Tarapada De and others Versus The State of West Bengal[SC 1951 January]

Keywords: Preventive Detention-subjective satisfaction

AIR 1951 SC 174 : (1951) SCR 212 : (1951) CriLJ SC 400

(SUPREME COURT OF INDIA)

(Before : M. H. Kania, C.J.I., Saiyid Fazl Ali, M. Patanjali Sastri, B. K. Mukherjea, S. R. Das And N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.)

Criminal Case No. 24 of 1950, Decided on : 25-01-1951.

Subjective satisfaction—Judicial review—Sufficiency of grounds for detention cannot be examined by the Court.

The sufficiency of the grounds, which gives rise to the satisfaction of the Provincial Government is not a matter for examination by the Court. The sufficiency of the grounds to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation can be examined by the Court, but only from that point of view.

On the question of satisfaction, as has been often stated, one person may be but another may not be satisfied on the same grounds. That aspect, however, is not for the determination of the Court; having regard to the words used in the Preventive Detection Act.

Preventive detention—Grounds—Communication of—Requirement of communication “as soon as may be”—Delay in communicating the grounds on account of large number of persons detained and the State Government had to deal with large number of cases on one day—Communication of grounds after about two weeks did not violate Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

Preventive detention—Grounds—Additional grounds—Permissibility—Supplementary grounds communicated to the detenu after more than three months—The substance of grounds has to be looked into and the nomenclature of grounds as supplementary is not conclusive.

A description of the contents of the second communication as “supplementary grounds” does not necessarily make them additional or new grounds. One has to look at the contents to find out whether they are new grounds.

We do not think it proper to consider the true effect of the communication only by reading its opening words. The whole of it must be read and considered together. The contention that the authorities were not satisfied on the original grounds and therefore put forth this communication as the supplemental grounds is again unsound. The fact that these details were communicated later does not necessarily show that they were not within the knowledge of the authorities.

Preventive detention—Subjective satisfaction—Judicial review—Sufficiency of grounds for detention cannot be examined by the Court.

The sufficiency of the grounds, which gives rise to the satisfaction of the Provincial Government is not a matter for examination by the Court. The sufficiency of the grounds to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation can be examined by the Court, but only from that point of view.

On the question of satisfaction, as has been often stated, one person may be but another may not be satisfied on the same grounds. That aspect, however, is not for the determination of the Court; having regard to the words used in the Preventive Detection Act.

Counsel for the Parties:

Shri Atul Chandra Gupta and Shri Sudhansu Sekhar Mukherjee. Senior Advocates, (Shri Arun Kumar Datta and Shri S. N. Mukherjea, Advocates, with them), instructed by Shri P. K. Chatterjee, Agent -for Appellants

Shri ,M. C. Setalvad , Attorney-General for India, (Shri B. Sen Advocate, with him), instructed by Shri P. K. Bose, Advocate for the State of West Bengal

The judgment of Kania C. J., Fazl Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasnkhara Aiyar JJ. was delivered by

JUDGMENT

Kania, C. J—This is an appeal under Art. 132, Const. Ind, from the judgment of the .H, C. at Calcutta, which rejected the habeas corpus petns. of the applts. The detention orders under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, in all cases were served on the applts, on 26-2-1950 and the grounds for the detention were served on 14-3-1950. By way of specimen we quote one of them:

“You are being detained in pursuance of a detention order made under sub-cl. (ii) of cl. (a) of Sub-section. (1) of S. 3, Preventive Detention Act 1950 (Act IV [4] of 1950), on the following grounds.”

(1) That you have been assisting the operations of the Communist Party of India, which along with its volunteer organisations has been declared unlawful by Govt. under S.16, Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act (Act XIV [14] of 1908), and which has for its object commission of, rioting with deadly weapons, robbery, dacoity, arson and murder and possession and use of arms and ammunitions and explosives and thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that it is necessary to prevent you from acting in such manner.

(2) That as a member of the C. P. I. on its Kishan front, you have fomented trouble amongst the peasants. of Howrah District and incited them to acts of lawlessness and violence:

and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order:

That as a worker of the C. P. I. you have tried to foment trouble amongst the tramways men and other workers at Calcutta and in speeches which you delivered at the University Hall and other places you actually incited them to resort to acts of violence and lawlessness; and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.”

2. On 16-7-1950, the Govt. of West Bengal served on the applts. “in continuation of the grounds already furnished on 14-3-1950 supplementary grounds” for their detention a specimen of which is in the following terms:

“In continuation of the grounds already furnished under order No. 6163 H. S. dated 14-3-1950, you are being informed of the supplementary grounds for your detention which are its follows:

“You as the Secretary of the Bengal Chatkal Mazdoor Union as a member of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Mercantile Employees Union, as the honorary reporter of the ‘Khabar’ newspaper (C. P. I. organ) carried on the disruptive programme of the C. P. I. on 29-7-1948 you along with others led a procession at Howrah preaching discontent against Govt. and have been thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.”

3. As in the case of the first grounds, these “supplementary grounds” were served on each applt. separately. The applts, applied for a rule of habeas corpus separately under S. 491, Cr. P. C., and on 21-7-1950 the H. C. issued a rule in each case on the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of West Bengal, A second set of grounds were communicated to the applts. on the 22nd or 23rd of July 1950. A specimen of one is in the following terms:

“In continuation of the grounds already furnished under order No. 12820 dated14th(16th?) July 1950 you are being informed-of the supplementary grounds for your detention which are as follows:_

1. That in a meeting held at the University Institute on 19-3-1947 under the auspices of the Calcutta Tramway Workers Union, you held out the threat that any attempt to take out tram cars on 20-3-1947 would be inviting disaster and you further said that if the authorities tried to resume the tram service you and your friends would not hesitate to remove the tram lines and cut the wires.

2. That on 13-6-1948, you presided over a meeting under the auspices of the Student Federation (C. P. I. controlled) and delivered speech advocating withdrawal of ban on the Communist Party of India and its organ Swadhinta.”

4. The H. C. after considering the whole matter rejected the petns. of the applts. The applts have thereupon come in appeal before us.

5. In the H. C. it was first contended on behalf of the applts. that the communication of the grounds dated the 14th March was not a compliance with Art. 22 (5), Const. Ind. as those grounds were not communicated “as soon as may be. “ The H. C, rejected this contention. Under the circumstances of the case, we agree with the H. C. and are unable to hold that in furnishing the grounds dated14-3-1950 the authorities had failed to act in accordance with the procedure laid down in Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. Under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, a very large number of persons were detained. The validity of that Act was being challenged in the H. C. and the judgment was expected to be delivered towards the end of Feb. 1950. The Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was passed by the Parliament of India in the last week of Feb. 1950 and these orders on all those detenus were served on 26-2-1950. Having regard to the fact that the Provincial Govt. had thus suddenly to deal with a large number of cases on one day, we are unable to accept this contention of the applts.

6. On behalf of the applts. it was next argued that there has been a non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution and S. 7, Preventive Detention Act, in the manner of supplying grounds to the applts, resulting in not providing to the applts. the earliest opportunity to make a representation, which they had a right to make. In the judgment delivered to-day in case No. 22 of 1950*. we have discussed in detail the nature of the two rights conferred under Art. 22 (5). We have to apply those principles to the facts of this appeal for its decision.

7. When the authorities sent their second communication dated16-7-1950 to the applts. they described it as “in continuation of the grounds already furnished” and as the “the supplementary grounds for your detention’’. Relying on the wording of this communication it was argued that these were additional grounds which were furnished to the detenu and therefore, the procedure prescribed under Art. 22 (5) had not been followed. It was argued that the obligation to communicate grounds “as soon as may be’’ was absolute. The grounds for detention must be before the Provincial Govt. before they could be satisfied about the necessity for making the detention order. If the grounds before the detaining authorities on 26-1-1950 were only those which they communicated on the 14th of March, they cannot support the detention on additionaI grounds which were not before them on that day and which they set out in the second communication four months later. It was also contended that the foot of this communication showed that the authorities were not satisfied on the original grounds and had, therefore, put forth these supplementary grounds as an afterthought. In our opinion these arguments cannot be accepted. A description of the contents of the second communication as “supplementary grounds” does not necessarily make them additional or new grounds. One has to look at the contents to find out whether they are new grounds as explained in our judgment in Case No. 22 of 1950*. Examining the contents of the later communication in that way we find that they only furnish details of the second heads of the grounds furnished to the appropriate applt. on 14-3-1950 in respect of his activities. We are unable to treat them as new grounds and we agree with the H. C. in its conclusion that these are not fresh or new grounds. We do not think it proper to consider the true effect of the communication only by reading its opening words. The whole of it must be read and considered together. The contention that the authorities were not satisfied on the original grounds and therefore put forth this communication as the supplemental grounds is again unsound. The fact that these details were communicated later does not necessarily show that they were not within the knowledge of the authorities when they sent the communication dated the 14th of March. The contention that this communication of 16-7-1950 was not “as soon as may be”, has to be rejected having regard to the principles set out in our judgment in case No. 22 of 1950. The facts in each case have to be taken into consideration and if the detained person contends that, this part of the procedure prescribed in Art.22 (5) was not, complied with, the authorities will have to place materials before the Ct. to refute that contention. In the present case the H. C. has considered that there has been no infringement of this procedural law and we see no reason to come to a different conclusion.

8. It was next argued that the grounds being vague, they could not be considered as grounds at all and therefore they could not be sufficient “to satisfy” the authorities. On this point we have nothing to add to what we have stated in our judgment in Case No. 22 of 1950. We are unable to accept the contention that ‘vague grounds” stand on the same footing as ‘irrelevant grounds”. An irrelevant ground has no connection at all with the satisfaction of the Provincial Govt. which makes the order of detention. For the reasons stated in that judgment we are also unable to accept the contention that if the ground are vague and no representation is possible there can be no satisfaction of the authority as required under S. 3, Preventive Detention Act. This argument mixes up two objects. The sufficiency of the grounds, which gives rise to the satisfaction of the Provincial Govt. is not a matter for examination by the Ct. The sufficiency of the grounds to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation can be examined by the Ct., but only from that point of view. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the quality and characteristic of the grounds should be the same for both tests. On the question of satisfaction, as has been often stated, one person may be but another may non be satisfied on the same grounds That aspect, however, is not for the determination of the Ct; having regard to the words used in the Act. The second part of the inquiry is clearly open to the Ct. under Art. 22 (5). We are, therefore, unable to accept the argument that if the grounds are not sufficient or adequate for making the representation the grounds cannot be sufficient for the subjective satisfaction of the authority.

9. As regards the grounds furnished by the Govt. in each case in its first communication, it is sufficient to notice that while the first ground is common to all the applts, the second ground is different in most cases. The H. C. has considered the case of each applt. in respect of the communication dated 14-3-1950, sent to him. In their opinion those grounds are not vague. They have held that the procedural requirement to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation has not been infringed by the communication of the grounds of the 14th of March and by the subsequent communication made to the applts. in July. This point was not seriously pressed before us. After hearing counsel for the applt. we see no reason to differ from the conclusion at the H. C. on this point. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.

10. Patanjali Sastri, J.—This appeal was heard along with case No. 92 of 1950. (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar (A. I. R. (38) 1951 S.C. 157) as the main question involved was the same. In the view I have expressed on that question in my judgment delivered today in that case, this appeal cannot succeed and I agree that it should be dismissed.

11. Das, J—The same important questions have been raised in this appeal by 100 detenus against an order of a Bench of the Calcutta H. C. as were raised by the detenu in the appeal of the State of Bombay in which judgment has just been delivered. One additional point raised in this appeal was that the fact that a large number of fresh order of detention were made “overnight” indicates bad faith on the part at the authorities, for the authorities could not have applied their minds to each individual case. I am unable to accept, this contention as correct The authorities had already applied their minds to the suspected activities of each of the detenus and were satisfied that with a view to prevent them from doing some prejudicial act of a particular kind it was necessary to make an order of detention against them under the local Acts. There being doubt as to the validity at the local Acts and the Preventive Detention Act having been passed in the meantime the question was to make a fresh order under the new Act. The minds of the authorities having already been made up as to the expediency of making an order of detention against them, an elaborate application of mind, such as is now suggested, does not appear to me to be necessary at all. I do not think there was any failure of duty on the part of the authorities which will establish bad faith on their part. In my view, for reasons stated in my judgment in the other appeal, there being as proof of any mala fides on the part of the authorities, no fundamental rights of the pettioners have been infringed. In the case of each of the detenus, apart from the common ground, there were one or more specific grounds of detention which are quite sufficient to enable the detenu concerned to make his representation. Therefore, the question of supplementary particulars does not arise at all. In my opinion the conclusions arrived at by Roxburgh J. were correct and well founded and therefore, this appeal should be dismissed.