The First Government of India | British Raj (1858-1914)

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Inauguration of the British ‘Raj’, the Government in India

Induction of British Raj

In 1857, the Indians rose in revolt against high-handed and oppressive Company rule – particularly its insensitivity towards their religions, which ignited a firestorm of resistance across various regions. This widespread discontent was fueled by grievances over economic exploitation, land seizures, and disregard for local customs, leading to a collective uprising that spanned from the northern plains to the southern provinces. The revolt was marked by fierce clashes, as Indian soldiers, known as sepoys, refused to serve under British commanders, and civilians rallied to support their cause.

In response, the British employed excessively brutal action by the Company’s army, deploying advanced military tactics and overwhelming force to regain control of its possessions, which resulted in significant loss of life and further resentment among the local populations. Following this catastrophic failure of governance, which highlighted the unsustainability of such colonial practices, the British state formally took over the East India Company’s rule in India, establishing direct control and implementing a series of reforms aimed at restoring order, but often exacerbating the very tensions that had led to the revolt.

The Role of British Parliament in India’s Governance

As the Crown took over rule in India in 1858, the ‘Government of India’ was transferred to Her Majesty Victoria by the East India Company, who were her trustees. Thereafter the Parliament’s involvement in Indian affairs significantly increased, marking a pivotal shift in the governance of the subcontinent. The administration now operated under the watchful eye of British lawmakers who sought to exert greater control and influence over local matters. The governance of India underwent frequent reviews, leading to the British Parliament passing a total of 196 Acts concerning the Indian subcontinent between 1858 and 1947. These legislative measures aimed to address various administrative, social, and economic issues arising from India’s complex and diverse landscape, reflecting the changing dynamics of British colonial policy during that period. The Acts often had deep impacts on Indian society and governance, shaping the subcontinent’s trajectory toward independence while sparking numerous movements for reform and resistance among Indians. Notably, the imposition of certain laws fueled discontent across different strata of Indian society, leading to a rising awareness of national identity and the urgent need for self-governance, ultimately setting the stage for India’s struggle for independence.

India is an ancient country of many nations; that it is peopled by various and varying races, differing in origin, in language, in religion, in manners, and in laws—some of them highly gifted and highly civilized, and many of them of rare antiquity. And this vast community is governed, under the authority of the Queen, by many Sovereign Princes, some of whom occupy Thrones which were filled by their ancestors when England was a Roman Province.

(MR. DISRAELI: Royal Titles Bill
Volume 227: debated on Thursday 17 February 1876)

Indian Councils Act 1861

The government of the Raj consisted wholly of British officials and was headed by the viceroy, who wielded considerable power and authority, alongside the appointed members of his council. This council, established with a clear structure, was not just a bureaucratic body; it represented the apex of British governance in India. Following the passage of the Indian Councils Act in 1861, this executive council effectively functioned as a cabinet, playing a pivotal role in administering British policies and also serving as a crucial part of an imperial legislative council where significant laws and reforms were debated and passed. Each of British India’s eleven provinces had its own governor, who was tasked with overseeing provincial matters and ensuring the implementation of central policies, assisted by similar provincial legislative councils of appointed officials that helped in governance at a more localized level. These councils were instrumental in dealing with the complexities of governance across diverse cultural landscapes. Furthermore, there were also a small number of Indian council members who were part of the local elite, appointed solely for consultative purposes, allowing for a semblance of representation in a system dominated by British officials; however, their influence was often limited, and they served mainly to provide perspective on Indian society rather than to hold genuine power.

I am deeply thankful for the uninterrupted health which My dear Son, the Prince of Wales, has enjoyed during his journey through India. The hearty affection with which he has been received by My Indian Subjects, of all classes and races, assures Me that they are happy under My rule, and loyal to My throne. At the time that the direct government of My Indian Empire was transferred to the Crown, no formal addition was made to the style and titles of the Sovereign. I have deemed the present a fitting opportunity for supplying this omission, and a Bill upon the subject will be presented to you.

( Excerpt from Her Majesty Queen Victoria`s speech, Royal Titles Bill Volume 227: debated on Thursday 17 February 1876

Queen Victoria the Empress of India

British rule over India was reinforced when in 1876 Parliament passed the Royal Titles Act, which formally endowed Queen Victoria with the title of Empress of India (“the Bill enabling Her Majesty to take this step, the House will show, in a manner that is unmistakable, that they look upon India as one of the most precious possessions of the Crown, and their pride that it is a part of her Empire and governed by Her Imperial Throne” Royal Titles Bill Volume 227: debated on Thursday 17 February 1876). This legislation symbolized the consolidation of British authority and was a significant step in solidifying the British monarchy’s connection to the Indian subcontinent. The Act not only enhanced the ceremonial status of the British Crown but also aimed to instill a sense of imperial grandeur and legitimacy in British rule, further shaping the political landscape of colonial governance in India. By adopting this grand title, the British sought to project a vision of their rule that portrayed their presence in India as one of benevolence and progress, emphasizing their role as civilizers of a vast and diverse land. This strategic move was accompanied by a variety of imperial exhibitions and celebrations that highlighted British achievements in India, showcasing advancements in infrastructure, education, and industry. Such efforts were designed to win the hearts and minds of both the Indian populace and British subjects back home, painting a picture of a harmonious empire thriving under enlightened rule. This title marked a pivotal moment in British colonial history, reinforcing Britain’s imperial ambitions and its perceived role as a benevolent power in the region, while also laying the groundwork for the complexities and contradictions of colonial rule that would unfold in the years to come.

Indian National Congress

In 1885, a group of Indian nationalists founded the Indian National Congress, marking the beginning of increased Indian involvement in politics both in India and within the broader British Empire. This assembly heralded a new era of political consciousness among Indians, fostering debates around governance, rights, and the quest for self-determination. During the 1890s, two notable figures emerged: Dadabhai Naoroji, a visionary leader and founder of the Indian National Congress, who was fiercely critical of British rule and passionately advocated for the economic plight of Indians, and Sir Macherjee M. Bhownaggree (15 August 1851 – 14 November 1933), a supporter of the Raj’s government, who held a contrasting stance. Both men represented London constituencies as Members of Parliament (MPs) in Westminster, highlighting the complexities of Indian political representation during this period. Their presence in the British Parliament served as a dual representation of Indian interests, even though their ideologies often clashed, demonstrating the varied responses within the Indian society to colonial governance. This growing involvement of Indians in political discourse was a significant step toward the eventual push for greater self-governance and independence, as it laid the foundations for future leaders to emerge and challenge the status quo, ultimately mobilizing a wider section of society to aspire toward freedom.

The 1909 Act

Two Indian Councils Acts, of 1892 and 1909, allowed a small number of Indians – 39 in 1892 rising to 135 in 1909 – to be elected to both the imperial and provincial legislative councils. The 1909 Act ensured that small groups of Indian electors chose these representatives as representatives of specific religious and social groups, such as Muslims or landowners. These councils remained merely advisory, and the governor was in no way responsible to these elected representatives.

Parliament’s legislation of 1892 and 1909 did not adequately address the wide-scale dissatisfaction with British rule, leaving many citizens feeling marginalized and oppressed. The lack of meaningful political representation and the persistence of social inequalities fueled public discontent and unrest. However, events following the First World War precipitated a crisis for the Raj, as returning soldiers and civilians alike became increasingly aware of their rights and began to demand greater autonomy. The deep impacts of the war, coupled with economic hardships and the growing influence of nationalist movements, laid the groundwork for an environment ripe for rebellion against colonial authority, intensifying calls for independence and significant reform. (1)

Indian nationalist feeling

Indian nationalist feeling intensified in the years after World War I, stimulated first by the Amritsar Massacre (2) when on 13 April 1919, British troops fired into a crowd in an enclosed park in the city of Amritsar. This tragic event resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Indian civilians and drew widespread outrage and condemnation across India and beyond, sparking a profound awakening of political consciousness among the Indian populace. The brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters heightened existing grievances against British rule and underscored the urgent demands for self-governance and rights. As news of the massacre spread, it galvanized various segments of Indian society, including students, intellectuals, and leaders, to join together in a unified quest for independence. The incident not only solidified anti-colonial sentiments but also inspired a wave of civil disobedience movements, marking a significant turning point in the struggle for freedom. The memory of the Amritsar Massacre became a rallying cry, symbolizing the resilience and determination of the Indian people to challenge the status quo and advocate for their rightful place in the world.

The massacre not only solidified nationalist sentiments but also marked a turning point in the struggle for independence, as many Indians, previously ambivalent or loyal to the British Crown, began to reassess their stance amid rising political consciousness. This tragic event served as a catalyst, igniting a widespread awakening among the populace, who began to understand the implications of colonial rule on their social, economic, and political well-being. As the news of the atrocity spread across the nation, it galvanized diverse groups, transcending regional and communal divisions, and fostering a newfound sense of unity in the fight against oppression. Many individuals who had once viewed the British presence as benign or beneficial now recognized the moral imperative to challenge their authority, leading to a surge in activism, protests, and the formation of revolutionary organizations that would ultimately reshape the trajectory of India’s quest for freedom.

The British response to the burgeoning nationalist sentiments often lacked sensitivity, further alienating the Indian populace and ignoring the deep-rooted cultural and historical grievances that had long been simmering beneath the surface. The introduction of repressive measures, such as the Rowlatt Act, which curtailed civil liberties and allowed for the detention of individuals without trial, stoked further resentment among citizens who yearned for justice and autonomy. This draconian legislation was viewed as an outright assault on the Indian way of life, exacerbating feelings of disenfranchisement and injustice. Consequently, the events following the Amritsar Massacre, where unarmed protesters were brutally fired upon, proved pivotal in uniting various factions within Indian society against colonial governance. People from diverse backgrounds, ranging from intellectuals to workers, found common ground in their demand for rights, leading to an increased push for independence and setting the stage for significant movements and protests in the years to come, such as the Non-Cooperation Movement and the Civil Disobedience Movement, which would further galvanize the Indian populace and inspire generations to stand against imperial rule.

Note:

(1) “If I differ from the right hon. Gentleman’s conclusions that that supplied any justification for the present Bill, it is because I really cannot see as regards many of the concessions which we have been asked to make, that they have any relation to those aspirations or to any other class of political reform aimed at, which Lord Morley professes to have any sympathy, or which he is desirous to meet. He tells himself that political reforms in India may be roughly divided into two classes. On the one extreme you have the party which aims at the total exclusion from India of Great Britain altogether, the class of reformer concerning whom Lord Morley has no other prescription except—to use his own words—”stern, unbending repression.” On the other hand, you have those who undoubtedly recognise the necessity for British Administration. They only desire it to be assisted by the influence of native advice. Between these two extremes you have a large body of native opinion, which fixes its eyes on the dream of Colonial self government, an ideal which Lord Morley tells us he himself believes to be wholly impracticable, and which he thinks these reformers are going to abandon as a result of the concessions which he is now conferring. If I really entertained that view I should certainly not criticise this Bill, but be enthusiastic in its favour. Is there the slightest solid reason to believe that the effect of this Bill will be what Lord Morley thinks? Primâ facie, if we take that part of the Bill which refers to legislative councils, is it reasonable to suggest 512that that part of the Bill is likely to divert the political energies and capacities of the people from the more barren task of irresponsible criticism, into the more fertile but more laborious task of active administration? I should say it was likely to have exactly the contrary effect. I am confirmed in that view by the published opinion of one of the leaders of the various reform parties in India. It was published a few days ago in “The Times.” Perhaps the House will allow me to read it:— Mr. Mitter struck me as holding inure advanced views than any other Bengali I encountered; but perhaps it was only that he declared his convictions with a more engaging frankness than the rest. He spoke of the reform scheme with contempt. He had declared it to he utterly inadequate on the day it was announced, and he adhered to his view. No one was really satisfied with the scheme. They would never be satisfied, and never rest, until they had complete control of the finances of their country. The money was theirs, and they had a right to say how it should be spent. Not only would the scheme not allay agitation but it was certain to increase it. Then there is the following:— Dr. Ashutosh Mookerjee, Judge of the Calcutta High Court, and Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University, stands in yet another category among the public men of Bengal. He has always held aloof from the Congress, but in breadth of knowledge and intellectual power he is probably the greatest living Bengali. Dr. Mookerjee in a conversation expressed general approval of the reforms, which he thought more than generous’; but with characteristic candour he added that he did not think they had made any deep impression upon the political tendencies now at work in India. The effusive expressions of thanks in Bengal had been ‘forced’ and ‘unreal.’ and a different, note would soon be sounded. No concessions would really satisfy any but the must moderate groups of politicians in India, and the British Government must be prepared for a steady continuance of agitation. He saw no sign of lasting political peace. Then lastly:— Mr. Surendra Nath Banerjee, the editor of the “Bengalee,” belongs to another school of political thought, but at present he claims to be heart and soul with the Moderates, is an enthusiastic supporter of the whole of the reforms, but only us an instalment. He and his supporters, he said, would never be satisfied until they had attained self-government on colonial lines,’ but he admitted that they had received as many concessions as they could expect just now, though, there ought to have been some degree of real financial control. The “Pioneer” noted an earlier opinion of his, at the moment when this reform scheme was first published, in which he said:— We asked for definite and effective control over finances and executive Government. I cannot say we have got either, but we have obtained substantial concessions which will prepare the way for those great ends. I regard the new scheme as a beginning of Parliamentary institutions, That seems to show that so far from native reformers in India being willing, as the result of this scheme, to abandon their own ideals of Colonial self-government, on the contrary they regard these concessions 513as merely affording a vantage ground for claiming further constitutional changes. As regards a considerable part of these proposals in reference to Legislative Councils set forth, it is in any case probably inevitable, certainly a perfectly legitimate and defensible development of the policy which the right hon. Gentleman referred to as the policy of 1851 and of 1892. I do not, for instance, quarrel with the proposed increase in the size of the legislative councils, although I am not quite sure that the right hon. Gentleman is correct in stating that the total numbers insisted upon in the case of the legislative councils are those which were recommended by the Government of India; it is certainly not the same as was recommended by the Government of India in its published despatch. Of course it has certain disadvantages. It will throw a great deal of work on the officials. But I quite recognise that any disadvantages of that kind may be more than outweighed by the advantage gained in giving to these councils a more representative character. At any rate, a somewhat considerable increase in the size of these legislative councils is indispensable if you are to retain the official element in anything like its present form. Nor do I quarrel with the power proposed to be given to these new councils in regard to questioning Ministers or criticising their general financial and administrative policy. I think the right hon. Gentleman is perfectly justified in saying that such occasions will give to the Government itself opportunities which it does not now possess of defending and explaining its policy and of repudiating misrepresentations. All this harmonises naturally with the conception of making these legislative councils more useful as advisory and consultative bodies. But when you go further than that, when you give to these legislative councils power to initiate legislation themselves, when you give them the power of not only criticising but of passing resolutions condemning the financial policy of the Government, when you give them the power of passing motions which are nominally and theoretically regarded as only a recommendation of advice to the Government, but would in fact be regarded as tantamount to a vote of censure on the Administration, and when, lastly, you go further and give to unofficial members of these councils an actual majority, then it seems to me perfectly idle to suggest that you are merely developing and extending the principles of 1892. You are in fact transforming and revolutionising the whole character of those bodies. Nothing that the right hon. Gentleman has said this afternoon has in the least explained to me why in the teeth of the opinions of the Government of India the Secretary of State for India should insist on abolishing the official majority on these legislative councils. The Government of India has clearly expressed no opinion on that subject but one. When the subject was first raised in the despatch of August, 1907, they used these words, which do not merely apply to the officials of the legislative council, but apply to all legislative councils. They said:— We have stated our reasons for deeming it essential to retain the power of procuring in the last resort the support of a majority of officials In our Legislative Councils. The principle of an official majority was accepted by His Majesty’s Government in the correspondence which took place last year, and was embodied, with their authority, in our letter of 24th August, 1907. We can discover nothing in the present correspondence that would justify us in proposing its surrender. It is obvious that under existing constitutional conditions the Government cannot resign; it must be able to settle the Budget and procure supplies for the service of the country; and it cannot divest itself of the power to give effect by legislation to the decisions of His Majesty’s Government. Those non-officials who approach the subject from its practical side, clearly realise the anomaly of the Executive Government being placed in a permanent minority. In the scheme submitted to us by the Hon. Mr. Gokhale, who may be taken to represent the better-informed section of Indian publicists, he carefully guards himself against any such idea. On the Councils outlined by him the Government is ‘assured of a standing majority behind it,’ and the head of the Government is further vested with a general veto. He asks only for ‘a minority—but a respectable minority’ of non-official members.’ In all provinces the opinions which carry most weight, owing to the position of the writers or their experience as members of a. Legislative Council, proceed on similar lines; though the strength of the official majorities proposed by them differs slightly. They have not changed their views in the last despatch published in November. There is another consideration which, to my mind, makes it all the more regrettable that Lord Morley should insist on the abolition of the official majority, contrary to the opinion which he originally expressed, and the views which the Government of India entertained apparently up to a very recent date. The Government of India itself, in dealing with the question of the constitution of the provincial assemblies, have gone considerably beyond anything which the Provincial Governments had recommended themselves. With a passion for uniformity, which, I confess, I find I have a good deal of difficulty to understand, in view of their own statements repeated by the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon as to the impossibility of applying to all the different parts of India precisely the same principles and conditions—they have insisted, in spite of the advice of the provincial councils, on levelling up the total numbers of these legislative councils in every case except Assam, to the number of fifty. In every case they have insisted on increasing the number of elective members, and in. every case insisted on equalising the official and unofficial members of the council in spite of the opinion, apparently, expressed by Madras in a despatch that they were very doubtful that under these conditions they could carry on the Government at all. Therefore, even under the proposals of the Government, there was to be a balance, an equality between the official and the non-official members, and the only way by which the Government could obtain an official majority was by the casting vote of the Lieutenant-Governor. And now the Secretary of State comes down and sweeps away even this precarious safeguard without being able to quote in favour of his action a single opinion of any kind except that quoted by the right hon. Gentleman just now, the opinion of the Government of Bombay. The opinion of the Government of Bombay, as cited in the despatch of the Government of India to the Secretary of State, was cited only to be rejected. Therefore, if we are to attach any importance to the language, or any great weight to the opinion of the Government of Bombay on this subject, does it really justify any other conclusion than that they should allow the Government of Bombay to try this experiment of the unofficial majority which they themselves recommended in propria personœ before they enforced it on all the other local Governments? As to the argument which Lord Morley adduced in favour of the unofficial majority, it seems to me that in so far as it is valid at all it would carry him very much further than he is himself prepared to go. The argument, for instance, that a set of politicians who find themselves in a permanent minority are likely to become sulky and irreconcilable, is the argument of the right hon. Gentlemen that, after all, it is not very likely that all the unofficial members, the nominated and elected members, will combine together against the Government—those two arguments are arguments for doing away with the majority of the. Viceroy’s Council, just as much as the majority of the provincial councils. On the other hand, if it is true, as Lord Morley himself said, that it is inadvisable to bring the veto of the Govenor-General into play more than can be helped, it is surely pro tanto undesirable to bring into play the veto of the provincial governors in the case of the provincial councils oftener than is necessary, and still more inadvisable, at the moment when you are asked to go further in the direction of decentralisation, that you should bring in the veto of the Governor-General in the last resort in order to override the opinion of a refractory provincial council. Lord MacDonnell pointed out in another place that one of the items in a programme of the Congress party many years ago was that the Govenor-General should have the power to override the majority of his Council, but in that event an appeal should lie to a Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Affairs, which they desire to see established, and I cannot help thinking that this change is very likely to give rise to a renewal of a demand of that kind. Then there is another consideration about doing away with the official majority, which was alluded to by the Government of India, and which has been overlooked by the Secretary of State. The Government of India, in dealing with the question of representation, said:— In framing these proposals we have not lost sight of the fact that the interests of landlords and tenants are by no means identical, that our electorates will consist mainly, if not exclusively, of the former class, and that no means can at present be devised of giving” the great body of tenants direct representation on the legislative councils. Their interests, however, are in no danger of being overlooked. In the debate in the House of Lords on 6th March, 1890, both Lord Ripon and Lord Kimberley pointed out that when the Bengal Tenancy Act was under discussion in Lord Dufferin’s Council ‘the only representative of the ryots was the Government.’ Among the official members of the legislative councils there will always be some experts in Indian land questions, who will be qualified to represent the views of the cultivators. Lord Northcote pointed out when he was Governor of Bombay when a Bill was passing through that Council to protect the interests of the tenants against the moneylenders it was received with unequivocal opposition by the whole of the unofficial members. I submit to the House that in their great anxiety to disclaim all bureaucratic sympathy, the Government of India, in abolishing this unofficial majority, are in reality running the risk of depriving of the protection and security they have hitherto had a very large class of the population for which the Government of India itself acknowledges it cannot devise any satisfactory system of representation at all. There is really only one argument that I know of that can possibly be brought forward to justify abolishing the official majority on the provincial councils while you refuse to do it on the Viceroy’s Council. That was the reason given by the hon. Gentleman in his opening speech. You can do it, they say, with comparative safety, because these provincial councils cannot do much mischief; the number of subjects is limited by Statute, if they refuse to pass legislation which is desired the Governor General can exercise his concurrent powers of legislation, and if they propose legislation of which the Governor General disapproves he can always exercise his veto. That is an argument which cuts both ways. I cannot imagine anything more detrimental to the interests of sound finance or more likely to demoralise politics in India than to place politicians under the temptation that they can always vote for a measure which they know to be popular, although they know it to be unsound, with the’ certain knowledge that in the last resort they can depend upon some other authority to step in in order to avert the consequences of their own decision. I cannot see any public object to be observed by giving to these councils a show of control without the reality and giving them the power of discrediting the power of the Administration without having the responsibility of creating another. I do not believe you could take a step more certain to make the local councils centres of political agitation and more certain to shake the general confidence of the public in India in the firmness, strength, and stability of our rule” (Earl PERCY INDIAN COUNCILS BILL [Lords.] – HC Deb 01 April 1909 vol 3 cc496-601496
§Order for second reading read. §Motion made and Question proposed “That the Bill be read a second time.”

(2) Much has been written about what happened on 13 April 1919 in the Jallianwala Bagh. Jallianwala is a place and “bagh” is the Punjabi word for “park”. I myself come from the area of Amritsar and, even though I was not around at that time, I heard many stories passed down the generations, especially through my grandmother. I have also visited the park many times and seen for myself the bullet holes in the walls and the well from which 150 bodies were extracted. Around the park, many stories are written on placards and stones, and it is impossible to come away from the place without tears rolling down your face. It is a shocking event to recall, even after 100 years. As Winston Churchill said during a debate in the other place:

“That is an episode which appears to me to be without precedent or parallel in the modern history of the British Empire. It is an event of an entirely different order from any of those of tragical occurrences which take place when troops are brought into collision with the civil population. It is an extraordinary event, a monstrous event, an event which stands in singular and sinister isolation”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/7/1920; col. 1725.]

People, including children, had gathered at the Jallianwala Bagh to protest about the arrest of some of their leaders earlier in the week. Martial law was in force at the time. Brigadier General Dyer took the view that the gathering was not only illegal but an expression of defiance against the authorities. Ordering his soldiers to the spot, he blocked all the exits. The people were trapped like rats, and fired upon without warning or any order to disperse. The firing continued on the crowd until the soldiers ran out of ammunition. It is not clear how many people, including children, died that day. But many who were injured and died later were not counted—they had been afraid of going to hospital in case they would be arrested for having defied the martial law. (UK Parliament, Lords, Amritsar Massacre: Centenary
Volume 795: debated on Tuesday 19 February 2019)

Date: 11/07/2024

Tanmoy Bhattacharyya

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