Supreme Court Daily Digest (28th Jan 2026): Waqf Tribunal, BNSS, Land Acquisition Case Laws

Read the Supreme Court’s key rulings for 28 Jan 2026: Jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunal, procedure under BNSS Section 175, land acquisition award validity, and more. Full case analysis included.

Supreme Court case summary today

HABIB ALLADIN VS. MOHAMMED AHMED

SLP(C) No. 2937/2022 – Diary Number 1776 / 2022 – 28-Jan-2026 (2026 INSC 90)

Supreme Court clarified the jurisdictional scope of the Waqf Tribunal under the Waqf Act, 1995. The Court held that the Tribunal’s authority to determine whether a property constitutes waqf property is limited to those properties already specified in the official “list of auqaf” (published under Section 5(2) or registered under Section 37). The ruling affirmed the precedent set in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf, stating that Section 83 of the Act does not independently confer expansive jurisdiction on the Tribunal.

Consequently, where a property is not listed or registered as a waqf, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to entertain disputes, including simple injunction suits regarding its status. The Court emphasized that the civil court’s jurisdiction is ousted only concerning matters expressly required by the Act to be determined by the Tribunal. On the facts, since the disputed property was not included in the list of auqaf, the plaint before the Tribunal was rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC.

M/S PREMIUM TRANSMISSION PVT. LIMITED VS. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

C.A. No. 532/2026 – Diary Number 17773 / 2023 – 27-Jan-2026 (2026 INSC 87)

The Supreme Court dismissed the employer’s appeal challenging the reference of an industrial dispute to the Industrial Court. The dispute involved contract labourers seeking regularization and parity with direct employees, alleging the labour contracts were a sham to deny their rights. The employer’s preliminary objection—that the reference was invalid because the union approached the conciliation officer without first serving a formal demand on the management—was rejected.

No Mandatory Prior Demand: A formal written demand to the employer is not a sine qua non for the existence of an industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, unless it involves a public utility service.
Apprehended Dispute is Valid Ground: The appropriate government is empowered under Section 10(1) to refer not only an existing dispute but also an “apprehended” industrial dispute to prevent unrest. The conciliation process under Section 12 does not require exhausting bilateral negotiations first.
Sham Contract Dispute Requires Adjudication: Where the core dispute is whether a labour contract is genuine or a sham/camouflage, the question involves a tripartite relationship and disputed facts. The proper forum for such adjudication is the Industrial Court, and the reference cannot be aborted at the threshold on a procedural technicality.

XXXXXXX VS. STATE OF KERALA

Crl.A. No. 4629/2025 – Diary Number 8626 / 2025 – 27-Jan-2026 (2026 INSC 88)

In Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra (2026 INSC 90), the Supreme Court clarified the interplay between Sections 175(3) and 175(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The case involved allegations of sexual assault against police officers. The Court held that Section 175(4) is not a standalone provision but operates as a procedural adjunct to Section 175(3). Consequently, a complaint alleging an offense by a public servant in the discharge of official duties must still comply with the mandatory requirement of being supported by an affidavit as stipulated in Section 175(3). The term “complaint” in Section 175(4) is contextually interpreted to mean a written complaint with an affidavit, not an oral allegation.

The ruling emphasizes a two-tier protective mechanism for public servants: first, under Section 175(4), where a Magistrate must call for a report from the superior officer and consider the public servant’s version before ordering investigation; second, under Section 218, requiring prior sanction for cognizance (though this is waived for sexual offenses).

The Court also found the High Court’s Single Judge erred in interpreting Section 175(4) via writ jurisdiction while parallel magisterial proceedings were pending, upholding the Division Bench’s reversal. The matter was remitted to the Magistrate for fresh consideration in accordance with the clarified procedure.

NIRAJ JAIN VS. COMPETENT AUTHORITY CUM ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR, JAGDALPUR

C.A. No. 566/2026 – Diary Number 8739 / 2025 – 27-Jan-2026 (2026 INSC 86) Non-reportable

The Supreme Court held that setting aside a land acquisition award due to fraud, collusion, or unjust enrichment in specific cases does not automatically invalidate the entire award for all landowners. The case involved the acquisition of land for a Special Rail Project in Chhattisgarh, where allegations of excessive compensation were made against only five specific landowners in collusion with officials. The High Court had erroneously set aside the entire award, including the appellant’s claim, even though the appellant was not implicated in the fraud and was not a party to the earlier proceedings.

The principle of severability applies to land acquisition awards. An award tainted by illegality concerning specific parties can be set aside only qua those parties, provided there is no inherent defect affecting the entire acquisition process. The wrongful acts of a few cannot vitiate the rights of untainted beneficiaries.

The Court restored the appellant’s original award and subsequent arbitration enhancement, directing disbursement within three months. It clarified that the Railways Act, 1989, and its Rules do not confer any power of review on the Competent Authority or Arbitrator to unilaterally cancel awards.

BERNARD LYNGDOH PHAWA VS. THE STATE OF MEGHALAYA

Crl.A. No. 3738/2023 – Diary Number 47207 / 2023 – 27-Jan-2026 (2026 INSC 85)

The Supreme Court overturned a High Court judgment that had reversed a trial court’s acquittal in a murder case based on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution’s case hinged on the “last seen together” theory, recoveries of the victim’s possessions and an alleged murder weapon (a rope), and confessions by the accused.

The Court found the evidence insufficient to meet the stringent standards for convicting on circumstantial evidence as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda. The “last seen” testimony was unreliable, with no proof the deceased was with the accused immediately before death. Recoveries were flawed: the body’s discovery was not properly linked to the accused, and the rope lacked forensic connection to the crime. The confessions were deemed inadmissible due to procedural irregularities (including discrepancies in dates and a failure to offer legal assistance) and were largely exculpatory or uncorroborated. Medical evidence was inconclusive between homicide and suicide.

Holding that the High Court improperly substituted its own view without finding the trial court’s acquittal to be an impossible conclusion, the Supreme Court restored the acquittal, emphasizing the reinforced presumption of innocence following an acquittal and the need for a complete chain of incriminating circumstances.

BIHAR INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. M/S SCOPE SALES PVT. LTD.

C.A. No. 929/2020 – Diary Number 41054 / 2014 – 23-Jan-2026 (2026 INSC 89)

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s Division Bench order and restored the Single Judge’s dismissal of M/s. Scope’s writ petition, thereby upholding the cancellation of its industrial plot allotment by the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (BIADA). The allotment was cancelled to reserve the land for the establishment and future expansion of IIT Patna, a project of significant national importance and public interest.

The Court emphasized the discretionary nature of writ jurisdiction and the principle that courts must balance individual rights against the larger public good. It held that the Single Judge’s decision to deny relief—considering the unforeseen need for the land for a premier educational institution, the bona fide actions of BIADA, and the offer of an alternative plot—was a plausible and reasonable exercise of discretion. An intra-court appellate bench should not substitute its view merely because a different interpretation is possible, especially when no perversity is found in the original order.

While protecting M/s. Scope’s interests, the Court directed BIADA to refund the principal amount of ₹3,38,98,000 with 7% annual interest and mandated that the plot be used exclusively for educational purposes. The ruling reaffirms that individual commercial interests must yield to overriding public interest in projects vital for national development.