Nature of Examination under Negotiable Instruments Act 1881

Once it is realized that Sections 143 to 147 were designed especially to lay down a much simplified procedure for the trial of dishonoured cheque cases with the sole object that the trial of those cases should follow a course even swifter than a summary trial and once it is seen that even the special procedure failed to effectively and expeditiously handle the vast multitude of cases coming to the court, the claim of the accused that on being summoned under Section 145(2), the complainant or any of his witnesses whose evidence is given on affidavit must be made to depose in examination-in- chief all over again plainly appears to be a demand for meaningless duplication, apparently aimed at delaying the trial.

Nevertheless, the submissions made on behalf of the parties must be taken note of and properly dealt with. Mr Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant in appeal arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 4760/2006 pointed out that Sub-section (2) of Section 145 uses both the words, “may” (with reference to the court) and “shall” (with reference to the prosecution or the accused). It was, therefore, beyond doubt that in the event an application is made by the accused, the court would be obliged to summon the person giving evidence on affidavit in terms of Section 145(1) without having any discretion in the matter. There can be no disagreement with this part of the submission but the question is when the person who has given his evidence on affidavit appears in court, whether it is also open to the accused to insist that before cross-examining him as to the facts stated in the affidavit he must first depose in examination-in-chief and be required to verbally state what is already said in the affidavit. Mr. Ranjit Kumar referred to Section 137 of the Indian Evidence Act, that defines “examination-in- chief”, “cross-examination” and “re-examination” and on that basis sought to argue that the word “examine” occurring in Section 145(2) must be construed to mean all the three kinds of examination of a witness. This, according to him, coupled with the use of the word “shall” with reference to the application made by the accused made it quite clear that a person giving his evidence on affidavit, on being summoned under Section 145(2) at the instance of the accused must begin his deposition with examination-in-chief, before he may be cross-examined by the accused. In this regard he submitted that Section 145 did not override the Evidence Act or the Negotiable Instruments Act or any other law except the Code of Criminal Procedure. He further submitted that the plain language of Section 145(2) was clear and unambiguous and was capable of only one meaning and, therefore, the provision must be understood in its literal sense and the High Court was in error in resorting to purposive interpretation of the provision. In support of the submission he relied upon decisions of this Court in Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash and Ors., (2001) 8 SCC 61 and Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi, (2005) 2 SCC 271. Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned Counsel for the appellant in the appeal arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 1106/2007 also joined Mr. Ranjit Kumar in the submission based on literal interpretation. He also submitted that ordinarily the rule of literal construction should not be departed from, particularly when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous. He relied upon the decision in Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank, (2007) 2 SCC 230.

We are completely unable to appreciate the submission. The plea for a literal interpretation of Section 145(2) is based on the unfounded assumption that the language of the section clearly says that the person giving his evidence on affidavit, on being summoned at the instance of the accused must start his deposition in court with examination-in-chief. We find nothing in Section 145(2) to suggest that. We may also make it clear that Section 137 of the Evidence Act does not define “examine” to mean and include the three kinds of examination of a witness; it simply defines “examination-in- chief”, “cross-examination” and “re-examination”. What Section 145(2) of the Act says is simply this. The court may, at its discretion, call a person giving his evidence on affidavit and examine him as to the facts contained therein. But if an application is made either by the prosecution or by the accused the court must call the person giving his evidence on affidavit, again to be examined as to the facts contained therein. What would be the extent and nature of examination in each case is a different matter and that has to be reasonably construed in light of the provision of Section 145(1) and having regard to the object and purpose of the entire scheme of Sections 143 to 146. The scheme of Sections 143 to 146 does not in any way affect the judge’s powers under Section 165 of the Evidence Act. As a matter of fact, Section 145(2) expressly provides that the court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine any person giving evidence on affidavit. But how would the person giving evidence on affidavit be examined, on being summoned to appear before the court on the application made by the prosecution or the accused? The affidavit of the person so summoned that is already on the record is obviously in the nature of examination-in-chief. Hence, on being summoned on the application made by the accused the deponent of the affidavit (the complainant or any of his witnesses) can only be subjected to cross-examination as to the facts stated in the affidavit. In so far as the prosecution is concerned the occasion to summon any of its witnesses who has given his evidence on affidavit may arise in two ways. The prosecution may summon a person who has given his evidence on affidavit and has been cross-examined for “re-examination”. The prosecution may also have to summon a witness whose evidence is given on affidavit in case objection is raised by the defence regarding the validity and/or sufficiency of proof of some document(s) submitted along with the affidavit. In that event the witness may be summoned to appear before the court to cure the defect and to have the document(s) properly proved by following the correct legal mode. This appears to us as the simple answer to the above question and the correct legal position. Any other meaning given to Sub-section (2) of Section 145, as suggested by Mr. Ranjit Kumar would make the provision of Section 145(1) nugatory and would completely defeat the very scheme of trial as designed under Sections 143 to 147. [Mandvi Co-op. Bank Ltd-AIR 2010 SC 1402 : JT 2010 (1) SC 259 : (2010) 1 SCALE 188 : (2010) 3 SCC 83 : (2010) 1 SCR 219]