Introduction to the Brahma Sutram by Sankara (शारीरक मीमांसा सूत्रभाष्य)

Hindu Scriptures and Interpretation

Brahma Sutram by Badarayana

Introduction

Sankaracharya

।।ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम्।।
श्रीमच्छंकरभगवत्पादैः विरचितम्।

श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यास्य श्रीगोविन्दभगवत्पूज्यपादशिष्यस्य श्रीमच्छंकरभगवतः कृतौ
शारीरकमीमांसासूत्रभाष्ये

।।प्रथमोऽध्यायः।।
।।प्रथमः पादः।।

युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोस्तमः प्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरितरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम् तद्धर्माणामपि सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः इत्यतः अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासः तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम्।

तथाप्यन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्मांश्चाध्यस्येतरेतराविवेकेन अत्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य अहमिदम् ममेदम् इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः।।

आह कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति। उच्यते स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः। तं केचित् अन्यत्रान्यधर्माध्यास इति वदन्ति। केचित्तु यत्र यदध्यासः तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रम इति। अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासः तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनामाचक्षते। सर्वथापि तु अन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति। तथा च लोकेऽनुभवः शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवदिति।।

कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मन्यविषये अध्यासो विषयतद्धर्माणाम् सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य च प्रत्यगात्मनः अविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि। उच्यते न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषयः अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यसितव्यमिति अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालाः तलमलिनतादि अध्यस्यन्ति एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यपि अनात्माध्यासः।।

तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते। तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्यामाहुः। तत्रैवं सति यत्र यदध्यासः तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न संबध्यते। तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारा लौकिकाः प्रवृत्ताः सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि। कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति उच्यते देहेन्द्रियादिषु अहंममाभिमानरहितस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। न हीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः संभवति। न चाधिष्ठानमन्तरेण इन्द्रियाणां व्यापारः संभवति। न चानध्य स्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते। न चैतस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन्नसति असङ्गस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते। न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरस्ति। तस्मादविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति। पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात्। यथा हि पश्वादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां संबन्धे सति शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते यथा दण्डोद्यतकरं पुरुषमभिमुखमुपलभ्य मां हन्तुमयमिच्छति इति पलायितुमारभन्ते हरिततृणपूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रति अभिमुखीभवन्ति एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः क्रूरदृष्टीनाक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान्बलवत उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते तद्विपरीतान्प्रति अभिमुखीभवन्ति।

अतः समानः पश्वादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः। पश्वादीनां च प्रसिद्ध एव अविवेकपूर्वकः प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः। तत्सामान्यदर्शनाद्व्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारस्तत्कालः समान इति निश्चीयते। शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी नाविदित्वा आत्मनः परलोकसंबन्धमधिक्रियते तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यमशनायाद्यतीतमपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादि भेदमसंसार्यात्मतत्त्वमधिकारेऽपेक्ष्यते अनुपयोगात् अधिकारविरोधाच्च। प्राक् च तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रमविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते। तथा हि ब्राह्मणो यजेत इत्यादीनि शास्त्राण्यात्मनि वर्णाश्रमवयोवस्थादि विशेषाध्यासमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते।

अध्यासो नाम  अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरित्यवोचाम। तद्यथा पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा अहमेव विकलः सकलो वेति बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति तथा देहधर्मान् स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहं गौरोऽहं तिष्ठामि गच्छामि लङ्घयामि च इति तथेन्द्रियधर्मान् मूकः काणः क्लीबो बधिरोऽन्धोऽहम् इति तथान्तःकरणधर्मान् कामसंकल्पविचिकित्साध्यवसायादीन्। एवमहंप्रत्ययिनमशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यति। एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः।

अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते। यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानाम् तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः। वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्येदमादिमं सूत्रम् ।

Next: Athato Brahma Gigyasa (अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा)

English Translation

।।Commentary on the Brahma Sūtras।।
Composed by Śrīmat Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda.

In the Śārīraka-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra-Bhāṣya composed by Śrīmat Śaṅkara Bhagavat, the disciple of the revered Śrī Govinda Bhagavatpūjyapāda, the Ācārya who is a Paramahaṃsa and Parivrājaka.

।।First Chapter।।
।।First Quarter।।

With regard to the subject and object (viṣaya–viṣayin) that are the spheres of the cognitions “you” (yuṣmat) and “I” (asmat), respectively, their natures are mutually opposed, like darkness and light (tamas–prakāśa). Since their being each other (itaretara-bhāva) is established as impossible, the mutual identification of their respective attributes is even more impossible. Therefore, it is proper that, with regard to the subject, the conscious Self (cid-ātmā), which is the sphere of the cognition “I,” there should be superimposition (adhyāsa) of the object that is the sphere of the cognition “you,” together with its attributes; and conversely, there should be superimposition upon the object of the subject and its attributes. This superimposition is false (mithyā).

Nevertheless, by superimposing upon one another the nature of one upon the other and the attributes of one upon the other, and by failing to discriminate between things whose attributes and their substrata are absolutely distinct, there arises, through false knowledge (mithyājñāna), this natural (naisargika) worldly usage in which truth and untruth are mutually combined (satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya), expressed in the forms:

“I am this” (aham idam)
and
“This is mine” (mama idam).

Someone asks: What is this thing called adhyāsa?

It is said: the appearance elsewhere of something previously experienced, in the form of memory (smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ).

Some describe it as “the superimposition elsewhere of the attributes of another” (anyatrānyadharmādhyāsa).

Others say that, wherever something is superimposed, the resulting error is founded upon failure to apprehend the distinction (vivekāgraha) between that and the thing upon which it is superimposed.

Others again describe it as the imagining of the opposite attributes in the thing upon which something is superimposed.

In every case, however, the essential feature does not deviate from this: the attributes of one thing appear as belonging to another.

And worldly experience is indeed of this kind: a shell appears as silver, and one moon appears as though there were a second moon.

But how can there be superimposition of the object and its attributes upon the inner Self (pratyagātman), when the latter is not an object?

For everyone superimposes one object upon another only when the object is situated before him; and you say that the inner Self, which is devoid of the cognition “you” (yuṣmat-pratyaya-apeta), is not an object.

It is said: the inner Self is not absolutely and without qualification a non-object, because it is the object of the cognition “I” (asmat-pratyaya-viṣaya), and because the inner Self is established as immediately evident (aparokṣa).

Nor is there any rule that only an object situated directly before one can have another object superimposed upon it. Even upon the imperceptible ākāśa, children superimpose such things as surface-dirt (tala-malina), and so forth.

In the same manner, therefore, superimposition of the non-Self upon the inner Self is not contradictory.

The learned regard this superimposition, thus characterised, as Avidyā (avidyā).

And through discrimination from it, they call the determination of the true nature of the thing (vastu-svarūpa-avadhāraṇa) Vidyā (vidyā).

When this is so, wherever something is superimposed, the substratum upon which that superimposition occurs is not affected by the defect or quality produced by that superimposition, even in the slightest degree.

Having taken this mutual superimposition of the Self and the non-Self (ātmānātmanor itaretarādhyāsa), called Avidyā, as their starting point, all worldly transactions involving means and objects of knowledge (pramāṇa–prameya-vyavahāra) proceed, as do all the Śāstras, whose purposes are injunction (vidhi), prohibition (pratiṣedha), and liberation (mokṣa).

But how can the means of knowledge such as perception (pratyakṣa), and the Śāstras, be concerned with a subject affected by Avidyā?

It is said:

Without the identification of “I” and “mine” (ahaṃ–mama-abhimāna) with the body, senses, and so forth, the status of being a knower (pramātṛtva) cannot be established; and without a knower there can be no operation of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa-pravṛtti).

For no transaction involving perception, etc., is possible without employing the sense organs.

Nor is the operation of the sense organs possible without a substratum (adhiṣṭhāna).

Nor does anyone engage in activity through a body unless the nature of the Self has been superimposed upon that body.

And if all this were absent, the Self, which is unattached (asaṅga), could not possess the status of a knower (pramātṛtva).

Nor is there any operation of the means of knowledge without the status of being a knower.

Therefore, perception and the other means of knowledge, as well as the Śāstras, are concerned only with subjects affected by Avidyā (avidyāvad-viṣaya).

And this is no different from animals and other creatures (paśvādi).

For just as animals, when there is contact between sound and the ear, and cognition of sound and the like arises as something unfavourable, withdraw from it, while when something favourable arises, they approach it—

for example, seeing a man approaching with a stick raised in his hand, they begin to flee, thinking:

“He wishes to strike me.”

But seeing that same person approaching with his hand filled with green grass, they move toward him—

in exactly the same way, human beings also, possessing developed minds, seeing men of cruel appearance, abusive speech, and powerful men with swords raised in their hands, withdraw from them; and toward those who are the opposite, they move forward.

Therefore, the transactions involving means and objects of knowledge (pramāṇa–prameya-vyavahāra) of human beings are similar to those of animals and other creatures.

And the perceptual transactions of animals and the like are well known to occur preceded by non-discrimination (aviveka-pūrvaka).

From observing this common feature, it is determined that even the perceptual transactions of human beings possessing developed intellectual capacity are, at the time of such transactions, similar in this respect.

In Śāstric activity, although a person does not become qualified merely without conscious consideration, and although one who does not know the relation of the Self to the other world (paraloka) is nevertheless admitted to ritual activity, the Śāstra does not require, for qualification, knowledge of the Self that is beyond hunger and thirst (aśanāyādy-atīta), beyond distinctions such as Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriya, and beyond saṃsāra (asaṃsāryātma-tattva).

Why?

Because such knowledge is of no use for that qualification and would contradict the very basis of qualification.

And before knowledge of the Self of such a nature arises, the Śāstra that operates does not transcend the condition of being concerned with a subject affected by Avidyā.

Thus, injunctions such as:

“The Brāhmaṇa should perform the sacrifice (brāhmaṇo yajeta)”

operate by relying upon the superimposition upon the Self of distinctions such as caste (varṇa), stage of life (āśrama), age (vayaḥ), state (avasthā), and so forth.

We have said that adhyāsa means:

“the cognition of that in what is not that (atasmiṃs tad-buddhiḥ).”

Thus, for example, when a son, wife, and others are defective or whole, one superimposes their external attributes upon the Self and thinks:

“I am defective” or “I am whole.”

Similarly, one superimposes the attributes of the body upon the Self:

“I am stout.”
“I am thin.”
“I am fair.”
“I stand.”
“I go.”
“I leap.”

Likewise, the attributes of the sense organs are superimposed:

“I am mute.”
“I am one-eyed.”
“I am impotent.”
“I am deaf.”
“I am blind.”

And similarly, the attributes of the inner instrument (antaḥkaraṇa), such as desire (kāma), resolve (saṅkalpa), doubt (vicikitsā), determination (adhyavasāya), and so forth, are superimposed upon the Self.

In this manner, one superimposes the inner Self (pratyagātman), which is the cogniser of the “I” notion and the witness of all its activities (aśeṣa-svapracāra-sākṣin), upon the inner instrument and so forth; and, conversely, one superimposes that inner Self, the witness of all, upon the inner instrument and so forth.

Thus this beginningless (anādi), endless (ananta), natural (naisargika) superimposition, having the form of false cognition (mithyā-pratyaya), which impels agency (kartṛtva) and experiencership (bhoktṛtva), is evident to the entire world.

For the abandonment of this cause of all evil (anartha-hetu), and for the attainment of the knowledge of the oneness of the Self (ātmaikatva-vidyā-pratipatti), all the Vedāntas are undertaken.

And just as this meaning belongs to all the Vedāntas, so we shall demonstrate it in this Śārīraka-Mīmāṃsā.

This is the first Sūtra of the Śāstra of Vedānta-Mīmāṃsā, whose exposition is intended here.

Sanskrit Vocabulary

Important Compound Expressions