Supreme Court Daily Digest (30th Jan 2026): Arbitration, Professional Misconduct by Advocate, Demolition of Residential Building

Supreme court case summary today

1️⃣ M/S Aarsuday Projects vs. Jogen Chowdhury

Case No.: C.A. No. 2920/2018 (2026 INSC 93)
Diary No.: 28062 / 2013
Order Date: 29 Jan 2026

Appeal From: Calcutta High Court judgment dated 21/22.08.2013.

Core Issue: Whether the High Court was justified in ordering the demolition of a residential building constructed by the appellant in Santiniketan on grounds it was built on preserved “khoai” land and with illegal permissions.

Supreme Court’s Holding: Allowed the appeals. The High Court’s judgment and demolition order are set aside.

Key Findings & Rationale:

1. No Proof of “Khoai” Land: The High Court’s reliance on reports from the District Magistrate and Pollution Control Board was misplaced. These reports contained conjectures and did not conclusively prove the specific plot was “khoai” land. The WBPCB noted the adjacent area was low-lying.
2. Valid Permissions Obtained: The appellant secured requisite approvals: building plan was vetted by Zilla Parishad; SSDA granted an NOC for land conversion after inspection by a committee; revenue authority approved the conversion. Any procedural irregularity was curable and not fatal.
3. Selective & Mala Fide Litigation: The PIL was not bona fide. Several petitioners themselves owned houses in the same land parcel, selectively targeting the new construction while ignoring existing ones.
4. Property Rights Protected: Demolition is a drastic remedy unjustified where statutory development plans earmarked the land for residential use and the builder acted on official permissions.

Final Order: The demolition order, compensation, and costs imposed by the High Court are quashed. Adverse remarks against SSDA officials are expunged. Costs of ₹1,00,000 imposed on the original PIL petitioners for lacking bona fides.

Highlights:

Costs levied on petitioners.
Demolition Order Reversed.

“Khoai” land claim unsubstantiated.

Builder acted on official approvals.

PIL found mala fide and selective.

2️⃣ Monty Goyal vs. Navrang Singh

Case No.: C.A. No. 77/2026 (2026 INSC 94)
Diary No.: 75503 / 2025
Order Date: 29 Jan 2026 (NON-REPORTABLE)

Case: Appeal under Section 38, Advocates Act, 1961, against a Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India (BCI) judgment dated 04.04.2025.

Issue: Whether the BCI’s finding of professional misconduct against the appellant-advocate is sustainable.

Material Facts: The appellant-advocate was engaged to file a quashing petition based on a compromise. The High Court initially allowed it subject to cost deposit. Due to non-deposit of costs, the petition was dismissed for want of prosecution. The order was later recalled, and the FIR was ultimately quashed. The respondent-complainant filed a disciplinary complaint but later submitted a sworn affidavit dated 15.12.2022, withdrawing all allegations and expressing satisfaction with the advocate’s services, stating the complaint arose from a misunderstanding.

BCI Decision: The Disciplinary Committee, overlooking the withdrawal affidavit, held the advocate guilty of professional misconduct for failure to ensure cost deposit and imposed a penalty of ₹1 lakh.

Court’s Findings & Decision:

1. The BCI completely glossed over the material withdrawal affidavit, failing to note the complaint’s substratum had vanished.
2. The finding of guilt was based on bald allegations without examining the complainant on oath or allowing cross-examination, rendering it legally unsustainable.
3. The impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal is allowed.

Highlights:

Outcome: BCI order set aside; appeal allowed.

Withdrawal Affidavit: Complainant’s sworn affidavit withdrawing allegations was vital and overlooked by the BCI.

Procedural Flaw: Finding of misconduct made without evidence or cross-examination.

3️⃣ Jagdeep Chowgule vs. Sheela Chowgule

Case No.: C.A. Nos. 574–575/2026 (2026 INSC 92)
Diary No.: 55611 / 2024
Order Date: 29 Jan 2026

If an arbitral tribunal – appointed by the High Court or by the parties concerned – does not complete proceedings within the required or extended time limit, can an application to extend time under Section 29A of the Act can be filed before the High Court or the Civil Court?

Subject: Jurisdiction for applications under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”).

Question of Law: Whether an application for extension of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A(4) of the Act must be filed before the High Court that appointed the tribunal under Section 11, or before the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act.

Key Holdings:

1. Exclusive Definition Governs: The term “Court” for the purpose of Section 29A is exhaustively defined in Section 2(1)(e). This means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district (or a High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction). The definition applies unless the context otherwise requires.
2. Section 11 Appointment is Limited: The power of the High Court or Supreme Court under Section 11 is confined to the prima facie examination and appointment of arbitrators. Upon constitution of the tribunal, the appointing court becomes functus officio and retains no ongoing supervisory role over the arbitral proceedings.
3. No Jurisdictional Anomaly: The perceived conflict—where a civil court (deemed “inferior”) might extend or substitute an arbitrator appointed by a High Court—is legally untenable. Jurisdiction flows from statute, not judicial hierarchy. The power under Section 29A(6) to substitute arbitrators is a curial supervision power vested in the “Court” under Section 2(1)(e).
4. Section 42 Inapplicable: The jurisdictional provision of Section 42 does not apply to applications under Section 11. Therefore, the fact that an arbitrator was appointed by a High Court does not attract Section 42 to confer exclusive jurisdiction on that High Court for all subsequent applications.

Conclusion: All applications for extension of time under Section 29A(4), irrespective of whether the arbitral tribunal was appointed by the parties or by the High Court/Supreme Court under Section 11, must be filed before the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act.

Highlights:

• Court Definition: Section 2(1)(e) provides the exhaustive meaning of “Court”.
• Functus Officio: High Court’s role under Section 11 ends upon appointment.
• Hierarchy Irrelevant: Perceived conflict between courts is not a valid contextual exception to the statutory definition.
• Final Authority: The Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction is the competent forum for Section 29A applications.

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