests that the warrant process should interfere with medical care. The point is that, in many cases, the police will have enough time to address medical needs and still get a warrant before the putative evidence (i.e., any alco-hol in the suspect’s blood) dissipates. And if police officers “are truly confronted with a ‘now or never’ situation,” they will be able to rely on the exigent-circumstances exception to order the blood draw immediately. McNeely, 569 U. S., at 153 (some internal quotation marks omitted); Riley, 573 U. S., at 391. In any other situation, though—such as in Mitchell’s and in many others—the officers can secure a warrant.

V

The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by our prece-dents, requires police officers seeking to draw blood from a person suspected of drunk driving to get a warrant if possible. That rule should resolve this case.


7 In addition to offering a justification for Wisconsin’s warrantless search that the State itself has disavowed, the plurality also relieves all States of their burden to justify similar warrantless searches. Until now, the Court has said that “the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrant-less searches.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 749–750 (1984); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 455 (1971). Today, the plurality turns that presumption on its head in favor of a new one that “almost always” authorizes the police to conduct warrantless blood draws even in the absence of an actual emergency. See ante, at 1.


The plurality misguidedly departs from this rule, setting forth its own convoluted counterpresumption instead. But the Fourth Amendment is not as pliable as the plurality suggests. The warrant requirement safeguards privacy and physical autonomy by “assuring citizens” that searches “are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.” Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 621–622 (1989); see id., at 621.

There is no doubt that drunk drivers create grave dan-ger on our roads. It is, however, “[p]recisely because the need for action . . . is manifest” in such cases that “the need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great.” Id., at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting). “Requiring a warrant whenever practicable helps ensure that when blood draws occur, they are indeed justified.” McNeely, 569 U. S., at 174 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). For that reason, “the police bear a heavy burden” to justify a war-rantless search like the one here based on “urgent need.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 749–750 (1984).
The plurality today carries that burden for a State that never asked it to do so, not only here but also in a scatter-shot mass of future cases. Acting entirely on its own freewheeling instincts—with no briefing or decision below on the question—the plurality permits officers to order a blood draw of an unconscious person in all but the rarest cases, even when there is ample time to obtain a warrant. The plurality may believe it is helping to ameliorate the scourge of drunk driving, but what it really does is to strike another needless blow at the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. With respect, I dissent.

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 18–6210

GERALD P. MITCHELL, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

WISCONSIN

[June 27, 2019]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting.

We took this case to decide whether Wisconsin drivers impliedly consent to blood alcohol tests thanks to a state statute. That law says that anyone driving in Wisconsin agrees—by the very act of driving—to testing under certain circumstances. But the Court today declines to answer the question presented. Instead, it upholds Wisconsin’s law on an entirely different ground—citing the exigent circumstances doctrine. While I do not doubt that the Court may affirm for any reason supported by the record, the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine in this area poses complex and difficult questions that neither the parties nor the courts below discussed. Rather than proceeding solely by self-direction, I would have dismissed this case as improvidently granted and waited for a case presenting the exigent circumstances question.

Docket  No. 18-6210
Title: Gerald P. Mitchell, Petitioner
v.
Wisconsin
Docketed: October 4, 2018
Lower Ct: Supreme Court of Wisconsin
   Case Numbers: (2015AP304)
   Decision Date: July 3, 2018
Questions Presented
DATE PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERS
Oct 01 2018 Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due November 5, 2018)
Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma PauperisPetitionAppendixProof of Service
Oct 16 2018 Motion to extend the time to file a response from November 5, 2018 to December 5, 2018, submitted to The Clerk.
Main Document
Oct 18 2018 Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including December 5, 2018.
Dec 05 2018 Brief of respondent Wisconsin in opposition filed.
Main DocumentProof of Service
Dec 19 2018 Reply of petitioner Gerald P. Mitchell filed. (Distributed)
OtherMain DocumentProof of Service
Dec 20 2018 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/4/2019.
Jan 07 2019 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/11/2019.
Jan 11 2019 Motion to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for a writ of certiorari GRANTED.
Feb 11 2019 SET FOR ARGUMENT on Tuesday, April 23, 2019
Feb 18 2019 Blanket Consent filed by Petitioner, Gerald P. Mitchell.
Blanket Consent
Feb 18 2019 Blanket Consent filed by Respondent, Wisconsin
Blanket Consent
Feb 25 2019 Joint appendix filed.
Main DocumentProof of Service
Feb 25 2019 Brief of petitioner Gerald P. Mitchell filed.
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Feb 26 2019 Brief amicus curiae of California DUI Lawyers Association filed.
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Mar 01 2019 Brief amicus curiae of National College for DUI Defense, Inc. filed.
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Mar 04 2019 Supplemental proof of service of amicus California DUI Lawyers Association filed.
Main Document
Mar 04 2019 Brief amici curiae of The Rutherford Institute and the Cato Institute filed.
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Mar 04 2019 Brief amicus curiae of Restore the Fourth, Inc. filed.
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountCertificate of Word Count
Mar 04 2019 Brief amici curiae of The DKT Liberty Project, Reason Foundation, and The Due Process Institute filed.
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Mar 04 2019 Brief amici curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and ACLU of Wisconsin filed.
Main DocumentProof of ServiceCertificate of Word Count
Mar 04 2019 Brief amicus curiae of DUI Defense Lawyers Association filed.
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Mar 20 2019 CIRCULATED
Mar 27 2019 Brief of respondent Wisconsin filed. (Distributed)
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Apr 03 2019 Brief amici curiae of National Conference of State Legislatures, et al. filed. (Distributed)
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Apr 03 2019 Brief amicus curiae of Mothers Against Drunk Driving filed. (Distributed)
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Apr 03 2019 Brief amici curiae of League of Wisconsin Municipalities, et al. filed. (Distributed)
Main DocumentProof of ServiceCertificate of Word Count
Apr 03 2019 Brief amici curiae of State of Colorado, et al. filed. (Distributed)
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Apr 16 2019 Reply of petitioner Gerald P. Mitchell filed. (Distributed)
Main DocumentCertificate of Word CountProof of Service
Apr 23 2019 Argued. For petitioner: Andrew R. Hinkel, Assistant State Public Defender, Madison, Wis. For respondent: Hannah S. Jurss, Assistant Attorney General, Madison, Wis.
Jun 27 2019 Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED. Alito, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Breyer and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Kagan, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
NAME ADDRESS PHONE
Attorneys for Petitioner
Andrew Robert Hinkel
Counsel of Record
Wisconsin State Public Defender
17 South Fairchild Street, Third Floor
Madison, WI 53703

hinkela@opd.wi.gov(608) 267-1779Party name: Gerald P. MitchellAttorneys for RespondentAnthony David Russomanno
Counsel of RecordWisconsin Department of Justice
17 W. Main Street, P.O. Box 7857
Madison, WI 53707

russomannoad@doj.state.wi.us6082672230Party name: WisconsinOtherJessica Ring Amunson
Counsel of RecordJenner & Block LLP
1099 New York Avenue NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001

JAmunson@jenner.com202-639-6023Party name: The DKT Liberty Project, Reason Foundation, and The Due Process InstituteDonald Joseph Bartell
Counsel of RecordBartell, Hensel & Gressley
5053 La Mart Drive
Suite 201
Riverside, CA 92507

djbartell@pacbell.net9517882230Party name: California DUI Lawyers AssociationDavid D. Cole
Counsel of RecordAmerican Civil Liberties Union Foundation
915 15th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005

dcole@aclu.org202-675-2330Party name: THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION AND ACLU OF WISCONSINL. Andrew Cooper
Counsel of RecordOffice of the Colorado Attorney General
1300 Broadway St.
Denver, CO 80203

andrew.cooper@coag.gov720-508-6465Party name: State of Colorado et al.Dorothy Alicia Hickok
Counsel of RecordDrinker Biddle & Reath LLP
One Logan Square
Suite 2000
Philadelphia, PA 19103

alicia.hickok@dbr.com215-988-2700Party name: The Rutherford Institute and the Cato InstituteDouglas James Hoffer
Counsel of RecordCity of Eau Claire
203 S. Farwell St.
Eau Claire, WI 54702

douglashoffer@gmail.com2624242759Party name: League of Wisconsin Municipalities, et al.D. Timothy Huey
Counsel of Record3240 West Henderson Road
Columbus, OH 43220

DTHLAW@gmail.com614-498-8667Party name: DUI Defense Lawyers AssociationTheane Evangelis Kapur
Counsel of RecordGibson, Dunn and Crutcher, LLP
333 South Grand Ave.
48th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071

tevangelis@gibsondunn.com213.229.7726Party name: Mothers Against Drunk DrivingLauren Suzanne Kuley
Counsel of RecordSquire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
201 E. Fourth St. Suite 1900
Cincinnati, OH 45202

lauren.kuley@squirepb.com513-361-1200Party name: National Conference of State Legislatures, et alDonald John Ramsell
Counsel of RecordRamsell & Associates LLC
128 S. County Farm Rd
Wheaton, IL 60187-2400

donald.ramsell@dialdui.com6306658780Party name: National College for DUI Defense, Inc.Mahesha Padmanabhan Subbaraman
Counsel of RecordSubbaraman PLLC
222 S. 9th St., Suite 1600
Minneapolis, MN 55402

mps@subblaw.com612-315-9210Party name: Restore the Fourth, Inc.