M/s. Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Appellant Versus CHURCH of SOUTH India Trust Association, Madras [ALL SC 1992 APRIL ]

AIRAIR All India Reporter 1992 SC 1439 : (1992) 2 SCRSupreme Court Reports It is the official Reporter of the reportable decisions delivered by the Supreme Court of India. It is published under the authority of the Supreme Court of India by the Controller of Publications, Government of India. 999 : (1992) 3 SCCSCC Supreme Court Cases 1 : JT 1992 (3) SC 98 : (1992) 1 SCALE 947

(SUPREME COURT OF INDIAArticle 124 of the Constitution of India Constitution of India > 124. Supreme Court (1) There shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven other Judges. (2) Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty-five years: Provided that-- (a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office (b) a Judge may be removed from his office in the manner provided in clause (4). (2A) The age of a Judge of the Supreme Court shall be determined by such authority and in such manner as Parliament may by law provide. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court unless he is a citizen of India and-- (a) has been for at least five years a Judge of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession; or (b) has been for at least ten years an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such courts in succession; or (c) is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist. (4) A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-third of the members of the House present and voting has been presented to the President in the same session for such removal on the ground of proved misbehavior or incapacity. (5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the presentation of an address and for the investigation and proof of the misbehavior or incapacity of a Judge under clause (4): (6) Every person appointed to be a Judge of the Supreme Court shall, before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the President, or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule. (7) No person who has held office as a Judge of the Supreme Court shall plead or act in any court or before any authority within the territory of India.)

(Before: N. M. Kasliwal, M. M. Punchhi And S. C. Agrawal, JJ.)

Civil AppealCivil Appeal Vasant Ganesh Damle vs. Shrikant Trimbak Datar (AIR 2002 SC 1237) in the following words: "The appeal is considered to be an extension of the suit because U/S. 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate Court has the same powers as are conferred by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Such a power can be exercised by the appellate Court "as nearly as may be" exercised by the trial Court under the Code. If the powers conferred upon the trial Court are under a specified statute and not under the Code, it has to be ascertained as to whether such a power was intended to be exercised by the appellate Court as well. Such a position can be ascertained by having a reference to the specified law by keeping in mind the legislative intention of conferment of power on the appellate Court either expressly or by necessary implication." No. 2553 of 1991 (with C.A. No. 126 of 1992), Decided on: 29-04-1992.

Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985—Section 22—Companies Act, 1956—Sections 434, 433(e), 15(1) and 3(1)(o)—Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961—Sections 21(1), 29(1) and 50—Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Sections 22 and   16.

Counsel for the Parties:

Mr. C. N. Sree Kumar, Advocate, for Appellant

Mr. K. Madhava Reddy, Sr. Advocate, Mr. N. K. Gupta and N.D.B. Raju, Advocates with him, for Respondent.

JudgmentJudgment The statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order - CPC 2(9). It contains a concise statement of the case, points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision - Order 20 Rule 4(2).  Section 354 of CrPC requires that every judgment shall contain points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. Indian Supreme Court Decisions > Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts (Art 141 Indian Constitution) Civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court (Art 144) Supreme Court Network On Judiciary – Portal > Denning: “Judges do not speak, as do actors, to please. They do not speak, as do advocates, to persuade. They do not speak, as do historians, to recount the past. They speak to give Judgment. And in their judgments, you will find passages, which are worthy to rank with the greatest literature….” Law Points on Judgment Writing > The judge must write to provide an easy-to-understand analysis of the issues of law and fact which arise for decision. Judgments are primarily meant for those whose cases are decided by judges (State Bank of India and Another Vs Ajay Kumar Sood SC 2022)

S.C. Agrawal, J—These appeals filed by M/s.Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. raise questions involving the interpretation of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’.

2. The appellant is a public limited company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. It was set up with the object of manufacturing mopeds in collaboration with Cycle Peugot of France. It has set up a factory at Hirahalli in Tumkur districtDistrict India has 800 districts under 29 federal states and 8 union territories. Adilabad Agar-Malwa Agra Ahilyanagar Ahmedabad Aizawl Ajmer Akola Alappuzha Aligarh Alipurduar Alirajpur Alluri Sitharama Raju Almora Alwar Ambala Ambedkar Nagar Amethi Amravati Amreli Amritsar Amroha Anakapalli Anand Ananthapuramu Anantnag Anjaw Annamayya Anugul Anuppur Araria Ariyalur Arvalli Arwal Ashoknagar Auraiya Aurangabad Ayodhya Azamgarh Bagalkote Bageshwar Baghpat Bahraich Bajali Baksa Balaghat Balangir Baleshwar Ballari Ballia Balod Balodabazar-Bhatapara Balotra Balrampur Balrampur-Ramanujganj Banas Kantha Banda Bandipora Banka Bankura Banswara Bapatla Bara Banki Baramulla Baran Bareilly Bargarh Barmer Barnala Barpeta Barwani Bastar Basti Bathinda Beawar Beed Begusarai Belagavi Bemetara Bengaluru Rural Bengaluru Urban Betul Bhadohi Bhadradri Kothagudem Bhadrak Bhagalpur Bhandara Bharatpur Bharuch Bhavnagar Bhilwara Bhind Bhiwani Bhojpur Bhopal Bichom Bidar Bijapur Bijnor Bikaner Bilaspur Bilaspur Birbhum Bishnupur Biswanath Bokaro Bongaigaon Botad Boudh Budaun Budgam Bulandshahr Buldhana Bundi Burhanpur Buxar Cachar Central Chamarajanagar Chamba Chamoli Champawat Champhai Chandauli Chandel Chandigarh Chandrapur Changlang Charaideo Charkhi Dadri Chatra Chengalpattu Chennai Chhatarpur Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar Chhindwara Chhotaudepur Chikkaballapura Chikkamagaluru Chirang Chitradurga Chitrakoot Chittoor Chittorgarh Chumoukedima Churachandpur Churu Coimbatore Cooch Behar Cuddalore Cuttack Dadra And Nagar Haveli Dahod Dakshin Bastar Dantewada Dakshin Dinajpur Dakshina Kannada Dhenkanal Dholpur Dhubri Dhule Dibang Valley Dibrugarh Didwana-Kuchaman Dima Hasao Dimapur Dindigul Dindori Diu Doda Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Konaseema Dumka Dungarpur Durg East East Garo Hills East Godavari East Jaintia Hills East Kameng East Khasi Hills East Siang East Singhbum Eastern West Khasi Hills Eluru Ernakulam Erode Etah Etawah Faridabad Faridkot Farrukhabad Fatehabad Fatehgarh Sahib Fatehpur Fazilka Ferozepur Firozabad Gadag Gadchiroli Gajapati Ganderbal Gandhinagar Ganganagar Gangtok Ganjam Garhwa Gariyaband Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi Gautam Buddha Nagar Gaya Ghaziabad Ghazipur Gir Somnath Giridih Goalpara Godda Golaghat Gomati Gonda Gondia Gopalganj Gorakhpur Gumla Guna Guntur Gurdaspur Gurugram Gwalior Gyalshing Hailakandi Hamirpur Hamirpur Hanumakonda Hanumangarh Hapur Harda Hardoi Haridwar Hassan Hathras Haveri Hazaribagh Hingoli Hisar Hnahthial Hojai Hooghly Hoshiarpur Howrah Hyderabad Idukki Imphal East Imphal West Indore Jabalpur Jagatsinghapur Jagitial Jaipur Jaisalmer Jajapur Jalandhar Jalaun Jalgaon Jalna Jalore Jalpaiguri Jammu Jamnagar Jamtara Jamui Jangoan Janjgir-Champa Jashpur Jaunpur Jayashankar Bhupalapally Jehanabad Jhabua Jhajjar Jhalawar Jhansi Jhargram Jharsuguda Jhunjhunu Jind Jiribam Jodhpur Jogulamba Gadwal Jorhat Junagadh Kabeerdham Kachchh Kaimur (Bhabua) Kaithal Kakching Kakinada Kalaburagi Kalahandi Kalimpong Kallakurichi Kamareddy Kamjong Kamle Kamrup Kamrup Metro Kancheepuram Kandhamal Kangpokpi Kangra Kannauj Kanniyakumari Kannur Kanpur Dehat Kanpur Nagar Kapurthala Karaikal Karauli Karbi Anglong Kargil Karimganj Karimnagar Karnal Karur Kasaragod Kasganj Kathua Daman Damoh Dangs Darbhanga Darjeeling Darrang Datia Dausa Davanagere Deeg Dehradun Deogarh Deoghar Deoria Devbhumi Dwarka Dewas Dhalai Dhamtari Dhanbad Dhar Dharashiv Dharmapuri Dharwad Dhemaji Katihar Katni Kaushambi Kendrapara Kendujhar Keyi Panyor Khagaria Khairagarh-Chhuikhadan-Gandai Khairthal-Tijara Khammam Khandwa (East Nimar) Khargone (West Nimar) Khawzawl Kheda Kheri Khordha Khowai Khunti Kinnaur Kiphire Kishanganj Kishtwar Kodagu Koderma Kohima Kokrajhar Kolar Kolasib Kolhapur Kolkata Kollam Kondagaon Koppal Koraput Korba Korea Kota Kotputli-Behror Kottayam Kozhikode Kra Daadi Krishna Krishnagiri Kulgam Kullu Kumuram Bheem Asifabad Kupwara Kurnool Kurukshetra Kurung Kumey Kushinagar Lahaul And Spiti Lakhimpur Lakhisarai Lakshadweep District Lalitpur Latehar Latur Lawngtlai Leh Ladakh Leparada Lohardaga Lohit Longding Longleng Lower Dibang Valley Lower Siang Lower Subansiri Lucknow Ludhiana Lunglei MAUGANJ Madhepura Madhubani Madurai Mahabubabad Mahabubnagar Mahasamund Mahendragarh Mahesana Mahisagar Mahoba Mahrajganj Maihar Mainpuri Majuli Malappuram Malda Malerkotla Malkangiri Mamit Mancherial Mandi Mandla Mandsaur Mandya Munger Murshidabad Muzaffarnagar Muzaffarpur Mysuru Nabarangpur Nadia Nagaon Nagapattinam Nagarkurnool Nagaur Nagpur Nainital Nalanda Nalbari Nalgonda Namakkal Namchi Namsai Nanded Nandurbar Nandyal Narayanpet Narayanpur Manendragarh-Chirmiri-Bharatpur(M C B) Mangan Mansa Marigaon Mathura Mau Mayiladuthurai Mayurbhanj Medak Medchal Malkajgiri Meerut Meluri Mirzapur Moga Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chouki Mokokchung Mon Moradabad Morbi Morena Mulugu Mumbai Mumbai Suburban Mungeli Narmada Narmadapuram Narsimhapur Nashik Navsari Nawada Nayagarh Neemuch New Delhi Nicobars Nirmal Niuland Niwari Nizamabad Noklak Noney North North 24 Parganas North And Middle Andaman North East North Garo Hills North Goa North Tripura North West Ntr Nuapada Nuh Pakke Kessang Pakur Pakyong Palakkad Palamu Palghar Pali Palnadu Palwal Panch Mahals Panchkula Pandhurna Panipat Panna Papum Pare Parbhani Parvathipuram Manyam Paschim Bardhaman Paschim Medinipur Pashchim Champaran Patan Pathanamthitta Pathankot Patiala Patna Pauri Garhwal Peddapalli Perambalur Peren Phalodi Phek Pherzawl Pilibhit Pithoragarh Poonch Porbandar Prakasam Pratapgarh Pratapgarh Prayagraj Puducherry Pudukkottai Pulwama Pune Purba Bardhaman Ranipet Ratlam Ratnagiri Rayagada Reasi Rewa Rewari Ri Bhoi Rohtak Rohtas Rudraprayag Rupnagar S.A.S Nagar Sabar Kantha Sagar Saharanpur Saharsa Sahebganj Saitual Sakti Salem Salumbar Samastipur Samba Purba Medinipur Purbi Champaran Puri Purnia Purulia Rae Bareli Raichur Raigad Raigarh Raipur Raisen Rajanna Sircilla Rajgarh Rajkot Rajnandgaon Rajouri Rajsamand Ramanagara Ramanathapuram Ramban Ramgarh Rampur Ranchi Ranga Reddy Sambalpur Sambhal Sangareddy Sangli Sangrur Sant Kabir Nagar Saraikela Kharsawan Saran Sarangarh-Bilaigarh Satara Satna Sawai Madhopur Sehore Senapati Seoni Sepahijala Serchhip Shahdara Shahdol Shahid Bhagat Singh Nagar Shahjahanpur Shajapur Shamator Shamli Sheikhpura Sheohar Sheopur Shi Yomi Shimla Shivamogga Shivpuri Shopian Shrawasti Siaha Siang Siddharthnagar Siddipet Sidhi Sikar Simdega Sindhudurg Singrauli Sirmaur Sirohi Sirsa Sitamarhi Sitapur Sivaganga Sivasagar Siwan Solan Solapur Sonbhadra Sonepur Sonipat Sonitpur Soreng South South 24 Parganas South Andamans South East South Garo Hills South Goa South Salmara Mancachar South Tripura South West South West Garo Hills South West Khasi Hills Sri Muktsar Sahib Sri Potti Sriramulu Nellore Sri Sathya Sai Srikakulam Srinagar Sukma Sultanpur Sundargarh Supaul Surajpur Surat Surendranagar Surguja Suryapet Tamenglong Tamulpur Tapi Tarn Taran Tawang Tehri Garhwal Tengnoupal Tenkasi Thane Thanjavur The Nilgiris Theni Thiruvallur Thiruvananthapuram Thiruvarur Thoothukkudi Thoubal Thrissur Tikamgarh Tinsukia Tirap Tiruchirappalli Tirunelveli Tirupathur Tirupati Tiruppur Tiruvannamalai Tonk Tseminyu Tuensang Tumakuru Udaipur Udalguri Udham Singh Nagar Udhampur Udupi Ujjain Ukhrul Warangal Wardha Washim Wayanad West West Garo Hills West Godavari West Jaintia Hills West Kameng West Karbi Anglong West Khasi Hills West Siang West Singhbhum West Tripura Wokha Y.S.R. Yadadri Bhuvanagiri Yadgir Yamunanagar Yavatmal Zunheboto Umaria Una Unakoti Unnao Upper Siang Upper Subansiri Uttar Bastar Kanker Uttar Dinajpur Uttara Kannada Uttarkashi Vadodara Vaishali Valsad Varanasi Vellore Vidisha Vijayanagara Vijayapura Vikarabad Viluppuram Virudhunagar Visakhapatnam Vizianagaram Wanaparthy of Karnataka State. The appellant company has taken on rent the premises belonging to the Church of South IndianIndia Hind/ hend >hindia. Bharat Varsha (Jambudvipa used in Mahavamsha) is the name of this land mass. The people of this land are Sanatan Dharmin and they always defeated invaders. Indra (10000 yrs) was the oldest deified King of this land. Manu's jurisprudence enlitened this land. Vedas have been the civilizational literature of this land. Guiding principles of this land are : सत्यं वद । धर्मं चर । स्वाध्यायान्मा प्रमदः । The place also been called Hindusthan in Pesia. The word Hendu is mentioned in Avesta. Read more Trust Association, respondent No. 1 in these appeals, in Bangalore on a monthly rent of ` 21, 159/-. The appellant company committed default in payment of rent and as on March 31, 1987 a sum of ` 2,45,534/- was payable as rent to the respondents. The respondents issued a legal notice dated 1 st April, 1987 calling upon the appellant company to pay the said amount. The appellant company while admitting the liability to pay the aforesaid sum stated that it was expecting certain sums of moneyMoney Χρήματα, νόμισμα (currency), Old French monoie, Pecunia, Money supply, Reserve money, Monetary System, Money-laundering, Electronic Money, Money Transfer, Promissory notes. Coin of Alexander (330 B.C.E). Dematerialized form is Paper Currency( In USA 1600 CE and in 1861 in India). Money makes men. Balance of Payments, Net borrowing. Euro, Dollar, INR. towards developmental loan from the Government of Karnataka and as soon as the same was received it would clear the outstanding payable by it to the respondents. Since the amount was not paid the respondents issued a notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act and thereafter a petitionPetition αναφορά > παρακαλώ (Prayer) was filed in the High CourtHigh Court High Court Judges in England and Wales handle complex and tough cases, sitting in London and traveling to court centers around the country. They preside over serious criminal and important civil cases, and support the Lord and Lady Justices in hearing appeals. High Court Judges are commonly referred to as ‘Mr/Mrs/Ms Justice surname’ and are given the prefix ‘The Honourable’. They are assigned to the King’s Bench Division, the Family Division, or the Chancery Division. The King’s Bench Division focuses on civil wrongs and judicial review, the Family Division deals with family law, and the Chancery Division handles various cases including company law and probate. Judges are appointed through a rigorous process overseen by the Judicial Appointments Commission. of Karnataka under Section 433(e) of the Companies Act for winding up of the appellant company. While the said winding up petition was pending the appellant company, claiming that it has become a sick industrial company, filed a reference under Section 15(1) of the Act before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’, on 12 December, 1988. After, hearing the concerned parties, the Board formed a prima facie opinionOpinion A judge's written explanation of a decision of the court. In an appeal, multiple opinions may be written. The court’s ruling comes from a majority of judges and forms the majority opinion. A dissenting opinion disagrees with the majority because of the reasoning and/or the principles of law on which the decision is based. A concurring opinion agrees with the end result of the court but offers further comment possibly because they disagree with how the court reached its conclusion. that it would be just and equitable as also in public interest that the appellant company, which has become a sick industrial company within the meaning of Section 3(1)(o) of the Act, should be wound up in view of the large accumulated losses, poor market prospects for the products of the appellant company and inability of the promoters to bring in the required additional interest free fundsFund The term refers to assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets. etc. After publicationPublication It includes any speech, writing, broadcast, or other communication in whatever form (including internet and social media), which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public. of the general notice in the newspapers and on intimation to the concerned parties the Board heard the objections/ suggestions, if any, of the concerned parties to the proposed winding up of the company and after considering the same the Board passed the order dated April 26, 1990, whereby it was found:

“Upon consideration of the facts and material before us and the submissions made at today’s hearing, we find that Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. have become economically and commercially non-viable due to its huge accumulated losses and liabilities and should be wound up. However, in view of the submissions made by the company and in order to give a final opportunity to the promoters as requested by them, our advice to windWind Ανεμος . वायुः पुं > Similar श्वसनः  स्पर्शनः  मातरिश्वा  सदागतिः  पृषदश्वः  गन्धवहः  गन्धवाहः  अनिलः आशुगः  समीरः मारुतः  मरुत् जगत्प्राणः समीरणः  नभस्वान्  वातः  पवनः  पवमानः प्रभञ्जनः अजगत्प्राणः  खश्वासः वाहः धूलिध्वजः फणिप्रियः वातिः नभःप्राणः भोगिकान्तः  स्वकम्पनः अक्षतिः कम्पलक्ष्मा  शसीनिः  आवकः  हरिः  वासः  सुखाशः  मृगवाहनः  सारः  चञ्चलः  विहगः  प्रकम्पनः  नभःस्वरः निश्वासकः  स्तनूनः  पृषतांपतिः । Vedic Deity. Solar wind is a stream of charged particles, consists mostly of electrons and protons with energies (1 keV). Pranayama= controlling breathe. up the company to the respective High Court will be withheld for a period of one month. The promoters were directed to submit an acceptable rehabilitation proposal which is technically, economically and commercially viable for the revival of the company to ICICI urgently and ICICI was directed to appraise the proposal, if any, submitted by the promoters to them and submit their report to us within one month. If no acceptable rehabilitation scheme is received by the BIFR within one month, our opinion to wind up the company will be forwarded to the High Court of judicature in Karnataka for further necessary action under the lawLaw νόμος:  Positive command of sovereign or divine. One can be ruled either by a Statute, a Statue, or a Statement. Legislation is the rule-making process by a political or religious organisation. Physics governs natural law. Logical thinking is a sign of a healthy brain function. Dharma is eternal for Sanatanis. Judiciary > Show me the face, and I will show you the law. Some people know how to bend the law rather than break it. Law Practice. Read a scholarly article.”

3. The appeal filed by the appellant company before the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, hereinafter referred to as the “Appellate Authority”, against the said order dated 26 April, 1990, was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by order dated January 7, 1991. The appellant company has filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 594/91 in the High Court of Delhi wherein the said order passed by the Appellate Authority has been challenged. In the said writ petition, the High Court of Delhi, on February 21, 1991, passed an order for issuing notice returnable for May 10, 1991, to show-cause as to why rule nisi be not issued. On the stay petition filed with the said Writ Petition, notice was issued for May 10, 1991 and in the meanwhile, operation of the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 7, 1991 was stayed. We have been informed that the said Writ Petition is still pending in the Delhi High Court and the stay order passed by the said Court is also operative.

4. After the dismissal of the appeal of the appellant company by the Appellate AuthOrity the winding up petition was taken up for consideration and it was allowed by a learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court by order dated August 14, 1991. The learned single Judge was of the view that pendency of’ the writ petition in the High Court of Delhi and the stay of operation of the order of the Appellate Authority did not stand in the way of the Court to proceed with the matterMatter Normal matter is made of molecules, which are themselves made of atoms. Inside the atoms, electrons are spinning around the nucleus. The nucleus is made of protons and neutrons. Inside the protons and neutrons, exist indivisible quarks, like the electrons. All matter around us is made of elementary particles. ( building blocks of matter > quarks and leptons). All stable matter in the universe is made from particles that belong to the first-generation. Fundamental forces result from the exchange of force-carrier particles, which belong to a broader group called “bosons”. The strong force is carried by the “gluon”, electromagnetic force is carried by the “photon.”. The appellant company filed an appeal against the said order of the learned single Judge which was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court by order dated November 6, 1991. Civil Appeal No. 126/ 92 has been filed by the appellant company against the said order of the Karnataka High Court dated November 6, 1991.

5. On 26 February 1988 the respondents filed a petition seeking eviction of the appellant company from the demised premises under S. 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 on the ground that the appellant company is a chronic defaulter in the payment of rent and as on . March 31, 1987 the appellant company was in arrears to the tune of ` 2,45,534/- and that the said amount has not been paid in spite of notice and that a cheque dated January 1, 1988 for a sum of ` 50,000 1 – which was sent by the appellant company, when presented for encashment, was dishonoured. In those proceedings the appellant company moved an application under S. 151, C.P.C. read with S. 22 of the Act for stay of the said proceedings on the ground that the appellant company had been declared a sick industrial company under the Act by the Board and a scheme was under preparation as per Section 16 of the Act. The said application of the appellant company was rejected by the XII Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore by order dated September 14, 1989, on the view that Section 22 of the Act had no application inasmuch as proceedings instituted by the landlord for recovery of possession of the premises of which a sick industrial company is a tenant is not included among the proceedings which are required to be suspended under S. 22(1) of the Act. Thereafter the XII Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore by order dated September 30, 1989 allowed the eviction petition filed by the respondents and held that the respondents were entitled to get possession of the premises and that appellant company is liable to vacate and give possession to the respondents. The appellant company filed a writ petition against the said order of the Additional Small Causes Court which was subsequently converted into a revision petition under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. The said revision was dismissed by a learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court by order dated 15 March, 1991 in view of S. 29(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act which prescribes that no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under S. 21 shall be entitled to prefer or prosecute a revision petition under S. 50 against an order made by the Court on an application made under S. 21 unless he has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the District Judge or the High Court, as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the premises up to the date of payment. The learned single Judge found that neither the tenancy nor the amount claimed in the petition towards the arrears and the subsequent rents due as on February 28, 1991 (amounting in all ` 9,35,618/-) was disputed. The learned single Judge rejected the prayerPraying It can be interpreted as a political idea. It implicitly assumes the existence of the powerful and the powerless, with an intermediate agency positioned between them. This agency, often unquestioned and abstract, functions to preserve the existing balance between power and poverty. In doing so, prayer operates as a mechanism that normalizes hierarchy, encourages acceptance over challenge, and sustains the status quo without requiring conscious awareness from those who participate in it. for exemption from the applicability of S. 29(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act claimed on the basis of the statutory protection granted to the appellant company under Section 22 of Act. It was held that no enquiry under S. 16 was pending nor any scheme referred to under S. 17 was under preparation or consideration and there is also no sanctioned scheme under implementation and that the appeal filed by the appellant company under S. 25 of the Act has also been rejected. It was held that the stay order which had been passed by the Delhi High Court in the writ petition did not entitle the appellant company to invoke the protection under S. 22 of the Act as if the appeal under Section 25 of the Act was pending. The revision petition filed by the appellant company was, therefore, rejected. Civil Appeal No. 2553/91 has been filed by the appellant company against the said order of the Karnataka High Court.

6. Two questions that arise for consideration in these appeals are: 1) What is the effect of the order passed by Delhi High Court dated February 21, 1991 staying the operation of the order dated January 7, 1991 passed by the Appellate Authority? Does it mean that after the passing of the said order by the High Court, the proceedings under the Act should be treated as pending and, if so, before which authority?

2) Are the proceedings instituted by a landlord for eviction of a tenant who is a sick company from the premises let out to it, required to be suspended under Section 22(1) of the Act?

7. The first question arises in both th appeals inasmuch as the order of the learned single Judge of the High Court dated August 14, 1991 for winding up of the appellant company as well as the order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated November 6, 1991, which are under challenge in C .A. No. 126 of 1992, were passed after the passing of the stay order dated February 21, 1991 by the High Court. Similarly in C.A. No. 2553 of 1991 the revision petition filed by the appellant-company against the order of the XII Additional Small Cause Judge, Bangalore allowing the eviction petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge of the High Court on March 15, 1991, i.e., after the passing of the stay order by the Delhi High Court. The second question arises for consideration only in Civil Appeal No. 2553 of 1991 arising out of the eviction proceedings instituted by the respondents.

8. Sub-s. (1) of Section 22 which alone has relevance to these questions provides as under:

“22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts etc. (1) Where in respect of an industrial company an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding-up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consentConsent Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 13 SCR 920 : (2019) 18 SCC 191; Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [2019] 11 SCR 423 : (2019) 9 SCC 608.Shiv Pratap Singh Rana v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr [2024] 7 S.C.R. 8. Doing Sex: involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action (or inaction), consents to such action. of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.”

9. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that it is applicable, in respect of an industrial company, where (i) an inquiry under Section 16 is pending; or (ii) a scheme referred to in Section 17 is under preparation or consideration; or (iii) a sanctioned scheme is under implementation; or (iv) where an appeal under Section 25 relating to the industrial company is pending. In that event no proceedings for winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for appointment of receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further. This injunction is, however, subject to the exception that the proceedings can be instituted or proceeded further with the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority. In other words, there is no absolute bar to the institution of proceedings referred to in S. 22(1) and for the operation of the bar imposed by the said section it is necessary that one of the matters referred to therein should be pending so that directions may be obtained either from the Board or the Appellate Authority for institution of or continuation of a proceeding of the type specified in S. 22(1).

10. In the instant case the proceedings before the Board under Ss. 15 and 16 of the Act had been terminated by order of the Board dated April 26, 1990 whereby the Board, upon consideration of the facts and material before it, found that the appellantcompany had become economically and commercially non-viable due to its huge accumulated losses and liabilities and should be wound up. The appeal filed by the appellant-company under S.25 of the Act against said order of the Board was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by order dated January 7, 1991. As a result of these orders, no proceedings under the Act was pending either before the Board or before the Appellate Authority on February 21, 1991 when the Delhi High Court passed the interim orderInterim order Once an interim order is passed in a suit or a proceeding, the interim relief granted to the party seeking interim relief could either be confirmed or vacated at the time of final disposal of the suit or proceedings, as the case may be. If the disposal is by way of an order of dismissal, interim relief which is granted as an aid of or ancillary to the final relief cannot continue beyond termination of such suit or proceedings. This is the position of law flowing from the decision in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta ( [1952] 1 SCR 28 : (1951) SCC 1024) staying the operation of the Appellate Authority dated January 7, 1991. The said stay order of the High Court cannot have the effect of reviving the proceedings which had been disposed of by the Appellate Authority by its order dated January 7, 199 1. While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. This means that if an order passed by the Appellate Authority is quashed and the matter is remanded, the result would be that the appeal which had been disposed of by the said order of the Appellate Authority would be restored and it can be said to be pending before the Appellate Authority after the quashing of the order of the Appellate Authority. The same cannot be said with regard to an order staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority because in spite of the said order, the order of the Appellate Authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the passing of the interim order dated February 21, 1991 by the Delhi High Court staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 7, 1991 does not have the effect of reviving the appeal which had been dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated January 7, 1991 and it cannot be said that after February 21,991, the said appeal stood revived and was pending before the Appellate Authority. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that any proceedings under the Act were pending before the Board or the Appellate Authority on the date of the passing of the order dated August 14, 1991 by the learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court for winding up of the company or on November 6, 1991 when the Division Bench passed the order dismissing O.S.A. No. 16 of 1991 filed by the appellant company against the order of the learned single Judge dated August 14, 1991. Section 22(1) of the Act could not, therefore, be invoked and there was no impediment in the High Court dealing with the winding up petition filed by the respondents. This is the only question that has been canvassed in Civil Appeal No. 126 of 1992, directed against the order for winding up of the appellant company. The said appeal, therefore, fails and is liable to be dismissed.

11. Similarly in Civil Appeal No. 2553 of 1991 this question has been raised by the appellant company to challenge the order of the learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court dated March 15, 1991 dismissing the revision petition under S. 50(1) of Karnataka Rent Control Act. For the reasons aforementioned Section 22(1) of the Act cannot be invoked to assail the said order of the High Court on the ground that on the date of passing of the order of the High Court the matter was pending before the Appellate Authority. But in this appeal, the order allowing the eviction petition was passed by the XII Additional Small Cause Court on September 30, 1989 and at that timeTime χρόνος. Judicial: Where any expression of it occurs in any Rules, or any judgment, order or direction, and whenever the doing or not doing of anything at a certain time of the day or night or during a certain part of the day or night has an effect in law, that time is, unless it is otherwise specifically stated, held to be standard time as used in a particular country or state. (In Physics, time and Space never exist actually-“quantum entanglement”) यमः , पुं, (यमयति नियमयति जीवानां फलाफलमिति । यम् + अच् । विश्वे च कलयत्येव यः सर्व्वायुश्च सन्ततम् । अतीव दुर्निवार्य्यञ्च तं कालं प्रणमाम्यहम् ॥यमैश्च नियमैश्चैव यः करोत्यात्मसंयमम् । स चादृष्ट्वा तु मां याति परं ब्रह्म सनातनम् ॥ the matter under Ss. 15 and 16 was pending before the Board. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the second question about the applicability of S. 22(1) to eviction proceedings instituted by the landlord against the tenant who happens to be a sick company. In this regard, it may be mentioned that the following proceedings only are automatically suspended under S. 22(1) of the Act:

1) Proceedings for winding up’of the industrial company;

2) Proceedings for execution, distress or the like against the properties of the sick industrial company; and

3) Proceedings for the appointment of receiver.

12. Eviction proceedings initiated by a landlord against a tenant company would not fall in categories (1) and (3) referred to above. The question is whether they fall in category (2). It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant company that such proceedings fall in category (2) since they are proceedings against the property of the sick industrial company. The submission is that the leaseholdLeasehold The leaseholder has no right or interest in the land, he pays rent to the landlord for using the flat or house. A lease is an agreement between the freeholder and the tenant. Commonhold is a form of ownership (or tenure) for multi-occupancy developments (flats of a building). Each unit-holder owns the freehold of their flat, and a commonhold or residents’ association owns and manages the common parts of the property. right of the appellant-company in the premises leased out to it is property and since the eviction proceedings would result in the appellant-company being deprived of the said property, the said proceedings would be covered by category (2). We are unable to agree. The second category contemplates proceedings for execution, distress or the like against any other properties of the industrial company. The words ‘or the like’ have to be construed with reference to the preceding words, namely,’for execution, distress’ which means that the proceedings which are contemplated in this category are proceedings whereby recovery of dues is sought to be made by way of execution, distress or similar process against the property of the company. Proceedings for eviction instituted by a landlord against a tenant who happens to be a sick industrial company, cannot in our opinion, be regarded as falling in this category. We may, in this context, point out that as indicated in the Preamble, the Act has been enacted to make special provisions with a view to securing the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings, the speedy determination by a Board of experts of the preventive, ameliorative, remedial and and other measures which need to be taken with respect to such companies and the expeditious enforcement of the measures so determined The provision regarding suspension of legal proceedings contained in Section 22(1) seeks to advance the object of the Act by ensuring that a proceeding having an effect on the working or the finances of a sick industrial company shall not be instituted or continued during the period the matter is under consideration before the Board or the Appellate Authority or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation without the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority. It could not be the intentionIntention This means to “have in mind.” A plant to do a thing (Planning: premeditation is evident through evidence of active preparation, e.g., hoarding pills, purchase of weapon). It refers to the aim, purpose, or goal of the behavior, e.g., to seek an end to/solution. A conscious mental process to move precedes the brain’s preparation for movement. of Parliament in enacting the said provision to aggravate the financial difficulties of a sick industrial company while the said matters were pending before the Board of the Appellate Authority by enabling a sick industrial company to continue to incur further liabilities during this period. This would be the consequence if S’ub-section (1) of S. 22 is construed to bring about suspension of proceedings for eviction instituted by landlord against a sick industrial company which has ceased to enjoy the protection of the relevant rent law on account of default in payment of rent. It would also mean that the landlord of such a company must continue to suffer a loss by permitting the tenant (sick industrial company) to occupy the premises even though it is not in a position to pay the rent. Such an intention cannot be imputed to Parliament. We are, therefore, of the view that Section 22(1) does not cover a proceeding instituted by a landlord of a sick industrial company for the eviction of the company premises let out to it.

13. We are also unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant company that the leasehold interest of the appellant company in premises leased out to it is property for the purpose of Section 22(1). It is no doubt true that leasehold interest of the lessee in the premises leased out to him is property which can be transferred and the said interest can also be attached and sold by way of execution in satisfaction of a decree against a lessee. In that sense, it can be said that the leasehold interest of a company is its property. But the question is whether the same is true in respect of the interest of a company which is in occupation of the premises as statutory tenant by virtueVirtue Aristotelian model: Excess Mean Deficiency >Irascibility Gentleness Spiritlessness >Rashness Courage Cowardice>Shamelessness Modesty Diffidence>Profligacy Temperance Insensitiveness>Envy Righteous Indignation Malice>Greed Justice Loss>Prodigality Liberality Meanness>Boastfulness Honesty Self-deprecation>Flattery Friendliness Surliness>Subservience Dignity Stubborness>Luxuriousness Hardness Endurance>Vanity Greatness of Spirit Smallness of Spirit>Extravagance Magnificence Shabbiness> Rascality Prudence Simpleness. of the protection conferred by the relevant rent law because in the instant case on the date of reference to the Board the proceedings for eviction of the appellant company were pending and the appellant company was in occupation of the premises only as a statutory tenant governed by the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. In Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar, 1985 Supp (1) SCR 1 , this Court has laid down that the termination of a contractual tenancy does not bring about a change in the status and legal position of the tenant .unless there are contrary provisions in the relevant Rent Act and the tenant, notwithstanding the termination of tenancy, does enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises. It is further laid down that this interest or estate which the tenant continues to enjoy despite termination of the contractual tenancy creates a heritable interest in the absence of any provision to the contrary. This Court has also held that the legislature which by the Rent Act seeks to confer the benefit on the tenants and to afford protection against eviction, is perfectly competent to make appropriate provision regulating the nature of protection and the manner and extent of enjoyment of such tenancy rights after the termination of contractual tenancy of the tenant including the rights and the nature of protection of the heirs on the death of the tenant.

14. In the instant case, we are concerned with the right of the tenant as governed by the Karnataka Rent Control Act. In Cl. (r) of S. 3, the expression “tenant” has been defined to include “the surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the premises as a member of the tenant’s family after the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour”. In view of Cl. (5) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 21, protection against eviction is not available to a tenant who has “unlawfully sublet the whole or part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein and where the subletting, assignment or transfer has been made before the coming into operation of this part (except in respect of sub-letting, assignment or transfer to which the provisions of S. 61 are applicable), such sub-letting, assignment or transfer has been made contrary to any provision of law then in force. S. 23 prohibits subletting or transfer by the tenant and provides as under:

“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, but subject to any contractContract An agreement enforceable by law is a contract. All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void. Indian Contract Act. to the contrary, it shall not be lawful after the coming into operation of this part, for any tenant to sub-let whole or any part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein:

Provided that the State Government may, by notification, permit in any area the transfer of interest in premises held under such leases or class of leases and to such extent as may be specified in the notification:

Provided further that nothing in this section shall apply to a tenant having a right to enjoy any premises in perpetuity.

(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-sec. (1), shall, on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees.”

15. From these provisions, it would appear that except in cases covered by the two provisos to sub-sec. (1) of S. 23, there is a prohibition for a tenant to sub-let whole or any part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein. This prohibition is, however, subject to a contract to the contrary. A tenant who subjects or assigns or transfers the premises,in contravention of this prohibition loses the protection of law and can be evicted by the landlord under S. 21(1)(f). In the case of a statutory tenant, the relationship is not governed by contract. The prohibition against assignment and transfer is, therefore absolute and the interest of a statutory tenant can neither be assigned nor transferred. This means that the interest of the statutory tenant in the premises in his occupation, as governed by the Karnataka Rent Control Act is a limited interest which enables the surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the premises as a member of the tenant’s family up to the death of the tenant and a\person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, to inherit the interest of the tenant on his death. The said interest of the tenant is, however, not assignable or transferable and, therefore, the interest, of a company which is continuing in occupation of the premises as a statutory tenant by virtue of the protection conferred by the Karnataka Rent Control Act, cannot be regarded as property of the company for the purpose of sub-see. (1) of S. 22 of the Act and for that reason also the provisions of S. 22(1) were not attracted to the eviction proceedings instittited by the respondents against the appellant company. The provisions of S. 22(1) did not, therefore, bar the prosecution of the said proceedings by the respondents and the order dated September 30, 1989 passed by the XII Additional Small Cause Judge, Bangalore allowing the eviction petition cannot be held to have been passed in contravention of the provisions of S. 22(1) of the Act. Civil Appeal No. 2553 of 1991 also, therefore, fails and is liable to be dismissed.

16. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed but in the circumstances with no order as to costsCosts Subject to any written law, costs are at the discretion of the Court, and the Court has the power to determine all issues relating to the costs of or incidental to all proceedings, including by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid, at any stage of the proceedings or after the conclusion of the proceedings. Generally “Costs” includes charges, disbursements, expenses, fees, and remuneration. Costs in any matter are payable from the date of the order of the Court unless the parties otherwise agree. The costs of a third-party funding contract are not recoverable as part of the costs of, or costs..