Athato Brahma Gigyasa (अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा) – BSSV – 1.1.1

Encyclopedia of Sanatan Dharma

Sarvarthapedia of Hindu Scriptures and Interpretation

Brahma Sutram by Badarayana

Introduction to Brahma Sutram by Sankara

शारीरक मीमांसा सूत्रभाष्य

जिज्ञासाधिकरणम्

श्रीमच्छंकर भगवतः कृतौ शारीरक मीमांसा सूत्र भाष्य

1.1.1

अत्र अथशब्दः आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते नाधिकारार्थः ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात् मङ्गलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात् अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एव ह्यथशब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च फलत आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकात्। सति च आनन्तर्यार्थत्वे यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेनापेक्षते एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि यत्पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षते तद्वक्तव्यम्। स्वाध्यायाध्ययनानन्तर्यं तु समानम्। नन्विह कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं विशेषः न धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागपि अधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः। यथा च हृदयाद्यवदानानामानन्तर्यनियमः क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात् न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः शेषशेषित्वे अधिकृताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावात् धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः। फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च। अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानम् तच्चानुष्ठानापेक्षम् निःश्रेयसफलं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानम् न चानुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम् भव्यश्च धर्मो जिज्ञास्यो न ज्ञानकालेऽस्ति पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रत्वात् इह तु भूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं नित्यवृत्तत्वान्न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम्। चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च।

या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणम् सा स्वविषये नियुञ्जानैव पुरुषमवबोधयति ब्रह्मचोदना तु पुरुषमवबोधयत्येव केवलम् अवबोधस्य चोदनाजन्यत्वान्न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते यथा अक्षार्थसंनिकर्षेणार्थावबोधे तद्वत्।

तस्मात्किमपि वक्तव्यम् यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति। उच्यते नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः शमदमादिसाधनसंपत् मुमुक्षुत्वं च। तेषु हि सत्सु प्रागपि धर्मजिज्ञासाया ऊर्ध्वं च शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च न विपर्यये। तस्मात् अथशब्देन यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यानन्तर्यमुपदिश्यते।।

अतःशब्दः हेत्वर्थः। यस्माद्वेद एव अग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयःसाधनानामनित्यफलतां दर्शयति तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते इत्यादिः तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् इत्यादिः तस्मात् यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या।।

ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा। ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम् जन्माद्यस्य यतः इति। अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरमाशङ्कितव्यम्। ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी न शेषे जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वाज्जिज्ञासायाः जिज्ञास्यान्तरानिर्देशाच्च। ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुध्यते संबन्धसामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वात् एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वमुत्सृज्य सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यात्। न व्यर्थः ब्रह्माश्रिताशेषविचारप्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वादिति चेत् न प्रधानपरिग्रहे तदपेक्षितानामप्यर्थाक्षिप्तत्वात्। ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेनाप्तुमिष्टतमत्वात्प्रधानम्। तस्मिन्प्रधाने जिज्ञासाकर्मणि परिगृहीते यैर्जिज्ञासितैर्विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति तान्यर्थाक्षिप्तान्येवेति न पृथक्सूत्रयितव्यानि। यथा राजासौ गच्छति इत्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनमुक्तं भवति तद्वत्। श्रुत्यनुगमाच्च। यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म इति प्रत्यक्षमेव ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति। तच्च कर्मणिषष्ठीपरिग्रहे सूत्रेणानुगतं भवति। तस्माद्ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी।।

ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा। अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म फलविषयत्वादिच्छायाः। ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म। ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः निःशेषसंसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिबर्हणात्। तस्माद्ब्रह्म
जिज्ञासितव्यम्।।

तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात् यदि प्रसिद्धं न जिज्ञासितव्यम्। अथाप्रसिद्धं नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुमिति। उच्यते अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्।

ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धत्वादयोऽर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते बृंहतेर्धातोरर्थानुगमात्। सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः। सर्वो ह्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति न नाहमस्मि इति। यदि हि नात्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः स्यात् सर्वो लोकः नाहमस्मि इति प्रतीयात्।

आत्मा च ब्रह्म। यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति ततो ज्ञातमेवेत्यजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नम् न तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः। देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मेति प्राकृता जना लौकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः। इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनान्यात्मेत्यपरे। मन इत्यन्ये। विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके। शून्यमित्यपरे। अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्तेत्यपरे। भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्तेत्येके।

अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरिति केचित्। आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपरे। एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्ना युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः। तत्राविचार्य यत्किंचित्प्रतिपद्यमानो निःश्रेयसात्प्रतिहन्येत अनर्थं चेयात्। तस्माद्ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते।।

ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तम्।

किंलक्षणं पुनस्तद्बह्मेत्यत आह भगवान्सूत्रकारः

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यास्य श्रीगोविन्दभगवत्पूज्यपादशिष्यस्य श्रीमच्छंकरभगवतः कृतौ शारीरकमीमांसासूत्रभाष्य

English Translation of SV 1.1.1

Here, the word atha is to be understood in the sense of immediacy/succession (ānantaryārtha), and not in the sense of commencement of a subject (adhikārārtha), because Brahma-jijñāsā is not something for which there can be an adhikāra in that sense, and because there is no syntactical integration (vākya-artha-samanvaya) of an auspicious purpose (maṅgala) with the sentence meaning. Indeed, the word atha, employed with another meaning, becomes by śruti conducive to maṅgala; and, as a consequence of its dependence upon what has been previously treated, it is inseparable from the sense of succession (ānantarya).

And when the meaning of ānantarya is accepted, just as Dharma-jijñāsā necessarily presupposes the previously completed study of the Veda, so also Brahma-jijñāsā must necessarily presuppose whatever has previously been completed and is required for it. The succession after the study of one’s own Veda (svādhyāyādhyayana) is common to both.

But it may be objected: here there is a particularity, namely, the succession after the understanding of karma, whereas in the case of Dharma-jijñāsā, even a person who has previously studied the Vedānta may undertake Brahma-jijñāsā. And just as, in the case of the hṛdaya and other avadānas, the rule of succession (ānantaraya-niyama) is intended because sequence (krama) is intended, so here sequence is not intended, because there is no pramāṇa for the relation of śeṣa–śeṣin or for the relation of adhikṛta–adhikāra between Dharma-jijñāsā and Brahma-jijñāsā. There is also a difference in the distinction of the fruit and the object to be desired to be known (phalajijñāsyabheda).

The fruit of Dharma-jñāna is abhyudaya, and that depends upon anuṣṭhāna. But the fruit of Brahma-jñāna is niḥśreyasa, and it does not depend upon any further anuṣṭhāna. Moreover, Dharma, being something to be brought into existence (bhāvya), is what is to be inquired into; it does not exist at the time of knowledge, because it is dependent upon the activity of the person (puruṣa-vyāpāra-tantra). Here, however, Brahman, which is already existent (bhūta), is what is to be inquired into; because it is eternally existent (nitya-vṛtta), it is not dependent upon the activity of the person.

There is also a difference in the operation of the injunction (codanā-pravṛtti).

For the injunction which is the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of Dharma, while engaging the person in its own sphere, itself makes him understand. But the Brahma-codanā merely makes the person understand. Since the understanding is produced by the codanā, the person is not engaged by the codanā in the act of understanding, just as, through the contact of the sense-organ with its object (akṣārtha-sannikarṣa), there is understanding of the object; so here also.

Therefore, something has to be stated as to what it is after which Brahma-jijñāsā is enjoined.

It is said: discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal (nityānitya-vastu-viveka), dispassion toward the enjoyment of objects here and hereafter (ihāmutrārtha-bhoga-virāga), the accomplishment of the means beginning with śama and dama (śamadamādi-sādhana-sampat), and the desire for liberation (mumukṣutva).

For, when these exist, Brahman can be inquired into and known even before Dharma-jijñāsā, and also after it; but not in the reverse situation. Therefore, by the word atha, the succession after the attainment of the means as stated above (yathokta-sādhana-sampatti) is being enjoined.

The word ataḥ has the meaning of cause (hetvartha).

Because the Veda itself shows the non-eternal nature of the fruits of Agnihotra and other means of śreyas, saying, for example, “Just as the world acquired by karma here is indeed exhausted, so likewise the world acquired by merit there is exhausted”, and so forth; and because it also shows through Brahma-jñāna the supreme human end (parama-puruṣārtha), saying, for example, “The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme (brahmavid āpnoti param)”, and so forth; therefore, after the attainment of the means stated above, Brahma-jijñāsā ought to be undertaken.

“Brahmaṇo jijñāsā” is Brahma-jijñāsā.

And Brahman is that whose characteristic will be stated later: “That from which the birth (janma), etc., of this [universe] is [derived] (janmādy asya yataḥ)”. Therefore, no alternative meaning such as class (jāti), etc., should be suspected for the word Brahman.

The expression “brahmaṇaḥ” is the genitive in the sense of the object (karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī), and not the genitive in the sense of relation or remainder (śeṣe), because jijñāsā requires an object to be inquired into (jijñāsyāpekṣatva) and because no other object of inquiry is separately stated.

But it may be objected: even if the genitive in the sense of śeṣa is accepted, there is no contradiction in taking Brahman as the object (karma) of jijñāsā, because a general relation (sambandha-sāmānya) rests upon a particular relation (viśeṣa-niṣṭha). Even so, abandoning the direct understanding of Brahman as the object and imagining its objecthood indirectly through a general relation would be a useless effort.

Not useless, it may be said, because the purpose is to declare an undertaking of the entire inquiry dependent upon Brahman (brahmāśrita-aśeṣa-vicāra).

No. Because, when the principal (pradhāna) is accepted, the meanings required by it are also implied by the meaning of the sentence (arthākṣipta).

For Brahman is the principal, because it is the most desired thing to be attained through knowledge. When that principal, namely Brahman, is accepted as the object of jijñāsā, all those things without which Brahman cannot be inquired into are themselves implied by the meaning and therefore need not be separately stated in additional sūtras.

Just as, when it is said, “That king is going” (rājā asau gacchati), the going of the king together with his retinue (saparivāra) is understood, so here also.

There is also conformity with śruti. The śrutis beginning with “That from which these beings are born (yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante)”, and so forth, directly show that Brahman is the object of jijñāsā, saying “Seek to know That; That is Brahman (tad vijijñāsasva, tad brahma)”. And this directly follows the sūtra when the genitive in the sense of the object (karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī) is accepted.

Therefore, “brahmaṇaḥ” is the genitive in the sense of the object (karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī).

“The desire to know (jñātum icchā) is jijñāsā.”

Knowledge extending up to apprehension/realisation (avagati-paryanta) is the object and result (karma-phala-viṣaya) of the desire expressed by the desiderative formation (san-vācyā icchā). For Brahman is desired to be apprehended through knowledge, through a pramāṇa.

Indeed, the apprehension of Brahman (brahmāvagati) is the puruṣārtha, because it removes the evils beginning with avidyā, which are the entire seed of saṃsāra (niḥśeṣa-saṃsāra-bīja-avidyādy-anartha-nibarhaṇa).

Therefore, Brahman ought to be inquired into (brahma jijñāsitavyam).

But then, is that Brahman something well-known (prasiddha) or not well-known (aprasiddha)?

If it is well-known, it should not be inquired into.

If it is not well-known, then it cannot be inquired into.

It is said: Brahman indeed exists, possessing the nature of eternal purity (nitya-śuddha), knowledge (buddha), and liberation (mukta), and endowed with omniscience (sarvajña) and omnipotence (sarvaśakti-samanvita).

For, when the word Brahman is etymologically derived (vyutpādyamāna), meanings such as eternal purity, etc., are understood, following the meaning of the verbal root bṛh, “to grow, expand, become great.”

And because Brahman is the Self of all (sarvasyātmatva), the existence of Brahman is well-established (brahmāstitva-prasiddhi).

For everyone apprehends the existence of the Self (ātmāstitva). No one thinks, “I am not” (nāham asmi).

Indeed, if the existence of the Self were not established, then the whole world would apprehend, “I am not.”

The Self is Brahman (ātmā ca brahma).

If, then, Brahman is well-known in the world as the Self (ātmatvena), it follows again that it is already known and therefore should not be an object of inquiry.

But not so, because there is disagreement concerning its particular nature (tad-viśeṣa).

Ordinary people and the Lokāyatikas hold that the body alone, qualified by consciousness (dehamātraṃ caitanya-viśiṣṭam), is the Self.

Others hold that the senses themselves, being conscious, are the Self.

Others hold that the mind (manas) is the Self.

Others hold that mere consciousness (vijñāna-mātra) is momentary (kṣaṇika).

Others hold that it is void (śūnya).

Others hold that there exists a saṃsārin, a doer and experiencer (kartā bhoktā), distinct from the body and so forth.

Some hold that he is merely an experiencer and not a doer (bhoktā eva kevalaṃ na kartā).

Some hold that there exists, distinct from this, an Īśvara, omniscient and omnipotent (sarvajñaḥ sarvaśaktiḥ).

Others hold that the Self is that experiencer (ātmā sa bhoktuḥ).

Thus, there are many who hold mutually divergent views (bahavo vipratipannāḥ), relying upon reasoning (yukti), scriptural statements (vākya), and pseudo-reasoning or apparent reasoning (tadābhāsa).

Among these, if a person, without inquiry (avicārya), accepts whatever happens to be presented, he would be obstructed from niḥśreyasa and would incur anartha.

Therefore, through the presentation of Brahma-jijñāsā, an inquiry into the sentences of the Vedānta (Vedānta-vākya-mīmāṃsā), equipped with reasoning that does not contradict those sentences (tad-avirodhi-tarka-upakaraṇa), and having niḥśreyasa as its purpose (niḥśreyasa-prayojana), is now being undertaken.

It has been said:

“Brahman ought to be inquired into (brahma jijñāsitavyam).”

Then, what is the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of that Brahman?

To this the Bhagavān Sūtrakāra replies:

“Janmādy asya yataḥ” — “That from which the birth, etc., of this [universe] is [derived].”

Thus ends the passage in the work of Śrīmat Paramahaṃsa-Parivrājaka-Ācārya Śrī Govinda-Bhagavatpūjyapāda’s disciple, Śrīmat Śaṅkara Bhagavat, namely the Śārīraka-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra-Bhāṣya.

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Sanskrit Vocabulary SV 1.1.1