KEYWORDS:- UNREGISTERED DEED
RATIO DECIDENDICase law It also known as common law, is derived from judicial decisions rather than constitutions, statutes, or regulations. It addresses specific disputes based on the factual details of each case. Unlike statutes and regulations, case law is founded on precedents set by prior judicial rulings. It differs from one jurisdiction to another. The ratio decidendi portion of a decision has binding force. :
- A documentDocument It means any matter expressed or described or otherwise recorded upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes electronic and digital records. (Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023) required to be registered is not admissible into evidenceEvidence All the means by which a matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted for investigation, is established or disproved. Bharatiya Sakshya (Second) Adhiniyam 2023 under Section 49 of the Registration Act.
2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the Proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act.
3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the lawLaw νόμος: Positive command of sovereign or divine. One can be ruled either by a Statute, a Statue, or a Statement. Legislation is the rule-making process by a political or religious organisation. Physics governs natural law. Logical thinking is a sign of a healthy brain function. Dharma is eternal for Sanatanis. Judiciary > Show me the face, and I will show you the law. Some people know how to bend the law rather than break it. Law Practice. Read a scholarly article required registration.
4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards.
5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose.
AIRAIR All India Reporter 2008 SCW 4829 : JT 2008 (9) SC 12
(SUPREME COURT OF INDIAArticle 124 of the Constitution of India Constitution of India > 124. Supreme Court (1) There shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven other Judges. (2) Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty-five years: Provided that-- (a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office (b) a Judge may be removed from his office in the manner provided in clause (4). (2A) The age of a Judge of the Supreme Court shall be determined by such authority and in such manner as Parliament may by law provide. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court unless he is a citizen of India and-- (a) has been for at least five years a Judge of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession; or (b) has been for at least ten years an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such courts in succession; or (c) is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist. (4) A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-third of the members of the House present and voting has been presented to the President in the same session for such removal on the ground of proved misbehavior or incapacity. (5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the presentation of an address and for the investigation and proof of the misbehavior or incapacity of a Judge under clause (4): (6) Every person appointed to be a Judge of the Supreme Court shall, before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the President, or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule. (7) No person who has held office as a Judge of the Supreme Court shall plead or act in any court or before any authority within the territory of India.)
| M/s. K. B. Saha and Sons Pvt. Ltd. | Appellant |
| Versus | |
| M/s. DevelopmentDevelopment ανάπτυξη Consultant Ltd. | Respondent |
(Before : A. K. Mathur And Tarun Chatterjee, JJ.)
Civil AppealCivil Appeal Vasant Ganesh Damle vs. Shrikant Trimbak Datar (AIR 2002 SC 1237) in the following words: "The appeal is considered to be an extension of the suit because U/S. 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate Court has the same powers as are conferred by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Such a power can be exercised by the appellate Court "as nearly as may be" exercised by the trial Court under the Code. If the powers conferred upon the trial Court are under a specified statute and not under the Code, it has to be ascertained as to whether such a power was intended to be exercised by the appellate Court as well. Such a position can be ascertained by having a reference to the specified law by keeping in mind the legislative intention of conferment of power on the appellate Court either expressly or by necessary implication." No.5659-5660 of 2002, Decided on : 12-05-2008.
West BengalWest Bengal Bengal derived its name from Vedic king Vanga (Son of Vali). Banga was part of the Magadha Kingdom of Jarasandha and later Nanda dynasty. After the Garuda Dynasty ( history lost) the region was named Gouda Bhumi. Districts North 24 Parganas South 24 Parganas Bankura Birbhum CoochBihar Dakshin Dinajpur Darjeeling Hooghly Howrah Jalpaiguri Jhargram Kalimpong Kolkata Malda Murshidabad Nadia Paschim Burdwan Purba Burdwan Paschim Medinipur Purba Medinipur Purulia Uttar Dinajpur Alipurduar Govt Site Calcutta High Court KMC Premises Tenancy Act, 1956—Section 13(6)—Registration Act, 1908—Section 49—Transfer of Property Act, 1882—Sections 108, 108(o) and 107.
Counsel for the Parties:
N. R. Choudhury and Somnath Mukherjee, for Appellant.
JudgmentJudgment The statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order - CPC 2(9). It contains a concise statement of the case, points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision - Order 20 Rule 4(2). Section 354 of CrPC requires that every judgment shall contain points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. Indian Supreme Court Decisions > Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts (Art 141 Indian Constitution) Civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court (Art 144) Supreme Court Network On Judiciary – Portal > Denning: “Judges do not speak, as do actors, to please. They do not speak, as do advocates, to persuade. They do not speak, as do historians, to recount the past. They speak to give Judgment. And in their judgments, you will find passages, which are worthy to rank with the greatest literature….” Law Points on Judgment Writing > The judge must write to provide an easy-to-understand analysis of the issues of law and fact which arise for decision. Judgments are primarily meant for those whose cases are decided by judges (State Bank of India and Another Vs Ajay Kumar Sood SC 2022)
Tarun Chatterjee, J—These two appeals are directed against the common final judgment and order dated 18th of May, 2001 of the High Court of CalcuttaHigh Court at Calcutta The High Court at Calcutta (High Court of Judicature at Fort William>opened on 1st July 1862, with Sir Barnes Peacock as its first Chief Justice) was established by the Letters Patent dated 14th May 1862 (High Court's Act, 1861), which provided the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court. passed in F. A. Nos. 39-40 of 1999 affirming the judgment and decree dated 11th of November, 1998 passed by the Asstt. DistrictDistrict India has 800 districts under 29 federal states and 8 union territories. Adilabad Agar-Malwa Agra Ahilyanagar Ahmedabad Aizawl Ajmer Akola Alappuzha Aligarh Alipurduar Alirajpur Alluri Sitharama Raju Almora Alwar Ambala Ambedkar Nagar Amethi Amravati Amreli Amritsar Amroha Anakapalli Anand Ananthapuramu Anantnag Anjaw Annamayya Anugul Anuppur Araria Ariyalur Arvalli Arwal Ashoknagar Auraiya Aurangabad Ayodhya Azamgarh Bagalkote Bageshwar Baghpat Bahraich Bajali Baksa Balaghat Balangir Baleshwar Ballari Ballia Balod Balodabazar-Bhatapara Balotra Balrampur Balrampur-Ramanujganj Banas Kantha Banda Bandipora Banka Bankura Banswara Bapatla Bara Banki Baramulla Baran Bareilly Bargarh Barmer Barnala Barpeta Barwani Bastar Basti Bathinda Beawar Beed Begusarai Belagavi Bemetara Bengaluru Rural Bengaluru Urban Betul Bhadohi Bhadradri Kothagudem Bhadrak Bhagalpur Bhandara Bharatpur Bharuch Bhavnagar Bhilwara Bhind Bhiwani Bhojpur Bhopal Bichom Bidar Bijapur Bijnor Bikaner Bilaspur Bilaspur Birbhum Bishnupur Biswanath Bokaro Bongaigaon Botad Boudh Budaun Budgam Bulandshahr Buldhana Bundi Burhanpur Buxar Cachar Central Chamarajanagar Chamba Chamoli Champawat Champhai Chandauli Chandel Chandigarh Chandrapur Changlang Charaideo Charkhi Dadri Chatra Chengalpattu Chennai Chhatarpur Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar Chhindwara Chhotaudepur Chikkaballapura Chikkamagaluru Chirang Chitradurga Chitrakoot Chittoor Chittorgarh Chumoukedima Churachandpur Churu Coimbatore Cooch Behar Cuddalore Cuttack Dadra And Nagar Haveli Dahod Dakshin Bastar Dantewada Dakshin Dinajpur Dakshina Kannada Dhenkanal Dholpur Dhubri Dhule Dibang Valley Dibrugarh Didwana-Kuchaman Dima Hasao Dimapur Dindigul Dindori Diu Doda Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Konaseema Dumka Dungarpur Durg East East Garo Hills East Godavari East Jaintia Hills East Kameng East Khasi Hills East Siang East Singhbum Eastern West Khasi Hills Eluru Ernakulam Erode Etah Etawah Faridabad Faridkot Farrukhabad Fatehabad Fatehgarh Sahib Fatehpur Fazilka Ferozepur Firozabad Gadag Gadchiroli Gajapati Ganderbal Gandhinagar Ganganagar Gangtok Ganjam Garhwa Gariyaband Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi Gautam Buddha Nagar Gaya Ghaziabad Ghazipur Gir Somnath Giridih Goalpara Godda Golaghat Gomati Gonda Gondia Gopalganj Gorakhpur Gumla Guna Guntur Gurdaspur Gurugram Gwalior Gyalshing Hailakandi Hamirpur Hamirpur Hanumakonda Hanumangarh Hapur Harda Hardoi Haridwar Hassan Hathras Haveri Hazaribagh Hingoli Hisar Hnahthial Hojai Hooghly Hoshiarpur Howrah Hyderabad Idukki Imphal East Imphal West Indore Jabalpur Jagatsinghapur Jagitial Jaipur Jaisalmer Jajapur Jalandhar Jalaun Jalgaon Jalna Jalore Jalpaiguri Jammu Jamnagar Jamtara Jamui Jangoan Janjgir-Champa Jashpur Jaunpur Jayashankar Bhupalapally Jehanabad Jhabua Jhajjar Jhalawar Jhansi Jhargram Jharsuguda Jhunjhunu Jind Jiribam Jodhpur Jogulamba Gadwal Jorhat Junagadh Kabeerdham Kachchh Kaimur (Bhabua) Kaithal Kakching Kakinada Kalaburagi Kalahandi Kalimpong Kallakurichi Kamareddy Kamjong Kamle Kamrup Kamrup Metro Kancheepuram Kandhamal Kangpokpi Kangra Kannauj Kanniyakumari Kannur Kanpur Dehat Kanpur Nagar Kapurthala Karaikal Karauli Karbi Anglong Kargil Karimganj Karimnagar Karnal Karur Kasaragod Kasganj Kathua Daman Damoh Dangs Darbhanga Darjeeling Darrang Datia Dausa Davanagere Deeg Dehradun Deogarh Deoghar Deoria Devbhumi Dwarka Dewas Dhalai Dhamtari Dhanbad Dhar Dharashiv Dharmapuri Dharwad Dhemaji Katihar Katni Kaushambi Kendrapara Kendujhar Keyi Panyor Khagaria Khairagarh-Chhuikhadan-Gandai Khairthal-Tijara Khammam Khandwa (East Nimar) Khargone (West Nimar) Khawzawl Kheda Kheri Khordha Khowai Khunti Kinnaur Kiphire Kishanganj Kishtwar Kodagu Koderma Kohima Kokrajhar Kolar Kolasib Kolhapur Kolkata Kollam Kondagaon Koppal Koraput Korba Korea Kota Kotputli-Behror Kottayam Kozhikode Kra Daadi Krishna Krishnagiri Kulgam Kullu Kumuram Bheem Asifabad Kupwara Kurnool Kurukshetra Kurung Kumey Kushinagar Lahaul And Spiti Lakhimpur Lakhisarai Lakshadweep District Lalitpur Latehar Latur Lawngtlai Leh Ladakh Leparada Lohardaga Lohit Longding Longleng Lower Dibang Valley Lower Siang Lower Subansiri Lucknow Ludhiana Lunglei MAUGANJ Madhepura Madhubani Madurai Mahabubabad Mahabubnagar Mahasamund Mahendragarh Mahesana Mahisagar Mahoba Mahrajganj Maihar Mainpuri Majuli Malappuram Malda Malerkotla Malkangiri Mamit Mancherial Mandi Mandla Mandsaur Mandya Munger Murshidabad Muzaffarnagar Muzaffarpur Mysuru Nabarangpur Nadia Nagaon Nagapattinam Nagarkurnool Nagaur Nagpur Nainital Nalanda Nalbari Nalgonda Namakkal Namchi Namsai Nanded Nandurbar Nandyal Narayanpet Narayanpur Manendragarh-Chirmiri-Bharatpur(M C B) Mangan Mansa Marigaon Mathura Mau Mayiladuthurai Mayurbhanj Medak Medchal Malkajgiri Meerut Meluri Mirzapur Moga Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chouki Mokokchung Mon Moradabad Morbi Morena Mulugu Mumbai Mumbai Suburban Mungeli Narmada Narmadapuram Narsimhapur Nashik Navsari Nawada Nayagarh Neemuch New Delhi Nicobars Nirmal Niuland Niwari Nizamabad Noklak Noney North North 24 Parganas North And Middle Andaman North East North Garo Hills North Goa North Tripura North West Ntr Nuapada Nuh Pakke Kessang Pakur Pakyong Palakkad Palamu Palghar Pali Palnadu Palwal Panch Mahals Panchkula Pandhurna Panipat Panna Papum Pare Parbhani Parvathipuram Manyam Paschim Bardhaman Paschim Medinipur Pashchim Champaran Patan Pathanamthitta Pathankot Patiala Patna Pauri Garhwal Peddapalli Perambalur Peren Phalodi Phek Pherzawl Pilibhit Pithoragarh Poonch Porbandar Prakasam Pratapgarh Pratapgarh Prayagraj Puducherry Pudukkottai Pulwama Pune Purba Bardhaman Ranipet Ratlam Ratnagiri Rayagada Reasi Rewa Rewari Ri Bhoi Rohtak Rohtas Rudraprayag Rupnagar S.A.S Nagar Sabar Kantha Sagar Saharanpur Saharsa Sahebganj Saitual Sakti Salem Salumbar Samastipur Samba Purba Medinipur Purbi Champaran Puri Purnia Purulia Rae Bareli Raichur Raigad Raigarh Raipur Raisen Rajanna Sircilla Rajgarh Rajkot Rajnandgaon Rajouri Rajsamand Ramanagara Ramanathapuram Ramban Ramgarh Rampur Ranchi Ranga Reddy Sambalpur Sambhal Sangareddy Sangli Sangrur Sant Kabir Nagar Saraikela Kharsawan Saran Sarangarh-Bilaigarh Satara Satna Sawai Madhopur Sehore Senapati Seoni Sepahijala Serchhip Shahdara Shahdol Shahid Bhagat Singh Nagar Shahjahanpur Shajapur Shamator Shamli Sheikhpura Sheohar Sheopur Shi Yomi Shimla Shivamogga Shivpuri Shopian Shrawasti Siaha Siang Siddharthnagar Siddipet Sidhi Sikar Simdega Sindhudurg Singrauli Sirmaur Sirohi Sirsa Sitamarhi Sitapur Sivaganga Sivasagar Siwan Solan Solapur Sonbhadra Sonepur Sonipat Sonitpur Soreng South South 24 Parganas South Andamans South East South Garo Hills South Goa South Salmara Mancachar South Tripura South West South West Garo Hills South West Khasi Hills Sri Muktsar Sahib Sri Potti Sriramulu Nellore Sri Sathya Sai Srikakulam Srinagar Sukma Sultanpur Sundargarh Supaul Surajpur Surat Surendranagar Surguja Suryapet Tamenglong Tamulpur Tapi Tarn Taran Tawang Tehri Garhwal Tengnoupal Tenkasi Thane Thanjavur The Nilgiris Theni Thiruvallur Thiruvananthapuram Thiruvarur Thoothukkudi Thoubal Thrissur Tikamgarh Tinsukia Tirap Tiruchirappalli Tirunelveli Tirupathur Tirupati Tiruppur Tiruvannamalai Tonk Tseminyu Tuensang Tumakuru Udaipur Udalguri Udham Singh Nagar Udhampur Udupi Ujjain Ukhrul Warangal Wardha Washim Wayanad West West Garo Hills West Godavari West Jaintia Hills West Kameng West Karbi Anglong West Khasi Hills West Siang West Singhbhum West Tripura Wokha Y.S.R. Yadadri Bhuvanagiri Yadgir Yamunanagar Yavatmal Zunheboto Umaria Una Unakoti Unnao Upper Siang Upper Subansiri Uttar Bastar Kanker Uttar Dinajpur Uttara Kannada Uttarkashi Vadodara Vaishali Valsad Varanasi Vellore Vidisha Vijayanagara Vijayapura Vikarabad Viluppuram Virudhunagar Visakhapatnam Vizianagaram Wanaparthy Judge, 9th Court at Alipore, South 24 Parganas whereby the two suits namely, Title Suit No 19/92 and 39/92 filed at the instance of the appellant were dismissed.
2. The facts leading to the filing of these two appeals are narrated in a nutshell as follows :
M/s. K.B. Saha and Sons Pvt. Ltd. (in short “the appellant”) brought Title Suit No. 19/92 before the 9th Court of the Asstt. District Judge, Alipore, South 24 Parganas against M/s. Development Consultants Ltd. (in short “the respondent”) alleging, inter alia, that the appellant was the owner of Premises No. 28/8, Gariahat Road, within Police Station Lake in the district of South 24 Parganas (hereinafter called “the suit property”). By a memorandum dated 30th of March, 1976, the respondent became a tenant in respect of a flat, as fully described in Schedule-A of the plaint, in the suit property (hereinafter called “the suit premises”) for the residential accom modation of a particular officer Mr. Keshab Das and members of his family and for no other purpose. The monthly rent was fixed at ` 1100/-, which included the rent of fixtures, fittings and parking place payable in advance by 5th of the current month for which the rent became due. The monthly rent and other charges were increased to ` 1210/- from September, 1985. The appellant alleged that the memorandum dated 30th of March, 1976 specifically provided that if the respondent intended to use the suit premises for any purpose other than providing residential accommoda tion to its named officer Mr. Keshab Das and members of his family, the respondent would have to seek a written consentConsent Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 13 SCR 920 : (2019) 18 SCC 191; Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [2019] 11 SCR 423 : (2019) 9 SCC 608.Shiv Pratap Singh Rana v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr [2024] 7 S.C.R. 8. Doing Sex: involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action (or inaction), consents to such action. from the appellant bringing the change of purpose by a notice.
3. By a letter dated 6th of March, 1992, the respondent informed the appellant that Mr. Keshab Das had vacated the suit premises and that it wanted to make repairs and to allot the same to another employee to which the appellant objected and re plied by a letter dated 12th of March, 1992 that the respondent had no right to allot the suit premises to another employee and, therefore, must surrender the same once vacated by Mr. Keshab Das. However, the appellant was informed by the respondent that they would not surrender the suit premises and shall carry out the repair work in it. In this backdrop, the aforesaid Title Suit No. 19/92 was filed by the appellant for declaration and permanent injunction that as per the terms of the Memorandum of AgreementContract An agreement enforceable by law is a contract. All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void. Indian Contract Act. dated 30th of March, 1976, the respondent had no right to allot the suit premises to any other employee after the same was vacated by Mr. Keshab Das and members of his family. By an interim orderInterim order Once an interim order is passed in a suit or a proceeding, the interim relief granted to the party seeking interim relief could either be confirmed or vacated at the time of final disposal of the suit or proceedings, as the case may be. If the disposal is by way of an order of dismissal, interim relief which is granted as an aid of or ancillary to the final relief cannot continue beyond termination of such suit or proceedings. This is the position of law flowing from the decision in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta ( [1952] 1 SCR 28 : (1951) SCC 1024) passed on 13th of March, 1992 in the aforesaid suit, the Assistant District Judge, 9th Court at Alipore had passed an order of injunction restraining the respondent from allowing any other person except Mr. Das to occupy the suit premises. This interim order was made final on 2nd of Sep tember, 1992. On 18th of March, 1995, a notice under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (in short “the Act”) was served on the respon dent asking them to vacate the suit premises and on failure of the respondent to vacate the suit premises as desired in the notice, another suit was filed by the Appellant being Title Suit No. 39/95 prayingPraying It can be interpreted as a political idea. It implicitly assumes the existence of the powerful and the powerless, with an intermediate agency positioned between them. This agency, often unquestioned and abstract, functions to preserve the existing balance between power and poverty. In doing so, prayer operates as a mechanism that normalizes hierarchy, encourages acceptance over challenge, and sustains the status quo without requiring conscious awareness from those who participate in it. for ejectment of the respondent from the suit premises. The aforesaid suit was brought by the appellant with similar allegations as contained in Title Suit No. 19/92 and it was alleged, inter alia, that although the respondent was bound to vacate the suit premises after Mr. Das had vacated the same, yet the respondent had not vacated the suit premises and, therefore, the Appellant was constrained to file the aforesaid suit for eviction of the respondent and damagesDamages Damages (often termed ‘user damage’) are readily awarded at common law for the invasion of rights to tangible moveable or immovable property (by detinue, conversion or trespass). Damages are also available on a similar basis for patent infringement and breaches of other intellectual property rights of a proprietary character. and consequential relief. The respondent entered appearance and contested both the suits by filing written statements. In the written statements, it was the de fence of the respondent that the respondent was in urgent need of rented accommo dation for its officer and, therefore, they hurriedly put their signatures on the agree ment dated 30th of March, 1976. The respondent further alleged that the tenancy was taken by them for providing residential accommodation to its officer Mr. Keshab Das who was only an officer of the respondent and it was the respondent who was the tenant of the suit premises and not the named officer Mr. Keshab Das. Therefore, according to the respondent, even after the suit premises was vacated by Mr. Das, the tenancy of the respondent continued and it was still continuing. The allegation of the appellant that the respondent had no right to allow another officer to occupy the suit premises was misconceived and baseless. It was further alleged in the written statements that the respondent had duly informed the appellant that the employee of the respondent i.e. Mr. Das had left the suit premises and that they were going to allot the suit premises to another officer. It was also asserted that since it was the respondent who was the tenant under the appellant and paid the rent to the appellant, such tenancy was protected by the provisions of the Act. It was further the case of the respondent that the tenancy agreement entered into by the parties was illegal and invalid and such an agreement was against the StatuteStatute A formal written legal enactment by a sovereign law-making body (Νόμος) > National Constitutions > National Laws > Indian Laws. Accordingly, in both the written statements, the respondent asserted that neither any order of injunction could be passed against them nor could the suit be decreed in favour of the appellant di recting eviction of the respondent from the suit premises. By a common judgment dated 11th of November, 1998, the suits of the appellant were dismissed.
4. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid common judgment of the trial CourtTrial court Court of original Jurisdiction > the court which examines the evidences for the first time., two appeals were filed in the High Court at CalcuttaHigh Court at Calcutta The High Court at Calcutta (High Court of Judicature at Fort William>opened on 1st July 1862, with Sir Barnes Peacock as its first Chief Justice) was established by the Letters Patent dated 14th May 1862 (High Court's Act, 1861), which provided the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court., which came to be registered as FA Nos. 39-40 of 1998. By the impugned common judgment of the High CourtHigh Court High Court Judges in England and Wales handle complex and tough cases, sitting in London and traveling to court centers around the country. They preside over serious criminal and important civil cases, and support the Lord and Lady Justices in hearing appeals. High Court Judges are commonly referred to as ‘Mr/Mrs/Ms Justice surname’ and are given the prefix ‘The Honourable’. They are assigned to the King’s Bench Division, the Family Division, or the Chancery Division. The King’s Bench Division focuses on civil wrongs and judicial review, the Family Division deals with family law, and the Chancery Division handles various cases including company law and probate. Judges are appointed through a rigorous process overseen by the Judicial Appointments Commission., the aforesaid two appeals being FA Nos. 39-40 of 1998 were dismissed and two Special Leave Petitions were filed against them in respect of which leave has al ready been granted.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and examined the judg ment of the High Court as well as of the trial court and other materials on record. We keep it on record that none had appeared for the respondent despite our best efforts to bring the respondent to appear before us and contest the appeals. We also keep it on record that in view of the interim order granted by the High Court as well as by the trial Court to the extent that the respondent cannot be allowed to bring any officer other than Mr. Keshab Das to occupy the suit premises, the respondent has kept the suit premises under lock and key without any occupation of any officer in the same.
6. On a perusal of the pleadings of the parties, it is pellucid that the case of the appellant in both the suits was based on the memorandum of leaseLeasehold The leaseholder has no right or interest in the land, he pays rent to the landlord for using the flat or house. A lease is an agreement between the freeholder and the tenant. Commonhold is a form of ownership (or tenure) for multi-occupancy developments (flats of a building). Each unit-holder owns the freehold of their flat, and a commonhold or residents’ association owns and manages the common parts of the property. agreement dated 30th of March, 1976. In this view of the matterMatter Normal matter is made of molecules, which are themselves made of atoms. Inside the atoms, electrons are spinning around the nucleus. The nucleus is made of protons and neutrons. Inside the protons and neutrons, exist indivisible quarks, like the electrons. All matter around us is made of elementary particles. ( building blocks of matter > quarks and leptons). All stable matter in the universe is made from particles that belong to the first-generation. Fundamental forces result from the exchange of force-carrier particles, which belong to a broader group called “bosons”. The strong force is carried by the “gluon”, electromagnetic force is carried by the “photon.”, it is expedient to reproduce some of the relevant Clauses in the Tenancy Agreement between the parties before we proceed further with this appeal. Accordingly, the relevant portion of the memorandum dated 30th of March, 1976 is reproduced as under: –
“THIS MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT made this the 30th day of March, one thousand nine hundred and seventy six BETWEEN M/s. K.B. Saha and Sons (Biri Merchants) Limited, a body corporate registered under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered officeOffice Αξίωμα > Officer > Office-bearer (1593) > Opus, officium, ex officio (Latin). Box-office (Cash Box). at 28/8, Gariahat Road within P. S. Tollygunge, Calcutta-700 029 within the local limits of CorporationCorporation A legally established entity that can enter into contracts, own assets and incur debt, as well as sue and be sued—all separately from its owner(s). The term covers both for-profit and nonprofit corporations and includes nonstock corporations, incorporated membership organizations, incorporated cooperatives, incorporated trade associations, professional corporations and, under certain circumstances, limited liability companies. of Calcutta hereinafter called the landlords (which expression unless repugnant to the context shall in clude its successors and assigns) of the First Part AND DEVELOPMENT CON SULTANTS PRIVATE LTD, a body corporate registered under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at present at premises No.24-B, Park Street, Calcutta, within P.S. Park Street, Calcutta-16 hereinafter called the tenant (which expression unless repugnant to the context shall include its successors and assigns) of the Second Part;
WHEREAS the party of the FIRST PART, the Landlord hereof is the sole owner and proprietor of multistoreyed buildings being Premises No. 28/8, Gariahat Road, within P.S. Tollygunge, Calcutta-29 within the local limits of Corporation of Calcutta AND WHEREAS the said Landlord, party of the first part hereof offered to let out Flat No. 3 on the 2nd floor of the said premises along with fittings, fixtures and installations therein at a total monthly rental of ` 1100/- (Rupees One Thousand One Hundred) only inclusive of rent of fittings and fixtures and service charges and parking space for one car AND WHEREAS the party of the second part hereof approached the party of the first part hereof and offered to it the said flat No.3 of the 2nd floor of the said premises No.28/8, Gariahat Road, Calcutta-29 for the use and occupation of its present Chief Engineer (Cement) of the aforesaid party Mr. Keshab Das and the members of his family only agreeing and accepting to the aforesaid offer by the party of the first part at a total rental of ` 1, 100/- (Rupees One thou sand one hundred only) inclusive of the rent of fittings and fixtures, service charges and parking space for one car AND WHEREAS the party of the first part hereof has agreed to let out the said flat to the party hereto of the second part for the use and occupation of its present said Chief Engineer (Cement) and his family members only AND WHEREAS the party of the first part agrees to give vacant possession of the said tenancy and the party of the second part hereto agrees to take possession of the said tenancy for the use and occupation of the said Chief Engineer (Cement)and his family members on First day of April, 1976”
Clause-9 of the Agreement runs as follows :-
“That the party of the second part hereof agrees and undertakes that the tenancy will be used and occupied by its present officer Mr. Keshab Das and members of his family for residential purpose only and for no other purposes. If the tenant intends to use the tenancy for occupation of any other officer or employees, it will seek for written consent of the landlord and the landlord shall have the option to agree or disagree to give such consent”.
Clause 20 of the said agreement is as follows :-
“That the tenant shall vacate and deliver vacant Khas possession of the demised premises unto the landlord on termination or determination of the tenancy with whole of the fittings and effects in as sound, perfect and clear condition as they were at the commencement of the tenancy excepting natural wear and tear”.
7. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the trial court in Title Suit No. 19 of 1992 :-
1. Has the plaintiff any cause of action for the suit?
2. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and in law?
3. Was the suit premises let out by the plaintiff to the defendant for providing accommodation to its particular officer viz. Mr.Keshab Das?
4. Is the plaintiff entitled to get the decree as prayed for?
5. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?
8. In Title Suit No.39/95, the following issues were framed :-
1. Is the suit maintainable?
2. Whether the notice of ejectment is valid, legal and sufficient? If so, was it duly served upon the defendant?
3. Whether the defendant is a defaulter in payment of rent as alleged?
4.Whether the defendant has caused damage to the suit premises?
5. Whether the defendant has violated the terms of the memorandum of agreement by not vacating the premises after the same having been vacated by Mr.Keshab Das? 6. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ?.
9. Considering the different clauses of the lease agreement and on consideration of the evidence on record and the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the trial court finally came to the following findings :-
I) The suit premises was let out by the appellant to the respondent initially for providing accommodation to its particular officer namely Mr. Keshab Das and mem bers of his family, which could not mean that the tenancy was created exclusively for the accommodation and residence of Mr. Keshab Das and his family only.
II) The tenancy was created in respect of the suit premises in favour of the respon dent.
III) Since the tenancy was determinable and terminable by a legal sufficient valid notice under the Act to the respondent, the respondent could be directed to vacate the suit premises only on proofProof Mathematical proof, Direct proof, Proof by contraposition, Proof by contradiction, Proof by construction, Proof by exhaustion, Closed chain inference, Probabilistic proof, Combinatorial proof, Nonconstructive proof, Computer-assisted proofs. of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) of the Act.
IV) Since the respondent was depositing rent in the office of the Rent Controller, Calcutta, the respondent was not a defaulter in payment of rent as a tenant and therefore, not liable to be evicted on the ground of default.
V) The respondent was a tenant in respect of the suit premises although it was taken exclusively for the benefit of the named officer and therefore, the named of ficer Mr. Das was only occupying the suit premises on behalf of the respondent.
VI) Since, admittedly, the lease agreement was not registered, which document under Section 49 of the Registration Act was required to be registered, the said agreement was not admissible in evidence.
VII) The lease agreement, being an unregistered document, could not be used to establish that the suit premises was let out to the respondent only for the purpose of occupation of its employee Mr. Keshab Das and the members of his family for their residential purpose and for no Other purpose.
VIII) From the agreement, which could be seen as a collateral evidence, the pur pose of the tenancy was clearly for residence and, therefore, the question of viola tion of Clause (o) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act by the respondent in the facts and circumstances of the case could not arise at all.
10. On the aforesaid findings arrived at by the Trial Court, both the suits were dismissed and the High Court on the same lines had affirmed the findings of the trial court and held that no ground was made out by the appellant to evict the respondent from the suit premises.
11. Mr. Somnath Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the lease agreement (Ext.4) creating tenancy from month to month in respect of the suit premises was not compulsorily register able under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. He also contended that the High Court as well as the trial court were wrong in holding that the lease agreement being an unregistered document cannot be used to establish the provi sions made in that agreement that the suit premises was let out to the respondent only for the purpose of occupation of the respondent’s named officer Mr. Keshab Das and members of his family and for no other purpose. He further contended that since the lease agreement in question was not required to be registered, the prohibi tion contained in Section 49 of the Registration Act was not applicable. He also contended in the alternative that even if it was held that the lease agreement in question was compulsorily registrable, even then the purpose of letting specified in the lease agreement was a ‘collateral purpose’ and accordingly, the lease agree ment could be looked into under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act and also that the said term did not extinguish the tenant’s right under the Act. Lastly, he contended that the respondent had violated section 108(o) of the Trans fer of Property Act and, accordingly, was liable to be evicted under Section 13(1b) of the Act. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the lease agreement between the parties was not illegal and against the statute. In Supplort of this contention, Mr.Mukherjee relied onRelied on Relied to make the decision (ratio decidendi) and not only referred to push an issue. a decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Juthika Mulick and Anr. vs. Dr. Mahendra Yashwant Bal and Ors. (AIR 1995 SC 1142 ) and he strongly relied on paragraph 42 of the said decision which says :
“As general proposition of law, there can be no demur that there is no estoppelEstoppel Res judicata debars a court from exercising its jurisdiction to determine the lis if it has attained finality between the parties whereas the doctrine issue estoppel is invoked against the party. If such an issue is decided against him, he would be estopped from raising the same in the latter proceeding.. Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar ([2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1104 : (2005) 1 SCC 787) against a statute. The language of Section 13 of the Act makes it clear that only if anything is found contrary in any other law an order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant. This wording is peculiar unlike most of the Rent Control Legisla tions where contractContract An agreement enforceable by law is a contract. All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void. Indian Contract Act. to the contrary is also enveloped in affording protection to the tenants against eviction. In view of the language of Section 13(1) of the Act, the parties have freedom to contract out of Section. In this case clause (1) of the lease-deed extracted above stipulates that the heirs of lessee will have no right to hold after the death of lessee and they have to deliver quiet, peaceful and vacant posses sion within three months after the demise of the original lessee. In other words, the right has been made specifically not heritable.”
12. In order to appreciate the submissions made by Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, it would be necessary for us to look into Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act which would be, in our view, material for rendering proper decision in this appeal. Accordingly, Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act may be quoted which runs as unde:
“Lease how made – A lease of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by a registered instrument.
All other leases of immoveable property may be made either by a registered in strument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession.
Where a lease of immoveable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee.
Provided that the State Government may from timeTime χρόνος. Judicial: Where any expression of it occurs in any Rules, or any judgment, order or direction, and whenever the doing or not doing of anything at a certain time of the day or night or during a certain part of the day or night has an effect in law, that time is, unless it is otherwise specifically stated, held to be standard time as used in a particular country or state. (In Physics, time and Space never exist actually-“quantum entanglement”) यमः , पुं, (यमयति नियमयति जीवानां फलाफलमिति । यम् + अच् । विश्वे च कलयत्येव यः सर्व्वायुश्च सन्ततम् । अतीव दुर्निवार्य्यञ्च तं कालं प्रणमाम्यहम् ॥यमैश्च नियमैश्चैव यः करोत्यात्मसंयमम् । स चादृष्ट्वा तु मां याति परं ब्रह्म सनातनम् ॥ to time, by notification in the OfficialOffice Αξίωμα > Officer > Office-bearer (1593) > Opus, officium, ex officio (Latin). Box-office (Cash Box). Gazette, direct that leases of immoveable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agree ment without delivery of possession.
13. Another section which would also be material for us to decide this appeal is – Section 49 of the Registration Act which runs as under :
“Effect of non-registration of documentsDocument It means any matter expressed or described or otherwise recorded upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes electronic and digital records. (Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023) required to be registered – No document required by Sec. 17 (or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) to be registered shall –
(a) affect any immoveable property comprised therein, or
(b) confer any powerPower The amount of energy transferred or converted per unit of time. In the International System of Units, the unit of it is the watt, equal to one joule per second. The capacity of energy infrastructure is rated using watts, which indicate its potential to supply or consume energy in a given period of time. A Power-plant rated at 100 MW has the potential to produce 100 MWh if it operates for one hour. to adopt, or
(c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or confer ring such power, unless it has been registered : Provided that an unregistered document affecting immoveable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882, to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performanceSpecific performance The remedy of specific performance is special and extraordinary and is at the court’s discretion, which the court would only exercise “if, under all the circumstances, it is just an equitable to do so”. Factors affecting the court’s discretion include considerations such as: (a) whether damages would be an adequate remedy; and (b) whether the person against whom the relief of specific performance is being sought would suffer substantial hardship. under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of 1877, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.”
14. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and after going through the judgment of the High Court as well as of the trial court, we do not find any ground for which interference can be made with the judgment of the High Court. We may note that it was the case of the respondent before the High Court that it was protected by the provisions of the Act and that it could not be evicted only because as per the agreement, the tenancy was to be occupied by one of its officers. The appellant, on the other hand, as noted hereinabove, placed reliance on the decision of this court in Smt. Juthika Mullick’s case (supra, to put forth the point that the respondent was bound to vacate the premises after the said officer had left the premises and relying on Smt.juthika Mulick’s case (supra ) submitted that the lease agreement was not at all contrary to the provi sions of the Act and that the parties were at liberty to contract out of the Section delineating the various grounds for eviction. We may note at this stage that in that decision, this court had held that although the tenant was protected under the provi sions of Section 13 of the Act and such tenant could be evicted only for one or more grounds as provided in that Act, the parties had the freedom to enter into an agree ment to take their case out of the provisions of that Section i.e. the parties were at liberty to contract out of that section. Before we deal with the submission of Mr. Mukherjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, on this question, we may look into the findings arrived at by the High Court on this question. The High Court in the impugned judgment has come to a conclusion that the decision in the case of Smt. Juthika Mulick’s case (Supra) cannot be of any benefit to the appellant on the ground that in Smt. Juthika Mulick’s case, (supra) the respondent had leased out the premises in question in favour of the lessee under a registered deed of sale whereas in the instant case, the lease deed was not registered. The High Court has observed that the lease agreement between the parties was in effect an agree ment for lease of the suit premises and was unregistered. Relying on Section 49 of the Registration Act, the High Court observed that a document purporting to be a lease and required to be registered under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act is not admissible in evidence if it is not registered. Proviso to Section 49, how ever, provides that although a lease deed falling under the provision of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act will not be admissible in evidence if the same is not registered but that deed may be used as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument. Therefore, the High Court observed that the question to be decided in this appeal is whether the conditions noted in the lease deed could be looked into for determining the question that the tenancy in question would be used only for the purpose of occupation of the named officer of the respondent.
15. Section 49 clearly provides that a document purporting to be a lease and required to be registered under Section 107 will not be admissible in evidence if the same is not registered. Proviso to this section, however, as noted hereinabove, provides that an unregistered lease deed may be looked into as evidence of collateral facts. Mr. Mukherjee, learned counsel for the appellant argued before us that the tenancy in question was exclusively granted for the benefit of the named officer and his family and unless the landlord gave his consent, no other person could use it and such condition in the lease agreement is admissible for ascertain ing the purpose of allotting the suit premises which according to the appellant is a collateral factFact Something तथ्य (In-formation) that truly exists or happens or some-thing that has actual existence. Circumstances: a fact or event that makes a situation the way it is. Indian Evidence Act: It means and includes— (i) anything, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses; (ii) any mental condition of which any person is conscious. “facts in issue” means and includes any fact from which, either by itself or in connection with other facts, the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability, asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding, necessarily follows..
16. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the view that the decision of this Court in Smt. Juthika Mullick’s case (supra, on which strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant is of no help to the appellant because as rightly pointed out by the High Court, the said decision was based on a registered deed of lease. In Smt. Juthika Mulick ‘s case (supra, as noted herein earlier, it has been held that the lan guage of Section 13 of the Act makes it clear that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, an order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by the court in favour of the landlord against a tenant on the grounds mentioned in that section. It was further observed that in view of the language of Section 13(1) of the Act, the parties have freedom to contract out of the Section. In the aforesaid judgment of this Court, on which strong reliance was placed by the appellant, the fact was that the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents in that appeal leased out the premises in question in favour of one Lal Bihari Mulick in a registered deed of lease at a monthly rental of ` 160/- and the lease deed contained a covenant that the lease was for the lifetime of the lessee and his heirs, executors, administrators, representatives and the heirs must yield up and deliver quiet, peaceful and vacant possession of the demised premises within three months from the date of death of the lessee unconditionally and without any objection whatsoever. It was further stipulated that they shall have no right to handover the demised premises after the said period under any circum stances. The lessee died on 16th of December, 1970 and his heirs did not deliver vacant possession in favour of the lessors or their successors in interest and this necessitated filing of the suit for eviction of the defendants. In that decision, the main defence raised in the written statement was that the original lessee Lal Bihari Mulick, having died on 16th of December, 1970, the registered lease dated 11th of July, 1966 shall fall under the category of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the tenants were residing in the demised premises with the said lessee namely Lal Bihari Mullick during his lifetime became monthly tenants under the plain tiffs of that case by operation of law. In view of the aforesaid facts and considering the fact that the aforesaid decision of this Court was rendered on the basis of a registered lease deed, we are of the view that the said decision is clearly distin guishable from the present case because of the fact that in the present case, there was no registered deed of lease nor was there any such covenant as mentioned hereinabove. Therefore, we do not find any ground to place any reliance on the aforesaid decision of this court.
17. As we have already noted that under the proviso to Section 49 of the Reg istration Act, an unregistered document can also be admitted into evidence for a collateral fact/collateral purpose, let us now look at the meaning of “collateral pur pose” and then ascertain whether Clause 9 of the lease agreement can be looked into for such collateral purpose. In Haran Chandra Chakrvarti vs. Kaliprasanna SarkarSaracens Murug and Turug, and other Muslim Nations or people connected with Islam. A Sarkan (Greek-Laltin word) is a Muslim fighter available on rental basis (Mal-e-Ganimat). Hindi word 'Sarkar' is rooted in the word Sarkan (كَنّان). Saracens are infidels in Christian sense. Murug is generated from the Sanskrit 'Maru'. Turug ( Sanskrit > Taru: Brikksha) (AIR 1932 Cal 83(2, it was held that the terms of a compulsorily regis trable instrument are nothing less than a transaction affecting the property comprised in it. It was also held that to use such an instrument for the purpose of proving such a term would not be using it for a collateral purpose and that the ques tion as to who is the tenant and on what terms he has been created a tenant are not collateral facts but they are important terms of the contract of tenancy, which cannot be provedProved A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists; by admission of an unregistered lease-deed into evidence.
18. The High Court in the impugned Judgment relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ratan Lal and Ors. vs. Harisankar and Ors. (AIR 1980 Allahabad 180 ) to hold that since the appellant wanted to extinguish the right of the respondent with the help of the unregistered tenancy, the same was not a collateral purpose. In Ratan Lal’s case (supra, while discussing the meaning of the term “Collateral Purpose”, the High Court had observed as follows :-
“The second contention was that the partition deed, even if it was not registered could certainly be looked into for a collateral purpose, but the collateral purpose has a limited scope and meaning. It cannot be used for the purpose of saying that the deed created or declared or assigned or limited or extinguish the right to immovable property ……….term collateral purpose would not permit the party to establish any of these acts from the deed.”
19. In the case of Bajaj Auto Limited vs. Behari Lal Kohli (AIR 1989 SC 1806, this Court observed that if a document is inadmissible for non-registration, all its terms are inadmissible including the one dealing with landlord’s permission to his tenant to sub-let. It was also held in that decision that if a decree purporting to create a lease is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of the terms of the lease can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause in the lease is not using it as a collateral purpose. Again this court in Rai Chand Jain vs. Chandra Kanta Khosla (AIR 1991 SC 747 ) reiterated the above and observed in paragraph 10 as under : –
“…….the lease deed Ex. P1 dated 19th May, 1978 executed both by the appellant and the respondent i.e. the landlady and the tenant, Rai Chand Jain, though unreg istered can be considered for collateral purposes and as such the findings of the Appellate Authority to the effect that the said deed cannot be used for collateral purposes namely to show that the purpose was to lease out the demised premises for residential purposes of the tenant only is not at all legally correct. It is well settled that unregistered lease executed by both the parties can be looked into for collateral purposes. In the instant case the purpose of the lease is evident from the deed itself which is as follows: “The lessor hereby demises House No. 382, Sector 30-A, Chandigarh, to lessee for residential purposes only”. This clearly evinces that the property in question was let out to the tenant for his residence only….”
20. In the case of Rana Vidya Bhushqn Singh vs. Ratiram (1969 (1) UJ 86 (SC, the following has been laid down : “A document required by law to be registered, if unregistered, is inadmissible as evidence of a transaction affecting immovable property, but it may be admitted as evidence of collateral facts, or for any collateral purpose, that is for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. As stated by Mulla in his IndianIndia Hind/ hend >hindia. Bharat Varsha (Jambudvipa used in Mahavamsha) is the name of this land mass. The people of this land are Sanatan Dharmin and they always defeated invaders. Indra (10000 yrs) was the oldest deified King of this land. Manu's jurisprudence enlitened this land. Vedas have been the civilizational literature of this land. Guiding principles of this land are : सत्यं वद । धर्मं चर । स्वाध्यायान्मा प्रमदः । The place also been called Hindusthan in Pesia. The word Hendu is mentioned in Avesta. Read more Registration Act, 7th En., at p. 189 :
“The High CourtsHigh Court High Court Judges in England and Wales handle complex and tough cases, sitting in London and traveling to court centers around the country. They preside over serious criminal and important civil cases, and support the Lord and Lady Justices in hearing appeals. High Court Judges are commonly referred to as ‘Mr/Mrs/Ms Justice surname’ and are given the prefix ‘The Honourable’. They are assigned to the King’s Bench Division, the Family Division, or the Chancery Division. The King’s Bench Division focuses on civil wrongs and judicial review, the Family Division deals with family law, and the Chancery Division handles various cases including company law and probate. Judges are appointed through a rigorous process overseen by the Judicial Appointments Commission. of Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad, Madras, Patna, Lahore, Assam, Nagpur, Pepsu, Rajasthan, Orissa, Rangoon and Jammu and Kashmir; the former Chief Court of Oudh; the Judicial Commissioner’s Court of Peshawar, Ajmer and Himachal Pradesh and the Supreme CourtSupreme Court The Court of last resort. Supreme Court of India (26/01/1950), Supreme Court of the United States (1798), Supreme Court of UK (1/10/2009), Supreme Court of Canada (1949), International Court of Justice (22/05/1947), > Supreme Court Network have held that a document which re quires registration under Section 17 and which is not admissible for want of regis tration to prove a gift or mortgage or sale or lease is nevertheless admissible to prove the character of the possession of the person who holds under it.”
21. From the principles laid down in the various decisions of this Court and the High Courts, as referred to hereinabove, it is evident that :-
1. A document required to be registered is not admissible into evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act.
2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the Proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act.
3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law required registration.
4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards.
5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose.
22. In our view, the particular clause in the lease agreement in question cannot be called a collateral purpose. As noted earlier, it is the case of the appellant that the suit premises was let out only for the particular named officer of the respondent and accordingly, after the same was vacated by the said officer, the respondent was not entitled to allot it to any other employee and was therefore, liable to be evicted which, in our view, was an important term forming part of the lease agreement. Therefore, such a Clause, namely, Clause 9 of the Lease Agree ment in this case, cannot be looked into even for collateral purposes to come to a conclusion that the respondent was liable to be evicted because of violation of Clause 9 of the Lease Agreement. That being the position, we are unable to hold that Clause 9 of the Lease Agreement, which is admittedly unregistered, can be looked into for the purpose of evicting the respondent from the suit premises only because the respondent was not entitled to induct any other person other than the named officer in the same.
23. Before we part with this Judgment, let us deal with another ground, which the High Court had also taken into consideration. This is with regard to the viola tion of provisions of Section 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 108 (o) clearly provides that the Lessee must not use or permit another to use the property for a purpose other than that for which it was let out or leased. Relying on this provision, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the purpose of the lease was for the use and occupation of one of the officers of the respondent, after the said officer had vacated the suit premises, the respondent, by refusing to handover the possession of the suit premises to the appellant and by giving the same to another officer, had violated the provisions of Section 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act. Before we decide this question it is necessary for us to reproduce the finding of the High Court on this aspect, which is as fol lows : –
“….Clause (o) of Section 108 of the T.P. Act touches the question of user. This clause requires the lessee to use the property as a man of ordinary prudence would use his property and not to use the property, for any other purpose, for which it is leased. In the instant case, from the tenancy agreement, what can be seen as a collat eral evidence is the purpose of the tenancy and such purpose clearly is for resi dence. Therefore, there is no question of violation of Clause (o) of Section 108 of the T.P. Act by the tenant/company in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
24. We have carefully examined the aforesaid finding of the High Court on the question of violation of Section 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act. In our view, the High Court was justified in coming to a conclusion that since this was not a case of ‘Change of User’ within the meaning of Section 108 to) of the Transfer of Property Act, it could not be held that the appellant had violated the provisions of Section 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 108(o) requires the lessee to use the property as a man of ordinary prudence would use his property and not to use it for a purpose different to that for which it was leased. It is true that under Section 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act, ‘use of the property for the purpose other than that for which it was leased i.e. ‘Change of User’ is not permit ted. Therefore, we have to consider whether in the backdrop of the facts of this case, violation of Clause 9 of the lease agreement, even if it is held that it can be looked into for collateral purposes, would be ‘Change of User’ or not. In other words, we have to find whether the expression ‘change of user’ would cover a situation wherein the property is let out for a particular named officer and for none else and despite this condition, the same is given to some one else, or would it cover and be limited to the cases where property is leased out for a residential or non-residential purpose or for a particular business and despite such express conditions, the property is used for the purpose other than the specified. We are of the view that letting out or leasing out the property for a particular named officer cannot be the ‘purpose’ of letting. The purpose of letting out would be residential or non-residential or for a particular business etc.
25. The learned counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance on the deci sions of this court in Dashrath Baburao Sangale and others vs. Kashimath Bhaskar Data (AIR 1993 SC 2646 ) and M. Arul Jothi and another vs. Lajja Bal (deceased) and another (AIR 2000 SC 1122 ) to suggest that the respondent had violated Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act. After carefully examining the aforesaid decisions of this Court, we do not find any Supplort from the said decisions for the purpose of holding that the present case is covered by the expression ‘Change of User’ as used in Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act. In Dashrath Baburao Sangale’s case (supra, the premises was let out to the tenant for sugarcane juice business whereas the tenant was using the premises for selling cloth and readymade clothes and on this ground, it was held that he was liable to be evicted on account of ‘change of user’. Similarly, in M. Arul Jothi’s case (supra, the tenant was held liable for eviction when the shop rented to him for carrying on the business of radios, cycles, fans, clocks and steel furniture was converted into a grocery store despite a specific clause in the rent agreement forbidding the same.
26. Therefore, in the present case, we are of the view that although the premises was leased out exclusively for the named officer of the respondent, the fact that it was subsequently used for the residence of some other officer of the respondent would not constitute ‘change of user’ so as to be hit by Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act.
27. Before we part with this judgment, we may deal with a short submission of Mr. Mukherjee that since the lease agreement in question was simpliciter a ten ancy agreement, which is not compulsorily registrable, the respondent was liable to be evicted even under the provisions of the Act. We are unable to agree with this contention of Mr. Mukherjee for the simple reason that for a decree to be passed under the Act, the landlord has to plead and prove one of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. Even if we accept that the appellant had made out a case under Section 13(1b) of the Act to the extent that the respondent was liable to be evicted under Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act, in view of our findings made hereinabove on that aspect, the appellant is not entitled to a decree of eviction under the Act.
28. In view of our discussions made hereinabove, we are, therefore, of the view that Clause 9 of the Agreement, which requires the respondent to use the suit pre mises only for its particular named officer, cannot be looked into even for collateral purposes and that the decision of this court in Smt. Juthika Mullick’s case (supra ) would not be of any help to the appellant because in that case, the lease deed was registered.
29. Secondly, we are of the view that although the suit premises was leased out exclusively for the named officer of the respondent, the fact that the respondent sought to use it for some other officer would not constitute “Change of User” within the meaning of Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act and, there fore, the respondent cannot be evicted for violation of the provisions of Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act.
30. No other point was raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and ac cordingly, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the appeal is therefore dis missed.
31. Since the suits have been dismissed and no argumentArguments It is not quarreling. It can be divided into Deductive, inductive, and conductive > Functional includes include: “because”, “since”, “for”, and “as”; typical conclusion indicators include “therefore”, “thus”, “hence”, and “so”. पंच अवयव तर्कः प्रतिज्ञा हेतू उदाहरणम् निगमनम् अवयवाः > premises to conclusion or conclusion to premises to Proof something. Proof is a derivation of a conclusion from premises through a valid argument. was advanced in re spect of the other appeal i.e. the appeal in respect of the injunction suit, the said appeal shall also stand dismissed.
32. Since the appeals have been dismissed, all the interlocutory applications, if any, now pending before this Court have become infructuous and accordingly, they are disposed of as infructuous. There will be no order as to costsCosts Subject to any written law, costs are at the discretion of the Court, and the Court has the power to determine all issues relating to the costs of or incidental to all proceedings, including by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid, at any stage of the proceedings or after the conclusion of the proceedings. Generally “Costs” includes charges, disbursements, expenses, fees, and remuneration. Costs in any matter are payable from the date of the order of the Court unless the parties otherwise agree. The costs of a third-party funding contract are not recoverable as part of the costs of, or costs..